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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis will determine the influence of Turkey’s domestic resources on 
Turkey’s foreign relations with the five Turkic states in the Caspian Sea Region. The 
spheres analyzed in this study are the common ties, which are history, culture, religion 
and language, with the regional countries, pan-Turkism, Turkey’s initial interactions as 
well as ongoing constructive policies in the region. Findings showed that both Turkey 
and the five Turkic republics were enthusiastic to carry their relations in every field to 
future cooperation following the break up of the Soviet Union. However the Turkic 
Republics’ interest in Turkish development model gradually declined starting from the 
1994s.The hypothesis that socio-cultural ties will ease establishing close foreign relations 
is applicable to all five republics. The Turkic states welcomed Turkey’s educational and 
cultural policies with great willingness. In the field of business we find that Turkish 
economy follows a similar pattern in its relations with the Azerbaijani and Central Asian 
markets. Accordant policy goals of Turkey and the five republics led Turkey to establish 
close foreign relations with the regional countries. Turkey tried to give military aid to the 
Turkic republics of Central Asia in their struggle against terrorist groups which have the 
capacity to destabilize governments and to threaten international security. The hypothesis 
that the more Turkey has business interests in the Caspian Sea Region the more Turkey 
will have closer foreign relations with Turkic countries is mostly apparent in the case of 
Azerbaijan. In the area of energy politics Turkey has its strongest link with Azerbaijan. 
Besides being strong economic partners Turkey is Azerbaijan’s biggest supporter in the 
region against Armenia.  
 iv
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my uncle, 
 
Akif Babali (1961-2006) 
 v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
This thesis would not have been possible without the guidance of my advisor and 
committee chair, Dr. Houman Sadri under whose supervision I chose this topic and began 
the thesis. I also thank the members of my graduate committee, Dr. Trudi Morales and Dr 
Barbara Kinsey for their suggestions. Lastly, and most importantly, I would like to thank 
my parents for their constant encouragement and support. 
 vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................... xi 
LIST OF TABLES............................................................................................................ xii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS/ABBREVATIONS ................................................................... xiii 
CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW AND LITERATURE REVIEW............................................ 1 
1.1 Defining Concepts and Theory ................................................................................. 1 
1.2 Literature Review ..................................................................................................... 6 
CHAPTER 2: TURKEY’S HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL TIES WITH THE 
TURKIC COUNTRIES .................................................................................................... 16 
2.1 Introduction............................................................................................................. 16 
2.2 Turkic People of the World and Pan-Turkism........................................................ 16 
2.2.1 Turkic People of the World.............................................................................. 16 
2.2.2 Kemalist Ideology: Nationalism in the Turkish Republic ............................... 18 
2.2.3 Pan-Turkism: The Union of all the Turks........................................................ 21 
2.2.4 Leading Ideologists of Pan-Turkism................................................................ 22 
2.2.4.1 Ismail Gaspirali......................................................................................... 22 
2.2.4.2 Yusuf Akcura ............................................................................................ 26 
2.2.5 World War I and Pan-Turkism ........................................................................ 27 
2.2.6 World War II and After.................................................................................... 31 
2.2.7 Reactions on Pan-Turkism............................................................................... 33 
2.3 Language................................................................................................................. 35 
2.3.1 Dialectic Similarities between the Turkish Language and the Languages of 
Central Asian Countries ............................................................................................ 37 
 vii
2.3.1.1 Azeris ........................................................................................................ 37 
2.3.1.2 Kazakhs..................................................................................................... 37 
2.3.1.3 Uzbeks....................................................................................................... 38 
2.3.1.4 Turkmens .................................................................................................. 39 
2.3.1.5 Kirghizs..................................................................................................... 40 
2.4 Islam as a Shared Identity between Turkey and the Turkic World ........................ 40 
2.5 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 47 
CHAPTER 3: ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE 
REGIONAL COUNTRIES............................................................................................... 49 
3.1 Introduction............................................................................................................. 49 
3.2 Basic Drawbacks and Motivations to Invest in the Caspian Sea Region ............... 50 
3.3 Bilateral Economic Relations between Turkey and the Regional Countries.......... 54 
3.3.1 Turkey-Azerbaijan ........................................................................................... 54 
3.3.1.1 Turkey’s Oil Demand ............................................................................... 54 
3.3.1.2 The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Project ............................................... 57 
3.3.1.3 The South Caucasus Gas Pipeline Project ................................................ 60 
3.3.1.4 Trade with Azerbaijan............................................................................... 62 
3.3.1.5 Eximbank Credits from Turkey ................................................................ 64 
3.3.2 Turkey-Kazakhstan .......................................................................................... 66 
3.3.2.1 Turkish Investment in Kazakhstan............................................................ 66 
3.3.2.2 Trade with Kazakhstan ............................................................................. 69 
3.3.2.3 Eximbank Credits...................................................................................... 71 
3.3.3 Turkey-Kyrgyzstan .......................................................................................... 72 
 viii
3.3.3.1 Turkish Investment in Kyrgyzstan............................................................ 72 
3.3.3.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Investing in Kyrgyzstan..................... 75 
3.3.3.3 Trade with Kyrgyzstan.............................................................................. 78 
3.3.3.4 Eximbank Credits...................................................................................... 80 
3.3.4 Turkey-Turkmenistan ...................................................................................... 80 
3.3.4.1 Turkey’s Need for Natural Gas................................................................. 80 
3.3.4.2 Turkmen-Turkey-Europe Gas Pipeline..................................................... 83 
3.3.4.3 Trade with Turkmenistan.......................................................................... 85 
3.3.4.4 Problems that Businesspersons Face In Turkmenistan............................. 87 
3.3.4.5 Eximbank Credits...................................................................................... 88 
3.3.5 Turkey-Uzbekistan........................................................................................... 89 
3.3.5.1 Turkish Investment in Uzbekistan ............................................................ 89 
3.3.5.2 Trade with Uzbekistan .............................................................................. 92 
3.3.5.3 Eximbank Credits...................................................................................... 93 
3.4 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 94 
CHAPTER 4: POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE 
REGIONAL COUNTRIES............................................................................................... 97 
4.1 Political Relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan............................................... 98 
4.1.1 Initial Interactions between Turkey and Azerbaijan ........................................ 98 
4.1.2 Turkey’s Reaction towards the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict ........................ 102 
4.1.3 Turkey’s Energy Politics towards Azerbaijan ............................................... 106 
4.1.3.1 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Project .................................................... 106 
4.1.4 Turkey’s Constructive Policies in Azerbaijan ............................................... 110 
 ix
4.1.4.1 Turkey’s Contributions to Azeri Education............................................ 110 
4.1.4.2 Turkish Policy in Culture........................................................................ 115 
4.1.4.3 Technical Cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan........................ 117 
4.1.4.4 Turkey’s Contributions in Azerbaijani Transportation........................... 118 
4.2 Political Relations between Turkey and Kazakhstan............................................ 119 
4.2.1 Initial Interactions between Turkey and Kazakhstan..................................... 119 
4.2.2 Turkey’s Constructive Policies in Kazakhstan .............................................. 124 
4.2.2.1 Economic Relations ................................................................................ 124 
4.2.2.2 Turkey’s Contributions to Kazakh Education......................................... 126 
4.2.2.3 Cultural Relations ................................................................................... 128 
4.2.2.4 Technical Cooperation between Turkey and Kazakhstan....................... 130 
4.3 Political Relations between Turkey and Kyrgyzstan............................................ 131 
4.3.1 Initial Interactions of Turkey and Kyrgyzstan Following the Independence of 
Kyrgyzstan .............................................................................................................. 131 
4.3.2 Turkey’s Constructive Policies in Kyrgyzstan .............................................. 136 
4.3.2.1 Turkey’s Contributions to Kirghiz Military............................................ 136 
4.3.2.2 Turkey’s Contributions to Kirghiz Education......................................... 137 
4.3.2.3 Cultural Relations ................................................................................... 139 
4.3.2.4 Technical Cooperation between Turkey and Kyrgyzstan....................... 141 
4.4 Political Relations between Turkey and Turkmenistan .................................... 142 
4.4.1 Initial Interactions of Turkey and Turkmenistan Following the Independence 
of Turkmenistan ...................................................................................................... 142 
4.4.2 Turkey’s Energy Politics towards Turkmenistan............................................... 145 
 x
4.4.2.1 The Blue Stream Project ......................................................................... 145 
4.4.2.2 Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline Project........................................................ 147 
4.4.3 Turkey’s Constructive Policies in Turkmenistan............................................... 149 
4.4.3.1 Economic Relations ................................................................................ 149 
4.4.3.2 Turkey’s Contributions to Turkmen Education ...................................... 150 
4.4.3.3 Technical Cooperation between Turkey and Turkmenistan ................... 152 
4.5 Political Relations between Turkey and Uzbekistan ............................................ 153 
4.5.1 Initial Interactions between Turkey and Uzbekistan...................................... 153 
4.5.2 Turkey’s Constructive Policies in Uzbekistan ............................................... 157 
4.5.2.1 Turkey’s Contributions to Uzbek Military ............................................. 157 
4.5.2.2 Turkey’s Contributions to Uzbek Education .......................................... 159 
4.5.2.3 Cultural Relations ................................................................................... 161 
4.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 163 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 166 
5.1 Findings ................................................................................................................ 166 
5.2 Some Questions for Future Studies ...................................................................... 186 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 191 
 
 xi
 
LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1:Caspian Sea Region.............................................................................................. 4 
Figure 2: Turkey’s Oil Production and Consumption between 1986 and 2006 ............... 56 
Figure 3: The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline.................................................................... 58 
Figure 4: Trade Volume between Azerbaijan and Turkey between 1992 and 2005 ........ 63 
Figure 5: Trade Volume Between Kazakhstan and Turkey between 1992 and 2005....... 69 
Figure 6: Trade Volume between Kyrgyzstan and Turkey between 1992 and 2004........ 78 
Figure 7: Turkey’s Natural Gas Consumption.................................................................. 82 
Figure 8: Trade Volume between Turkmenistan and Turkey between 1992 and 2005.... 85 
Figure 9: Trade Volume between Turkey and Uzbekistan between 1992 and 2005 ........ 92 
Figure 10: The Blue Stream Project................................................................................ 145 
Figure 11: Trans-Caspian Pipeline Project ..................................................................... 148 
 
 xii
 
LIST OF TABLES  
 
Table 1: Eximbank Credits ............................................................................................... 65 
Table 2: Number of Turkish Schools in the Region ....................................................... 113 
Table 3: Number of Turkic Students in Turkey in 2001................................................. 127 
 
 xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS/ABBREVATIONS 
 
AGSP (Azerbaijan Gas Supply Company)  
ACC (Atlantic Cooperation Council)  
AIOC (Azerbaijan International Operating Company) 
BOTAS (Petroleum Pipeline Corporation)  
BP (British Petroleum)  
BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Project)  
BTE (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Project)  
CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation)  
DEIK (Foreign Economic Relations Board)  
GOGC (Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation)  
KOSGEB (Small and Medium Sized Industry Development Agency) 
NIS (Newly Independent States) 
SCP (South Caucasus Pipeline)  
TCGP (Transcaspian Gas Pipeline Project) 
TICA (Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency)  
TPAO (Turkish Petroleum Cooperation)  
TPOC (Turkish Petroleum Overseas Company)  
TUDEV (Turkic States and Communities Friendship, Brotherhood and 
Cooperation Foundation)  
TUPRAS (Turkish Petroleum Refineries Cooperation) 
CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
1.1 Defining Concepts and Theory 
 
I built my theory around the idea that Turkey’s domestic sources of foreign policy 
affect Turkey’s foreign relations with the Turkic countries in the Caspian Sea Region. My 
independent variable is domestic sources of Turkey’s foreign relations with the Turkic 
countries, which are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan from Central 
Asia and Azerbaijan from the Caucasus and my dependent variable is Turkey’s foreign 
relations with these countries. Domestic sources are divided into three categories, which 
are Turkey’s historical, cultural and political relations with the Turkic states and Turkey’s 
economic interests in the region. My question for this thesis paper is to see how Turkey’s 
domestic sources of foreign relations affect Turkey’s foreign relations with the regional 
countries. 
 
Apparently the traditional separation of domestic politics and foreign politics may 
have sensible advantages but today, especially with increasing global communication and 
transportation networks, the study of political science does not isolate domestic politics 
from foreign politics. In other words, it is hard to draw a strict line between domestic and 
foreign politics in current international system which offers intense interactions between 
states. London (1956) gives a great example to explain this relation. He argues that 
“foreign and domestic politics resemble the positive and negative components of electric 
current; eliminate one and the other will not function, they produce power only when 
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combined.”1 In accordance with the theory of this thesis paper London argues that “in 
any political system domestic issues have an important bearing on the management and 
substance of foreign policy.”2 This study is directly based on London’s approach and 
seeks to find the influence of domestic sources of Turkish policy on Turkey’s foreign 
relations with the regional countries and the strength of this influence.  
 
The theoretical framework of this study is strengthened by Rosenau’s linkage 
politics. Currently political life has changed with almost the virtual interaction of national 
and international politics. According to Rosenau’s linkage politics, “recurrent sequences 
of behavior that originate in one system are reacted to in another.”3 Although Rosenau 
“acknowledges the importance of policy boundaries” he adds to it that “both national and 
international boundaries are becoming central to daily lives.”4 The initial stage of a 
linkage is called input and the latter stage is called output. In this thesis paper, the inputs 
are Turkey’s historical and cultural ties and political relations with Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Turkey’s business interests in 
the Caspian Sea Region and the output is the interaction between Turkey and these states. 
We may call this output as foreign relations as well. In view of Rosenau’s linkage 
politics, I suggest that patterns of Turkish character within the region will stir up 
boundary crossing responses and eventually will turn out to be Turkey’s constructive 
foreign policy in the region.  
 
Linkages are commonly used concepts. One set of linkage that will be applied in 
this thesis paper is ideology. This linkage offers that “policy formation-implementation is 
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ideological”.5 In this thesis paper the ideology, which was supposed to hold the Turkic 
states together, is pan-Turkism and the general boundary of this ideology is mainly 
Turkey and also the Central Asian countries. Turkey’s further sets of functionaries which 
influence the domestic policies of the regional countries and which are utilized in this 
study are Turkey’s diplomatic services, secular and political doctrines, exchange of goods 
and students. 
 
 Today’s international system as Rosenau argues “is linking polities ever more 
firmly”6 than before. For example; different countries from the far East to the far West 
are involved in the post-Soviet region with their policies. Furthermore, these policies in 
pursuit of different goals, somehow, are interlinked. As this study is going to show the 
post-Soviet international system brings different policy options towards the Caspian 
region for different countries.  
 
For Turkey, the break up of the Soviet Union means exercising political influence 
by offering Turkish political and economic system as a development model. For the 
Western countries, particularly the US, being a major actor in this newly emerging region 
is crucial to prevent the spread of Iranian fundamentalism. Turkey, in this context, as an 
ally of the US, could avoid the US’s such concerns by acting as a stabilizing factor in the 
region. From a Russian perspective, it is important for Russia not to lose Russian 
dominance in its “backyard” and to have control over the pipeline routes. China, on the 
other hand, wishes to realize its economic calculations on the pipeline routes to transport 
oil and gas to the country.  
 4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Energy Information Administration  
 Figure 1:Caspian Sea Region 
 
 
Hypothesis: Given the enthusiasm and mutual expectations of Turkey and the 
Turkic countries in terms of establishing close and cooperative political and economical 
relations with the break up of the Soviet Union I hypothesize that; 
_ The stronger the socio-cultural ties are between Turkey and the Turkic states the 
closer the foreign relations between Turkey and the Turkic countries are. 
_The more Turkey has business interests in the Caspian Sea Region the more 
Turkey will have closer foreign relations with Turkic countries.  
_The more Turkey has common policy goals with the Turkic states the more 
 5
Turkey has closer foreign relations with Turkic countries. 
  
 Methodology: This is a qualitative study and the spheres analyzed in this study 
are the common ties, which are history, culture, religion and language, pan-Turkism, 
which is the ideology of the union of all the Turks, Kemalist ideology, Turkey’s energy 
politics and trade relations with the region, Turkey’s initial interactions with the region 
and Turkey’s ongoing constructive policies in the region. In addition to explaining the 
areas that are mentioned above I will talk about the contextual factors influencing these 
areas. I will try to analyze domestic contexts of the countries, particularly Turkey’s 
domestic context in terms of social relations, political stance and economic needs.  
 
Data collection: I will refer to news reports and Turkish economic institutions’ 
annual reports. I will try to access information from the documents of the websites of the 
Turkish international organizations such as Turkish International Cooperation and 
Development Agency (TICA) and I will make interviews with the officials from these 
organizations. I will also use journal articles and the existing literature on the history and 
culture of the Turks and the Newly Independent States (NIS) of Central Asia and the 
Caucasus as secondary sources.  
 
Limitations: The amount of knowledge on the Turkic countries is limited. 
Especially there is lack of information on Turkey’s bilateral political relations after 1994. 
Also the documentation and research of Turkey’s involvement in the region in terms of 
Turkey’s cultural and educational contributions to the Turkic states is scarce.  
 6
1.2 Literature Review 
 
Historically the amount of studies on Central Asia, which is a peripheral region, 
has been relatively little when compared to studies on Europe or the US. Despite this fact 
there is still substantial literature on the geopolitical issues of the Muslim states of the 
former Soviet Union and Turkey’s interactions with these states in terms of economic, 
political and cultural relations in the post-Soviet international order. These works focus 
on the official and work visits of Turkish businessmen and politicians immediately 
following the independence of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, Turkey’s contributions to the region in educational, cultural and economical 
fields and Turkey’s involvement in the energy game. However the literature lacks 
significant resources on Turkey’s bilateral relations with these countries. This thesis 
paper is going to fill this gap by analyzing Turkey’s relations with the Turkic countries 
on a bilateral basis.  
 
With the break up of the Soviet Union Turkey’s presence was felt heavily in the 
region. Turkey took its place in the “New Great Game”7 with its constructive policies 
such as Turkish entrepreneurs’ attempts to establish schools, business and cultural 
centers, to give scholarships to students, to supply educational materials or to appoint 
teachers and imams, who lead prayers in mosques, to the places in need. Unfortunately 
these contributions of Turkey have not been recorded in an organized and chronological 
fashion. One of the few sources giving extensive information on Turkey’s contributions 
in the region is TICA. Another limitation of doing research on the Caspian Sea Region is 
that the information on the current relations between Turkey and the Turkic Republics is 
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scarce. The literature mostly talks about Turkey’s interactions with the five Turkic states 
at the initial stages of their independence. At this stage we can find numerous works 
explaining Turkey’s and the newly independent countries’ enthusiasm to establish close 
relations and cooperation. However it seems like this enthusiasm has declined starting 
from the mid-1990s.  
 
History and Culture: Findley’s book, The Turks in World History, traces Turkic 
peoples’ history starting from early period’s steppes to today’s nation states. It makes a 
great contribution to this thesis paper by projecting the cultural, economic, social and 
political history of modern Turkish Republic and the five post-Soviet republics. This 
work sheds light on the history of Turks for non-specialists considering it as a part of the 
history of humanity. The author answers the question of “what the most distinctive large-
scale patternings in politics, culture, society or economy and how things differ for Turkic 
peoples who somehow avoid incorporation into these patterns.”8 
 
Hostler’s book, Turkism and the Soviets, gives us extensive knowledge on the 
origins and characteristics of the Turkic peoples of the world. It is a strong source to learn 
about the ethnic, cultural and religious ties between the Turks living in Turkey and the 
Turks living in the former Soviet Union. It is a sufficient source to learn about a 
significant manifestation of the Turkish issue, pan-Turkism, which concerns Anatolia and 
the Turkic speaking areas of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republic as well as 
other Asiatic territories. The author discusses the emergence and development of pan-
Turkism in the post-Soviet region.  
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 Politics: The two strong sources on Turkey’s relations with the Turkic Republics 
are Turkey’s relations with the west and the Turkic Republics, and Turkey in Post-Soviet 
Central Asia. Bal’s main concern is to argue whether Turkish development model, which 
offers a secular, democratic and multi-party political system, and a liberal economy 
integrated with global economy, is an appropriate model for these republics. He presents 
how enthusiastic the Turkic leaders were to support this model in 1991 and how this 
support began to decline by the end of 1992. This is the first study which gives detailed 
information on the initial interactions between Turkey and the Turkic Republics. 
Winrow’s Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia is a short study on the same topic. Winrow 
informs us about Turkish foreign policy towards the Turkic republics from the demise of 
the Soviet Union until 1995.Winrow gives place to the First and Second Turkic Summits 
and the results of these summits. Winrow, like Bal, contributes to the literature by 
examining the achievements and shortcomings of Turkish policy towards Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan from the enthusiasm and optimism of 1991-
92 to the realism of the mid-1990s.9 
 
Menashri’s Central Asia Meets the Middle East examines the impact of the 
emergence of the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union in Central 
Asia and its influences for the Middle East. Robins goes through Turkey’s efforts to 
introduce democratic politics and an open market economy to the newly independent 
states. Hale in Turkey and Transcaucasia studies Turkey’s policy interests and 
determinants in the region. Both of these works refer to pan-Turkism, which is the 
ideology to unify all Turks, while discussing Turkey’s policies in the region.  
 9
 Jung and Piccoli study Turkish politics with a pan-idealistic approach as well. In 
their book, Turkey at the Crossroads, they analyze Turkish politics in view of the 
Ottoman-Turkish submerged legacy. They link the current political problems of Turkey 
to this legacy. Moving from this perspective the authors see Turkish policies in Central 
Asia and the Transcaucasus as the revival of pan-Turkism. In addition, there is a study on 
Islamic modernism, pan-Turkism, Turkish nationalism and economic and cultural ties 
between the Turkish Republic and the Turkic states.  
 
In the last days of the Ottoman Empire Young Turks, who initiated the reform 
movement of the Ottoman administration in the first quarter of the 20th century, and the 
two principal exponents of pan-Turkism, Ziya Gokalp and Yusuf Akcura, pursued purely 
pan-Turkic oriented policies. Also, during the Second World War, pan-Turkist groups in 
Turkey supported the Germans in their war against the Soviet Union with the hope to 
defeat Soviet troops and free Turkic peoples of Central Asia and Caucasus from the 
Soviet command. These were two different time periods when pan-Turkism was popular 
in the Ottoman Empire however it may be not be accurate to justify Turkey’s policies in 
the Caspian Sea Region by referring to pan-Turkism.   
 
In my view, naming Turkey’s involvement in the region through its development 
organizations, and Turkey’s efforts to get closer to the Turkic people as signs of pan-
Turkism is misleading. Although there have been some marginal groups who advocate 
that the ideology through which Turkey pursues its policies in the region should be pan-
Turkism, dominant Turkish centrist leaders of the Turkish political life do not support 
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such pan ideals. Centrist politicians are aware of the negative implications of such 
policies. It is the apparent prediction of Turkish leadership that such “pan-Turkic oriented 
foreign policy creates virtual state of war in Central Asia considering many ethnic Turks 
living on the territory of Iran, China and Russia.”10 Moreover Turkic people, who have 
lived under the Soviet command up to 1990s, do not want to see another “big brother”.  
 
Aras’s The New Geopolitics of Eurasia, and Turkey’s Position, is an effort to 
create a guideline for Turkish foreign policy in Eurasia. In his book, Aras analyzes the 
new geopolitics of Eurasia focusing on the roles of the newly involved actors in this area 
following the break up of the Soviet Union. The author discusses Turkey’s position in 
this region to provide insights for the future of Turkish foreign policy towards the region. 
The author claims that “for the first time in its republican history, Turkey seeks to 
develop a sphere of influence with its pro-Western and secular orientation in the 
region.”11Aras also studies Turkey’s energy politics, pipeline route selection in particular, 
in the region. However the author’s argument that all parties involved in the energy game 
can benefit through cooperation needs to be supported by tangible evidence.  
 
Similarly Chufrin’s The Security of the Caspian Region, is a study focusing on the 
geopolitical aspect of the region. This book takes an innovative approach to analyze 
regional issues with a concentration on the geopolitical environment. It addresses specific 
issues such as the national, political and security interests in the region during the post-
Soviet period. Authors from twelve different countries including Turkey and the Caspian 
Sea Basin countries have contributed to this book. They introduce data on a wide range of 
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topics from the true energy resources of the Caspian Sea Region to military spending by 
regional governments. 
 
Karaosmanoglu’s contribution to this edited volume is about Turkey’s objectives 
in the Caspian Sea region. This chapter tells about the geopolitics of pipelines, Turkey’s 
cooperation with Russia and Turkey’s internal and external constraints. Like Aras, 
Karaosmanoglu describes Turkey’s economic considerations in the area of oil and gas 
reserves. 
 
Turkey’s relations with the Turkic states cannot be understood excluding Russia. 
In this respect this thesis utilizes some works on Russian involvement in the region with a 
particular focus on Russian-Turkish relations. One of these works is D. B. Sezer’s article, 
Turkish-Russian Relations: The Challenges of Reconciling Geopolitical Competition with 
Economic Partnership which explores the Turkish Russian relations mostly in terms of 
economics starting from the 1980s. These two countries have traditionally belonged to 
two different continental systems however their relations have been shaped by a 
combination of cooperation and competition over the past decade. Akturk’s article, 
Turkish–Russian Relations after the Cold War (1992–2002) examines this cooperation 
between Turkey and Russia in the post-Cold War restructuring. The author proceeds by 
giving references to international relations theories. The author’s argument is that the 
retreat of Russian threat allowed for the possibility of Turkish-Russian cooperation.12 
 
Lastly Aydin’s Foucault's Pendulum: Turkey in Central Asia and the Caucasus, is 
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a great source discussing Turkey’s position in the Caspian Sea basin. It introduces 
Turkey’s challenges and opportunities which were born after the emergence of eight 
independent states in Central Asia and the Caucasus in a clear way. The author’s 
prediction is that “although economic and political conditions in the region are unlikely 
to stabilize for some years, it is without doubt that Turkish policymakers will continue 
with their efforts to create new networks of interdependency between Ankara and the 
regional capitals”.13  
 
Educational Policies:  Demir, Balci and Akkok make a great contribution to the 
literature with their article, The role of Turkish schools in the educational system and 
social transformation of Central Asian countries: the case of Turkmenistan and 
Kyrgyzstan considering the scarcity of documentation on Turkey’s educational policies in 
the region. They suggest that “all throughout history the educational process has been 
perceived as a very influential agent of the socialization process with the power to shape, 
reshape, refresh or build the social and psychological environment”14 Moving from this 
theory they explore the role of Turkish schools in transforming society in Central Asia. 
Considering the good reputation of these schools throughout the region one can conclude 
that Turkish schools have made a positive contribution to the future of Turkic countries.  
 
Another work on Turkey’s Educational Policies in the region is Yanik’s The 
Politics of Educational Exchange: Turkish Education in Eurasia.15 This article assesses 
Turkey’s educational exchange programs as a foreign policy tool. It examines Turkey’s 
public and private educational ties with the Turkic populations of Eurasia. The author 
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discusses the roles of Turkey’s educational activities in the Turkic peoples’ cultural 
reorientation. This work gives the reader an idea of education’s importance which is a 
tool of soft power in helping people identify themselves beyond giving descriptive and 
statistical information.  
 
Business:  The majority of the Turkish business interests in the Caspian Sea 
Basin lie in the energy field. Aras and Foster, in their article, Turkey and the Azerbaijani 
Oil Controversies: Looking for a Light at the End of the Pipeline talk about the oil 
controversies in the Caspian basin with a particular focus on Turkey’s involvement. This 
article suggests that the collapse of the Soviet Union has caused a great shift in Turkey’s 
foreign policy. From a political perspective Turkey acted to spread the model of Turkish 
government and society. From an economic perspective, Turkey has always wanted to 
take the advantage of the mutual development opportunities that cooperation can create. 
 
For Turkey, economic opportunities include “guaranteed access to vital energy 
resources, lucrative oil transport revenues, as well as increased diplomatic clout and 
strategic importance.”16 For the new republics these opportunities include the prospect of 
attracting investment and technological expertise, as well as of establishing a secure route 
for distribution of their products to the West. Particularly Azerbaijan, a Turkic-speaking 
former Soviet possession that shares borders with Russia, Georgia, Armenia, and Iran, 
has attracted the greatest interest of Turkey among the newly independent states.  The 
authors argue that “the source of this interest is not only the linguistic, ethnic, religious 
and cultural affinity shared by Turkey and Azerbaijan, but also the tremendous oil 
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reserves possessed by the tiny Caucasian state.”17 
 
There are some Turkish scholars who contribute to the literature by focusing on 
particular pipeline projects which are in Turkey’s interest. In this context Bacik’s The 
Blue Stream Project, Energy Co-operation and Conflicting Interests, analyzes the 
discussions about the Blue Stream Project which envisages the transportation of Russian 
natural gas to Turkey. The context of this article is Turkish politics and regional energy-
oriented relations. Bacik argues that “Turkey has contributed to the emergence of an 
energy regime in Eurasia by connecting itself to the major energy markets through 
complex energy projects”.18 Furthermore Oztun and Hepbasli’s article, Natural Gas 
Implementation in Turkey. Part 2: Natural Gas Pipeline Projects is a comprehensive 
source for Turkey’s natural gas demand and natural gas pipelines in which Turkey is 
involved.   
 
Although they are not many in number, some authors have studied business 
relations between Turkey and the Turkic countries bilaterally. For example, Dikkaya and 
Keles, examine Turkish investment in Kyrgyzstan, in their article, Foreign Direct 
Investment in Kyrgyzstan. This article analyzes FDI characteristics in Kyrgyzstan in a 
case study context and provides suggestions for FDI issues. This article basically touches 
the issues of the importance of company and host country specific factors in FDI 
decisions, the drawbacks of operating in the country and the effects of company 
performances on FDI.  
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It has been only sixteen years since the countries of this region of the world 
gained independence. However the number of studies on the Caspian Sea Region is 
expected to increase in the coming years. Although the existing literature is limited it has 
been quite helpful and intriguing for this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2: TURKEY’S HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL TIES WITH THE 
TURKIC COUNTRIES  
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to shed light on common ties, which increase the credibility of 
Turkey in the eyes of the five former Soviet states, between the Turkish peoples living in 
Turkey and the Turkic people living in the Caspian Sea Basin in terms of language, 
ethnicity and religion. I will start with explaining the historical identity of Turks to see 
how far modern Turkey’s ethnic tie with the region goes back. Then I will explain 
Turkish nationalism created by Ataturk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, and pan-
Turkism. I will try to explore Ataturk’s approach towards pan-ideals and also pan-
Turkism with relevance to the Caspian Sea Region. It is significant to understand these 
two points in order to interpret today’s Turkish policies. Next I will explain linguistic 
similarities of Turkic countries considering that language is an important tool that eases 
any kind of relationship whether it is political, economic or cultural. Finally another 
unifying factor, Islam as the major religious faith in Turkey and in the region, will be 
explained.  
 
 
2.2 Turkic People of the World and Pan-Turkism 
 
2.2.1 Turkic People of the World 
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Turks are defined by their language, Turkish, and by certain shared elements of 
culture, history and religion. They maintained their identity while moving across Eurasia. 
As Findley explains “when we track the Turks back in history we find not one route 
ending in the West but radiating routes beginning in Eastern Asia, interconnecting along 
the way, and ending at points all across Eurasia or, even since the 1960s around the 
world.”19 
 
The oldest known Turkish inscriptions are the Orkhon runes in the valley of the 
Yenisei River in Siberia and in the valley of the Orkhon River in Mongolia in 1889.20 
They include the oldest known material in Turkic language. In these inscriptions are 
mentioned the Uyghur Turkish people and the Kirghiz people. The name Oguz, which 
refers to a Turkic tribe, is used for the first time on these stone slabs.  
 
The present Turkish territory is enclosed by the boundaries of the Turkish 
Republic. The history of the contemporary Turkish republic is based on three roots which 
are composed of the Anatolian heritage, the Islamic heritage which was born in the 
seventh century in Arabia, and the Turkic heritage which goes back to the earliest Turks 
in inner Asia. Turks are a part of the combination of Turkic-Islamic-European 
civilization; they are Muslim by religion and they speak Turkic dialects.  
 
Central Asian Turks, who have been moving to Turkey for centuries, and 
Eurasian Turks compose a large segment of the Turks in Turkey. There are some Central 
Asian tribes still living in Turkey. For example; the Yuruks, which form the largest 
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Turkic group in Turkey, live in small groups from the region around Izmir. Yuruk is the 
Turkish word for nomad and yuruks have preserved many of their Central Asian habits. 
Turkmen tribes form another Turkish group in Anatolia. They have come togather around 
the Salt Lake ( Tuz Golu ). The Kizilbas Turks live in Ankara and Tokat. They have 
historical affiliations with trans-Caucasia. However the Kemalist regime with its 
principle of nationalism has blended them with the rest of the Turkish population through 
the teachings of the modern school system.  
 
Turks living outside the Turkish territory are gathered in Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, 
Western Turkestan ( Kazakistan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan ), 
Eastern Turkestan ( including Turkic peoples of China ), Southwest Asia ( Iran, Iraq, 
Syria ), Russia, Europe and South Europe (Ex-Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania), 
and Cyprus.  
 
2.2.2 Kemalist Ideology: Nationalism in the Turkish Republic  
 
Before I analyze the effects of pan-Turkist ideology on the Caspian Sea Region 
countries I will give some brief information on Turkish nationalism and Ataturk’s 
nationalist ideas which form the base of contemporary Turkish policies.  
 
Turkish nationalism is an old phenomenon. The 1908 Young Turks’ Revolution 
activated the nationalistic awareness of the political leaders in the Ottoman Empire. 
World War I and the break down of the empire accelerated the wave of nationalist 
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inspirations.  
 
The ideas of Ataturk, who is the founder of the Turkish Republic, are gathered 
under the ideology of Kemalism, the central pillar of which is nationalism. The year 1923 
marks the beginning of a new era in the history of the Turkish Republic. On July 24, 
1923 the Lausanne Treaty was signed and Turkey was admitted to the new international 
community of free nations. In October Turkey was proclaimed as a republic and Kemal 
Ataturk was elected as the first president. Kemalist philosophy is based on six principles. 
In 1937 these principles were later formally incorporated into the constitution as 
republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and revolutionism. Among 
these principles nationalism is the primary principle and all other principles are derived 
from it.  
 
From these principles we find that Ataturk has always been the advocate of 
nationalist policies rather than pan ideals like Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism. In 
Ataturk’s Eskisehir talk we find his approach toward pan ideals. Ataturk said:  
 
Neither Islamic Union nor Turanism can form a doctrine, a 
logical policy for us. In order that our nation should be able 
to live a happy, strenuous and permanent life it is necessary 
that the state should pursue an exclusively national policy 
and that this policy should be in perfect agreement with our 
internal organization and be based on it.21  
 
The nationalist aspect of Kemalist ideology mostly found its expression in the 
Turkification of the language. The foreign elements of the Ottoman language were 
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replaced with the genuine Turkish words. Ataturk stated that, “The Turkish nation which 
knew how to defend its country and its noble independence must also liberate its 
language from the yoke of foreign languages.”22 The Turkish Linguistic Society, which 
was founded in July 1932, published Ottoman-Turkish and Turkish-Ottoman pocket 
glossary and encouraged people not to use Arabic or Persian words. 
 
Ataturk developed the Sun Language Theory (Gunes Dil Teorisi) concerning the 
Turkic linguistics. He gave great importance to the issue of history as well as language. 
According to Ataturk’s another thesis relating to the origin of the Turks, the Turkish 
History Thesis, Turks formed the cradle of human civilizations in Central Asia and in the 
view of this thesis Turkish was acknowledged as the mother of all languages. The 
purpose of the Turkish History Thesis was to examine the roots of the Turkish nations 
and development of Turkish history within the framework of world history. Prior to 
Ataturk, the role of Turkish people’s literature and culture belonging to the pre-Ottoman 
and especially the pre-Islamic ages were particularly neglected. The history of Turkish 
nations was thought to be a part of the history of Islam or Ottomans. Moreover both the 
Seljuk historians and the Ottoman historians did not leave enlightening works on the 
cultural heritage of the ancient Turks of the pre-Islamic ages. Unlike past historians, 
Ataturk suggested to study the early movements of the Turkic peoples of Central Asia to 
firmly establish Turkish culture and history. By doing so; Turks would take their 
appropriate place in the world history. 
  
 According to Ataturk’s thesis, in the light of archeological, anthropological and 
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ethnological knowledge, all civilizations of the history of mankind originate from Central 
Asia. Plentiful pre-historic artifacts and craft skills in the Central Asian sub-strata 
indicate rich cultures dating back to the ages before the Christian era.23 This theory 
suggests that a pre-historic civilization, which was developed in Central Asia, lived on 
through the stone, bronze and iron ages. With the migration of people from Central Asia 
to Mesopotamia, Anatolia, Egypt and Europe new civilizations were born and later they 
were developed. The origin of the pre-historic peoples of Anatolia was also in Central 
Asia. Here we see that Central Asia was a cradle of civilizations and left its mark on 
many following civilizations. Central Asian influence was eventually seen in the cultures 
of many other nations and peoples.  
 
As Kocaturk explains Ataturk did not claim that “the races of mankind, history 
and language come from one common origin” but he wanted to emphasize “how the 
earliest civilizations of Central Asia took elements of their cultures to Anatolia, Europe 
and other parts of the world as they migrated extensively”.24Currently patriotic feelings 
are still pervasive and nationalism is still a dominant ideology in Turkey. 
 
2.2.3 Pan-Turkism: The Union of all the Turks  
 
As Khalid defines, “Pan-Turkism professes the goal of the political unity of those 
who belong to the Turkic nation.”25 Pan-Turkist ideology aims to give Turks a common 
soul and consciousness. The importance of this ideology in relation to the Caucasus and 
Central Asia is that nationalist and separatist movements, which were on the rise 
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especially after the Russian Revolution of 1917, were justified with this ideology. Upon 
these nationalist demands the Russian empire was eventually transformed into a number 
of republics with varying degrees of autonomy in the last decade of the 20th century.  It 
should be noted that Turkism, pan-Turkism, Islamism and pan-Islamism are closely 
related concepts. As Hostler points out “there is a terminological chaos in Russian 
sources reflecting the intermixture of nationalism with pan movements among the Turks 
of the USSR.”26 
 
The nationalist and reformist movements among the Eastern Turks were evaluated 
within the scope of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism in principle and most importantly 
these ideas were spread to this region from Turkey. Historically Turkish policy has 
moved toward Pan-Turkism in times of war in the twentieth century. This was the policy 
of the Young Turks during the First World War and after the Russian Revolution of 1917. 
Also, during the Second World War, pan-Turkist groups in Turkey supported the 
Germans in their war against the Soviet Union with the hope to defeat Soviet troops and 
free Turkic peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus from the Soviet command. Today, 
nationalism still forms an important trait of Turkish policy. 
 
2.2.4 Leading Ideologists of Pan-Turkism 
 
2.2.4.1 Ismail Gaspirali  
 
Gaspirali is an important figure in the history of the Turkic people in the Russian 
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Empire. He undertook actions in the areas of education, language and social reform, and 
politics. The whole organization of the Pan-Turkist movement in Russia was in the hands 
of Gaspirali. He had profound influence on the nationalist awakening of Turkic people. 
Accordingly, he is considered to be the real leader of the all-Turkish movement. 
 
He went to a traditional Muslim school (medresse); he continued his education in 
a Russian gymnasium and he ended up in Military Academy in 1865. In 1867, he left his 
education in the academy to go to the Ottoman Empire and fight against the Greek rebels. 
He spent the years between 1871 and 1875 in Paris and Istanbul. In 1882 he married 
Zühre Hanim, daughter of a wealthy Tatar family from Kazan.27  
 
During his lifetime, Gaspirali met several Russian intellectuals and prominent 
figures of the Ottoman Empire. As Tuna suggests “his 1879 appeal to the Russian 
authorities to publish a Tatar language journal shows that he had reached a certain level 
of intellectual sophistication by this time and wanted to put his ideas into practice.”28 
 
Gaspirali sought ways of conveying pan-Turkist ideas to people. After trying for 
four years and making numerous trips to St. Petersburg, Gaspirali succeeded in getting 
permission to publish a newspaper, Tercuman. His biggest idea was to introduce social 
and religious reforms in the Turkic-Islamic world through congresses with wide 
participation. He actively participated in all the Turkic congresses and during his life, he 
organized two congresses with the same topic: The Union of Turco-Muslims of Russia.  
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 He called for the unity and solidarity among all the Turkic people and he 
expressed these ideas in Tercuman. His well-known motto was "Unity in language, 
thought, and action."29 Gaspirali was also a supporter of women rights believing that 
better education of women was a key to bringing the Islamic society into the mainstream 
of modern life. Moving from this theory he initiated a new journal for women, Alem-i 
Nisvan (World of Women).30 He was an advocate of equality in matters of marriage, 
divorce, and inheritance.  
 
He improved new teaching methods which gained popularity throughout Russia. 
In 1912, Gaspirali traleved to India to demonstrate the effectiveness of his new method of 
teaching. In February 1912 towards the end of his life, he attended a private meeting of 
Turkic leaders from the Volga region, the Caucasus and Crimea in St. Petersburg to 
discuss the viability of reviving the Union of Russian Muslims. In September 1914 he 
died in Bahcesaray and his funeral was attended by more than 6,000 people who had 
come from various parts of Russia and elsewhere to pay their last respects to the great 
man.31 
 
His experiences in Turkey and Western Europe inspired him to raise Turkic 
people to the level of the west. He believed that this aim could only be achieved through 
the extension of education to the masses. His starting point would be the linguistic and 
spiritual unity of the Turks. He introduced curricular reforms encouraging children to use 
their mother tongues. The idea of a common language was understood by Gaspirali as 
“one shared by all Turks from Crimea to Heart, from Istanbul to Kashgar, and not only 
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for the educated but as well for the simple people.”32He increasingly got interested in the 
issues concerning Turkic people’s education. At the same time he tried not to anger his 
Russian opponents. He concentrated his efforts in the cultural field and he avoided any 
direct contact with current politics. He was hopeful about the future. He said; “I believe 
that in the future the Russian Muslims shall be more civilized than any other muslim 
nation. Give us the possibility to learn and the sciences should be admitted to the Tatar 
schools, and in the Tatar language.”33 
 
Gaspirali also supported the Djadid (Modernist) movement, which was initiated to 
reinterpret religioun in Russia with a solid program. He guided the religious reform 
aspect of the movement. He was enthusiastic to spread practical activism towards general 
cultural progress and modernized education rather than abstract discourses. The Jadids 
tried to introduce modernist ideas to the Turkic world through their works. They formed 
new opportunities through their schools and theatres where people could socialize. Their 
schools were places where the elites of the future would be trained. They put an emphasis 
on the education of women and children.  
 
When it comes to religion, Gaspirali considered Islam as part of the Turco-
national culture.  Islam was an outstanding trait of the Turks and it was necessary to resist 
Russification. Gaspirali frequently referred to the Kur’an since it both united the 
modernists and the clergy.34 
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2.2.4.2 Yusuf Akcura 
 
Yusuf Akcura (1876-1933) is another eager supporter of pan-Turkism. He spent 
many years in Turkey and he established strong political ties with Turkey. He was 
regarded as a member of an all-Turkish society and served as a symbol of the unity of 
Eastern and Western Turks.  
 
As Hostler explains, Yusuf Akcura was born in Simbirsk, a district of Russia, and 
he was educated in Istanbul and in Paris. He was a member of the Russian Duma 
(Parliament) and he was a part of the All-Muslim Union ‘Ittifak’ Organization. He started 
living in Istanbul after 1907. He took part in the works of Turk Dernegi ( Turkish 
Association ) which aimed at the reformation of the Turkish-Arabic script.35 Akcura was 
against European colonial policies and he wanted to be the voice of the nationalist 
feelings of the Turks living in Soviet Empire and Turkey.  
 
He dreamed of an Islamic-Turkish Empire. He became famous for his article 
entitled ‘Three Political Systems’ in the Cairo paper in 1903. Principles of pan-Turkism 
were explained in this article.  
 
It can be regarded as similar to that of the Communist Manifesto of 1848 for the 
Marxists. For this reason he is accepted as one of the founders of pan-Turkism. The first 
principle seeks to create an Ottoman Nation through assimilating and unifying the various 
nations subject to Ottoman rule. The second principle seeks to unify all Muslims living 
under the governance of the Ottoman State and the third principle seeks a policy of 
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Turkish nationalism based on ethnicity. Akcura was against the idea of pan-Islamism 
because from his point of view, pan-Islamism was not reflecting the national feelings of 
all Muslim nations.36 Islam does not make a distinction between people with regards to 
their nations as opposed to nationalist ideologies.  
 
2.2.5 World War I and Pan-Turkism  
 
Pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism formed the driving forces of Turkish policy 
during World War I. In other words, Turkey wished to unite with ethnically and 
linguistically familiar peoples and with those of the same religion.  In this direction the 
Young Turks made their famous proclamation of November 23, 1914 with a Pan-Islamic 
spirit. It was assumed that they used Islamic terminology in this proclamation to capture a 
crowded audience. A part of the proclamation, which was signed by the Caliph, is as 
below: 
 
All Mohammedans living in the territories exposed to the 
persecutions of the above named oppressive powers, such 
as the Crimea, Kazan, Turkistan, Bukhara, Khiva, India, 
China, Afghanistan, Persia, Africa and other countries, 
must consider it, in concert with Ottomans, as their most 
supreme religious duty to participate in the Holy War, with 
their bodies and goods, keeping in mind the inspirations of 
the Kuran.37 
 
Turkic people of the former Soviet Union were on the side of the Ottoman Turkey 
and its allies in the World War I. This was not a surprising result considering the 
popularity of pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism in Russia.  
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 Enver Pasha was recorded as a symbol of the military aspect of Pan-Turkism in 
the World War I. Enver Pasha was involved in the Caucasian offensive in 1914 as well as 
in the Turkestanian struggle with the Soviets in 1921-1922. He is linked strongly with the 
Turks in Russia and with pan-Turkism.  
 
Enver Pasha was born in Istanbul on 22 November 1881. As Yilmaz states “his 
family was originally from Monastir and their ancestry can be traced back to the 
‘Gagavuz Turks.”38 Enver took part in the Tripolitan campaign of 1912. At the beginning 
of the Balkan War he returned to Constantinople in 1913, where he was active in 
overthrowing the cabinet of Kamil Pasha for capitulating to the Bulgarians.  
 
During World War I Enver Pasha was responsible for the command of the Third 
Caucasian Army on the Caucasian frontier. It was the assumption that such a victory 
would increase, as Yilmaz identifies, “his power and fame, while opening the way for 
more conquests in the east”.39 
 
He arrived at Erzurum in December 1914 and the Caucasian battle began at the 
end of that month. By January 1915 it was clear to both Ottomans and Russians that 
Turkish offensive would fail. However, in spite of difficulties like cold, fatigue and 
hunger the troops on both sides were still willing to fight and the battle continued another 
fourteen days. It was impossible for Enver Pasha to be successful considering the 
topographic and climatic obstacles during the winter months. Some scholars attribute 
Enver Pasha’s failure to his own inexperience. For example; Rustow says that it was 
 29
Enver Pasha’s “grandiose and amateurish conduct of the war”40 that caused the loss of 
thousands of troops. The offensive resulted with astounding Turkish losses. There were 
about 75,000 casualties, many of which were armed. On the Russian side there were 
16,000 people killed and wounded, and 12,000 people sick.41 As Yilmaz suggests “his 
rise was determined by military successes, and his fall would also be closely tied to the 
defeat of the Ottoman Empire fighting on the side of the Germans during the First World 
War.”42  
 
New opportunities were born in the Turco-Muslim areas of Russia due to the 
outbreak of the Russian Revolution in 1917 and new half-independent states appeared in 
the region. As Hostler explains, although Enver Pasha was personally absent in the 
Caucasus from 1917 to 1919 it was through his directives that the Azerbaijan-Turkish 
military preparations got started. Enver Pasha decided to organize an army within the 
Republic of Azerbaijan with the aid of the Army of Islam. A base was chosen at the 
ancient Muslim town of Ganja and the Turkish Fifth Caucasian Division was moved 
there. A few days later, Enver Pasha’s half brother Nuri Pasha arrived to take over 
command of the Army of Islam. Enver Pasha planned to capture Baku in nearly a month 
but the Turks received news that a German-Soviet agreement on Baku had already been 
practically concluded. The Turks left their Fifth Caucasian Division in Baku and at the 
same time the Thirty-sixth division moved northward along the railway toward Derbent. 
The only victory that the Army of Islam could get was the occupation of Petrovsk. 
Thirty-sixth Caucasian division continued its Pan-Turanian March along the shores of the 
Caspian and in October occupied Petrovsk. Thus some external issues put an end to the 
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adventures of Pan-Turkists in the region.43 
  
 Bolsheviks and pan-Turkists had a common goal of fighting against imperialism 
which was attributed to the West in general. Hostler explains that “Enver Pasha 
unofficially planned the reestablishment of the kingdom of Timur and saw himself as the 
ruler of the realm embracing Chinese Turkestan, Russian Turkestan, Kazakhstan and 
Afghanistan.”44 Enver Pasha kept the belief that the center of this empire would be 
Turkey as part of his pan-Turkish movement. On the other hand the Bolsheviks, who saw 
Enver Pasha and all Muslims as enemies of the imperialists, were supporting Enver 
Pasha. Enver Pasha’s intention was also an alliance with the Bolsheviks in Bukhara in the 
fight for Islamic ideals against imperialism. He worked to free Buhara emirate from the 
Russians. He attended the Congress of the Peoples of the East called by the Third 
International Soviets at Baku in September 1920 with these intentions. The Bolsheviks 
supported the Holy War of Muslims against the imperialists. He intended to mobilize 
Eastern Turkish resistance particularly the Basmachis against the Soviets and to set up an 
independent state in Central Asia.45  
 
Enver Pasha was killed in the Tajik Hills in action against the Soviets on 8 August 
1922. In Turkey, periodicals such as Bozkurt ( Grey Wolf ) and Cinaralti ( Under the 
Maple Tree ) while propagating the unity for all the Turkish peoples and liberation of the 
Turks of the Soviet Union also described the exploits of Enver Pasha in Turkestan.  
 
With his death on Turkestan soil he offered the supreme sacrifice for the country 
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and for the history of the Turks.46 It was acknowledged that “Enver Pasa spent his entire 
life in a perpetual battle in both the political and the military fields in order to restore the 
long-lost glory of an Empire which no longer existed.”47 
 
2.2.6 World War II and After  
 
The outbreak of the World War II (1939-1945) created new hopes for the Turkish 
unification among the Turks in Turkey and Pan-Turkists in the Caspian Sea Basin as 
well.  
 
Particularly, the eruption of the German-Soviet War produced a great stimulation 
among the Turks with the satisfaction of finding a powerful ally to fight against the 
Soviets. The Turkish foreign officers advocating the German-Turkish cooperation were 
actively engaged in the promotion of anti-Soviet schemes. Pan-Turkism was a helpful 
tool of anti-Soviet propaganda in the Caspian Sea area and pan-Turkists were eager to 
participate in the struggle against the Soviets. It can be noted that, along with these 
events, pan-Turkism became even more popular. There was a rise in the number of pan-
Turkist periodicals and youth organizations which were the cultural centers of Turkey.  
 
Increased cooperation occurred between the Germans and the Turks on the issues 
of intelligence gathering and military operations. Nearly all of the Turkish leaders in the 
West and Turkey supplied the Germans with various documents and the Germans also 
sought the opportunities for exchange of ideas.  
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 From the military perspective there were Turks from the USSR in the German 
armed forces during World War II. These Turks were part of the pan-Turkist activity and 
they fought against the Soviets. This was the most important aspect of World War II pan-
Turkist activity. As Hostler explains, the Germans were aware of the Turkish potential to 
make allies out of the Central Asian populations. The overwhelming majority of the 
Turkish volunteers were recruited from among Soviet prisoners of war captured by the 
Germans. As for the German objectives Turks fighting against the Soviets would be a 
great contribution to German forces.48 
 
On December 30, 1941 the high command of the Wehrmacht was directed to 
establish a Turkestan legion consisting of members of the following nationalities: 
Turkmens, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghizs, Karakalpaks and Tajiks. Also a Caucasian 
Mohammedan Legion was composed of Azerbaijanis, Dagestanis, Ingushes, Lezhins and 
Chechens a Georgian Legion and an Armenian Legion.49  
 
On the other hand the Turks were expecting some rewards in return for their help. 
Turkish ruling circles were hoping that the Turks would be united by establishing 
externally independent states. However it was in question whether the Eastern Turks, 
who were at the center of these plans, were supporting Enver Pasha and other pan-Turkist 
ideologists in Turkey. Some of these people believed that Turks who amalgamated in the 
new Turkish republic were not entitled to be included under the term ‘true Turkish 
nationality’. From their perspective they had lost their Turkish character long ago. 
Despite the expectations of pan-Turkist circles Germany’s defeat against the USSR 
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became the turning point of the expansion of Pan-Turkist feelings in Turkey.  
 
2.2.7 Reactions on Pan-Turkism  
 
At the time of the outbreak of the German-Turkish collaboration against the 
Soviets during World War II., some private Turco-German diplomatic talks and the 
unofficial negotiations of pan-Turkists in Berlin were found. Concurrently youth 
organizations in Turkey were engaging in wide scale movements. As Hostler explains, 
these noisy demonstrations were patronized by some activists from the older generation. 
Common themes of these organizations were nationalistic passion for the ancient Turkish 
symbols of the grey wolf or of leaders such as Atilla or Cengiz Khan.50  
 
Zeki Velidi Togan was one of the sponsors of the pan-Turkist organizations that 
emerged after the German-Soviet War. He was a scholar and a politician. As Paksoy 
identifies, “he was a key figure in the uprising against control by the Bashmachi, a group 
of disaffected intellectuals, Islamic patriots and others who opposed the new order.” 51 
Zeki Velidi Togan established a secret society. The aim of this society was to create one 
unified Turkish state as soon as the German victory was guaranteed. In the broadest sense 
Zeki Velidi Togan and likeminded people viewed all of Central Asia as Turkestan.52They 
also planned to aid in the organization of the liberation of the prisoners of war of Turkish 
origin who were in German hands.  
 
Another cluster of Pan-Turkists was led by the veteran politician, Dr. Riza Nur, 
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poet, writer, journalist and army officer who died in 1942. He wrote a detailed book on 
Turkish History published by the Ministry of Education in 1914-26.53 As Foss explains 
this study gives the Turks dominance in world history by dividing them into the Turks of 
the Motherland and the Turks of the Outer Homelands. According to Riza Nur, groups, 
who do not belong to the Chinese, Egyptian, Indian, North African and American 
civilizations, form the Turks of the Motherland, Central Asia.54  
 
After the death of Riza Nur, Nihal Atsiz took the leading role of the pan-Turkist 
intellectual movement. Atsiz was a secondary school teacher who was accused in 1944 of 
spreading racist and Pan-Turanist ideals among his pupils. This circle published several 
magazines among which was Tanridagi ( Holy Mountain ). According to Uzer, Nihal 
Atsiz was an advocate of racism and Turkism. Like previous nationalists Atsiz was also 
influenced by the expansionist and irredentist rhetoric of the political atmosphere of the 
1930. The point that he differed from the earlier pan-Turkist thinkers was in the area of 
religion. As Uzer explains “he was not openly denying religion but his anti-religious bias 
was apparent in his articles.”55 Uzer notes that, for Atsiz “everything should be national: 
language, literature, music and way of life.”56 
 
In response to the above efforts to propagate pan-Turkism there were some 
reactionary presentations against Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism at the 1954 Tashkent 
Conference. As Hostler explains special interest was attracted by a paper written by 
Babadjan Gafurov the first Secretary of the General Committee of the Communist Party 
of the Tajik SSR. Gafurov claimed that “Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism were the two 
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ideologies that were under the special protection of International imperialism; America 
was trying in every way to exploit these ideologies for its aggressive aims.”57 America 
was pretending to protect Muslims and to fight for their independence movements. 
However its actual aim was to organize military blocks in the Near and Middle East. 
Gafurov’s lecture supported the conclusion that nationalism in Central Asia and in 
Kazakhstan was primarily an expression of Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism and Pan-
Iranism.58  
 
2.3 Language 
 
Findley argues that “where different populations came into contact Turkic speech 
has usually prevailed with the result that linguistic assimilation has been a crucial 
element in the ethnogenesis of the Turkic peoples.”59Some scholars suggest that no factor 
unites all Turks but language. In support of this claim, linguists insist that the unity of the 
Turkic peoples is most apparent in language. There is resemblance among the Turkish 
languages because they all belong to a larger Altaic family. Turkish languages that 
divided into several courses in their historical evolution are as follows. According to 
Deny, the French Turkologist, the Turkish dialects are divided into eight groupings:  
 
North Eastern: This dialect is spoken by Mongolians, Yakuts, Tuva,Karagais and 
other small Turkish speaking tribes  
 
Hakas ( Khakass ): This dialect is spoken by the small tribes of the Abakan and 
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Minusinsk area.  
 
Altaic: This dialect is spoken in the region of the Altaic Mountains.  
 
Eastern Siberian: This dialect is spoken by the tribes of the Chulim river region 
 
Volga-Ural: This dialect is spoken by the Tatars of Kazan and Baskhirs.  
 
Central Asian: This dialect is spoken in Chinese Turkestan, Kazakhstan, 
Kirghizistan and Uzbekistan 
 
South western: This dialect is spoken in Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and the 
Azerbaijanis in Persia, Northern Caucasus and Anatolia  
 
Other: spoken in  Crimean and Chuvash Nogais of the Dobruja and Kuban region  
 
According to Deny; all of these Turkish languages are related with the Turkish 
tongue except Yakut and Chuvash.60 It should also be noted that the skill of 
communication has many variables other than being a linguistic matter. As Krader writes, 
“communication by words depends to a great degree on a common language but many 
other factors are involved.”61 Some of these factors are social, political and historical 
factors. In Central Asia, for example, linguistic disunity is affected by political disunity.  
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2.3.1 Dialectic Similarities between the Turkish Language and the Languages of 
Central Asian Countries  
 
2.3.1.1 Azeris  
 
Azerbaijanis are the nearest Turkish kinsmen to the Anatolian Turks and their 
language is closely related. Turkish language started to gain influence in Azerbaijan 
during the period of Seljuk Empire.62 There are several Azerbaijani dialects but all Turks 
of Azerbaijan understand each other without difficulty and can be understood by 
Anatolian Turks. Azerbaijanis differ from the Turks in Turkey in their religious sect, 
which is Shiite. However as Hostler explains, they are the nearest Turkish kinsmen to the 
Anatolian Turks and their language is closely related.63  
 
Turkish TV programs are watched in Azerbaijan with great interest. This transfer 
helped to transfer some words in Anatolian Turkish to Azeri Turkish. For example; 
grandchildren translate some words that are used in a Turkish TV series to their 
grandparents while they are both watching the same program. As Karaman says, some of 
the new words that Azeri newspapers have started to use are “saygi, bilim, kolay, 
ekonomi, cadde, konu, mutlu”.64  
 
2.3.1.2 Kazakhs  
 
Ethnically Kazakhs are of Mongolian descendant but they have retained a 
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primitive Turkish vocabulary. This pervasiveness of a pure Turkish speech throughout 
the Kazakh steppe shows that the Turkish element is ascendant in Kazakhstan.65  
 
In 1928, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the great Turkish reformer, instituted the Roman 
alphabet as standard for Turkey. The Soviet colonial administration, which was affected 
by this move, eliminated the use of the Roman alphabet in Kazakhstan. There, the 
instruction of children was switched to the Cyrillic spelling and the use of thousands of 
school books was halted. As a tool of writing Turkish the Cyrillic script was more fitting 
than the Arabic.66 The Kazakh people did not resist to this change at the time. As Dave 
explains, in authoritarian post-Soviet states citizens easily accept the official identity 
categories in the absence of debates on important issues such as identity and language. 
Dave says that “when claiming proficiency in the state language is both easy and risk-free 
for the titular group, there are few incentives to fight a political battle over the language 
issue and resist the language policy of the state.”67 
 
2.3.1.3 Uzbeks  
 
Turks form the largest group in Uzbekistan. Likewise Uzbeks are the largest 
group of Turks in Central Asia with many small Turkish clans in neighboring republics.  
 The literary language of the Uzbeks is Chatagatai which was developed in the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and in diverse parts of the Muslim Turkish world. The 
Ottoman Turkish, which is the other prominent language developed in the same period 
with the Chatagatai, was replaced by Turkish which is used currently. Today the 
 39
language of the people in Uzbekistan is Uzbek while the old ruling class uses the written 
language of Chatagatai. In general the Uzbek government pursues strongly nationalist 
policies called "Uzbekization"; the intention is to distance Uzbekistan from Russia.68 
 
Turkish and Uzbek proverbs show some similarities in terms of format and 
content. This matters with regards to the unity of culture as well as language. Two of the 
proverbs that both Turks and Kazakhs use are as follow:  
 
Gapirganing kumus, gapirmagning altin. /Soz gumusse sukut altindir. / Speaking 
is silver, silence is gold. 
 
Bir gun tuz iggan yerga kirk kiin salam ber. /Bir fincan kahvenin kirk yil hatiri 
var. / A cup of coffee has a 40-year memory.69 
 
2.3.1.4 Turkmens  
 
Turkmens form a link with the Western Turks since they do not differ essentially 
from the Persian Azerbaijanis and the Anatolian Turks. Their language belongs to the 
same group as Anatolian and Azerbaijan. Among the languages of Anatolia, Azerbaijan 
and Turkmenistan, the first two are more closely connected and the Azerbaijani can 
understand Anatolian Turkish with more ease than Turkmen people.  
 
Like other Turkic Republics Turkmenistan was given the right to choose its own 
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alphabet. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a purely Turkmen literary language 
developed and the unified Latin Turkish alphabet was eventually adopted in 1929-1930 
considering the sounds that are not foreign to its own language.  
 
2.3.1.5 Kirghizs 
 
The Kirghiz language is a member of the Turkic subfamily of Altaic languages. 
The Kirghiz have remained almost entirely unmixed and are on the whole the truest 
ethnic representatives of the Turks. Their language belongs to the groups of Turkic 
languages. After the alphabet was modified in 1924 and the unified Turkish Latin 
alphabet was adopted in 1928 the literary language showed remarkable development. The 
Latin alphabet was replaced by a Cyrillic alphabet in 1940. There were attempts to return 
to the Latin alphabet after the independence but this has never been implemented. 
 
With the “Law on the Official Languages of Kyrgyzstan in 2001,” Russian was 
accepted as the official language of Kyrgyzstan and can be used in public sphere along 
with the national language, Kirghiz.70  
 
2.4 Islam as a Shared Identity between Turkey and the Turkic World  
 
There is not extensive information on Turkish religious life in the pre-Islamic 
period. Turks’ religion was based on an ancient system of complex beliefs widespread in 
Inner Asia. The conventional name for this belief system was Shamanism. Shamanism is 
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a method to calm the body and mind and to get rid of stress in a mechanical way. It heals 
not only the mind but also it is believed to heal the soul.71 In the period before Islam 
shaman leaders were not only called for routine religious practice but also they were 
called for medical needs. For example Krader notes that “a shaman is a curer who 
practices his medicine in a state of trance or ecstacy” and he continues writing that “a 
constant feature is the beating on a drum and singing songs which invoke Adam, Noah or 
Daniel.”72 
 
From the Middle Eastern point of view, the Turkish flux into the Islamic world 
occured with the capture of Turkish nomads in border raids. Actually Islam was 
introduced to the Turkish peoples of Anatolia with the Alparslan’s victory of the 
Malazgirt battle. This happened long after the rise of Islam. The conquerors of Anatolia 
were no longer the predominant Arab sources of the early Islamic conquests but rather 
Turks. It is noteworthy that the roots of today’s modern Turks are found in Anatolia. 
Turks were the descendants of the non-Muslim, non-Turkish peoples who inhabited the 
region before the Battle of Malazgirt (1071). In a much quoted phrase, “we are both the 
conquerors and the conquered.” Turks’ conversion to Islam had opened the gates of the 
Middle East to Turks. Anatolia became the place then where the Turks mixed their inner 
Asian nomadic heritage, their Islamic heritage and the ancient Mediterranean heritage of 
agrarian civilization.73 
  
 From the victory of Malazgirt to the fourteenth century, most Turks converted to 
Islam. This brought the first great civilizational divide in the history of Turks. The 
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creation of a Turco-Islamic culture started with the Central Asian peoples’ entrance to 
Islam. The Turkish adoption of Islam changed their identity. It has been suggested that 
Muslim Turks sank their national identity in Islam as the Arabs and the Persians had 
never done.74 As Cagatay explains Islam has become more than a faith for its believers. It 
is also a particular set of belief systems and morals which command the practices of daily 
life and socialization of the Muslims. Until the establishment of secular systems the 
Turks in Anatolia and the Turks in Central Asia were gathered around “a joint faith, a 
collective culture, a shared identity, and a common political goal.”75 In short Islam, one 
of the great world religions, was the basis for most Turks’ identity. The significance of 
this change becomes clear from the basic features of Islamic faith. 
 
As the last monotheist religion Islam means “submission [to the one God],” and a 
Muslim is “one who submits”. The Qur’an identifies Abraham as a Muslim and Muslims 
see Islam as the religion of Abraham. Abraham has also submitted to God and he was a 
monotheist. Actually, Adam is believed to generate an understanding of relations among 
Islam, Christianity, and Judaism that proved profoundly important for later Islamic 
societies. 
 
The revelations that Prophet Muhammad (sav) received during his life were 
compiled into the written text of Qur’an. The Qur’an includes many topics and characters 
that are also found in the Bible and frequently mentions Jews and Christians. This is 
because all of God’s prophets (nabi) and messengers (rasul) received the same 
revelations.  
 43
 Although the Prophet Muhammed (sav) is regarded as the last prophet, Muslims 
accept all the previous Prophets of God as they are acknowledged in the Qur’an. The 
Prophet Muhammed (sav) was born in 570 C.E., and his prophetic mission continued 
from 610 to his death in 632 C.E.  The Qur’an, the holy book of Islam, includes all the 
principles of Islam for the community of believers to follow. 
 
Accepting Islam means announcing the oneness of God, tawhid. It means 
accepting certain beliefs, summarized in this oft-quoted verse: “O you who believe, you 
shall believe in GOD and His messenger, and the scripture He has revealed through His 
messenger, and the scripture He has revealed before that.  Anyone who refuses to believe 
in GOD, and His angels, and His scriptures, and His messengers, and the Last Day, has 
indeed strayed far astray.” (Qur’an 4.136) 
 
When a person believes in Islam, he becomes a member of the Islamic 
community, umma. There are certain rules that members practice. The most basic 
principles are the “five pillars” of Islam: the profession of faith (shahada), prayer (salat 
in Arabic, namaz in Persian or Turkish), almsgiving (zakat), fasting (sawm) during 
Ramadan, and the pilgrimage (hajj). The obligatory prayer ritual occurs five times a day, 
although of course one can also pray at other times; the pilgrimage is obligatory once in a 
lifetime for every adult Muslim who is physically and financially capable of it. Fasting 
time occupies a month in a year. During the fasting time people, rich and poor, go 
without food and drink from dawn to dusk.  
 
 44
The five pillars shaped Islamic societies in numerous ways. For example the 
fivefold prayer helped Islamize the carpet making. Turkic carpets were used as prayer 
rugs which are called seccade. Struggle ( jihad ) is a term meaning the struggle for inner 
development. Another meaning of it is the struggle for the defense of Islam, the Holy 
War. The latter was often referred to as Gaza.  Originally it referred to the “raiding” that 
bedouin tribes carried out among themselves. This Islamic word gave Turks a common 
purpose, which transcended tribal difference.  
 
By the time Turks began to convert to Islam the religion had already led to the 
development of a civilization that went far beyond those basics. After the death of the 
Prophet Muhammed (sav) there has been a political split notably between Sunni and Shii 
Muslims, of whom the former ultimately became the majority. This split was mostly 
because of the questions of how to choose a new leader for the community after the death 
of the Prophet and how to understand that leader’s role. Sunni and Shii Muslims 
represent the two sects in Islam. As Esposito explains, Muslims mention that “the 
differences between Sunnis and Shiis do not have to do with dogma but rather are 
political having to do with the qualifications for the head of the Muslim community.”76 
Sunni Muslims, followers of the Sunnah (example of the Prophet), believed that “Prophet 
Muhammad (s.a.v) had died without establishing a system for selecting a successor.”77 
On the other hand, Shiis believed that selection of the head of the Muslim community 
should be hereditary. Therefore they wanted Ali, Muhammad’s first cousin and closest 
living male relative, to be the successor. Today, Sunnis constitute approximately 85 
percent of Muslims and Shiis make up 15 percent.78 
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 In the period through the fifteenth century, both members of these two sects were 
expanding. While the Turkish warriors were leaving their footprints through the military 
and political expansion from Anatolia to India, Iranian ulema was spreading Persian and 
Arabic literature with Sunni synthesis in the same region.  
 
The examples of this Sunni synthesis include the establishment of medreses 
(schools of higher Islamic learning) and the sufi tradition and teachings, which emerged 
in the 12th century. This Sunni synthesis became the official religion of the Ottoman 
Empire. (1300–1922). It also provided universal values and it became recognizable by 
Muslims from different parts of the world.  
 
Islam has a centuries-old history in Central Asia. Islam entered Central Asia in the 
the mid-seventh century. It became the dominant religion of the region in the eighth 
century. Tashkent and Buhara are the important cities of the Islamic world with their 
“leading centers of learning and culture.”79 Islam has left a deep impact on the regional 
people with its medreses and mosques of Bukhara, Samarkand, Khiva, and other cities. 
However as Gunn states “during 70 years of Soviet rule, the Islamic mosques and 
medreses that had previously thrived in Central Asia were closed, destroyed, or converted 
into museums or factories; Islamic literature was carefully controlled by the state, and 
only a pale, state controlled "official" Islam was permitted to exist legally, though an 
underground Islam continued.”80  
 
In the pre-Islam era, Inner Asia provided the bedrock of Turks’ religiosity. Turks 
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adopted religions that were present in their area at some point. By comparison Islam 
covered all the periphery religions and served as a unifier for the Turks. In this sense 
Islam is the next most decisive constituent of Turkic identity after language. Islam made 
the Turks members of an international Islamic community and offered Turks universal 
standards in law and ethics derived from Abrahamic tradition. Naturally, the Turks’ 
experience of Islam ranged across the wide spectrum that any great religious tradition 
offers its adherents.81  Islam also allows people to adhere to different formats to practice. 
For example there are Sunnis and Alevis in Turkey today or a wide region, from the 
Balkans to China, hosts different traditions of Naksibendi or sufi order. Religiously 
devoted Muslims today do not strike out against modernity but they engage the modern 
world through the window of these different traditions. The whole Near East was 
transformed by the Islamic conquests of the Arabs but the process of Islamization was 
very slow and lasted until the twentieth century when some nomadic Turkish tribes of 
Northern Kazakhstan and Western Siberia were converted to Islam by Kazan Tatar 
missionaries.  
 
Currently, Islam is a strong part of the Turkish peoples’ culture in Central Asian 
countries and Azerbaijan. However, the official Soviet atheism that lasted for 70 years 
broke people’s ties with traditional Islamic teachings and practices. People are working to 
reconstruct their Islamic identity within the five formerly Soviet Republics of Central 
Asia. As Krader writes “the continuity of the Islamic tradition on the folk level is but a 
part of the whole; the intellectual life no longer exists in the form which it formerly 
had.”82Turkic people of the Soviet Union are trying to shape their own Islamic identity on 
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the basis of their historical past. 
 
There are also non-Muslim Turks. These people, historically, are Orthodox 
Christians (the Gagauz of the Danubian delta, the Chuvash of the Volga region, and the 
Yakuts and smaller groups in Siberia), Buddhists (the Tuvans of Siberia or the Yellow 
Uyghurs of Gansu Province, China), and a few Jews (the Karaim of eastern Europe).83 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter reveals that Ataturk’s nationalist principle was far from pan-ideals. 
Ataturk acknowledged that the origin of the Turks of today’s Anatolia was in Central 
Asia but he never advocated pan-Turkism, which is the ideology of the union of all 
Turks. Ataturk rather pursued territorial policies focusing on the development of the 
newly founded Turkish Republic. In opposition to Ataturk’s nationalist principle, pan-
Turkism suggests the gathering of all Turkic people of the post-Soviet region under the 
control of the same state. Ataturk’s stance on pan-Turkism explain why Turkish leaders 
strongly avoided pan-Turkist policies in Central Asia and Caucasus. As a matter of fact, 
Pan-Turkist adventures, historically, put Turkey into trouble. The pan-Turkist policies of 
Enver Pasha, who saw himself as the ruler of a realm embracing Chinese Turkestan, 
Russian Turkestan, Kazakhstan and Afghanistan and who was the commander of the 3rd 
Caucasian Army in the World War I, drove Turkey to a complete catastrophe. Thousands 
of qualified Turkish military troops got killed in their struggle against Soviets to help 
Central Asians free themselves from Moscow’s authority. This is an important event that 
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takes place in Turkish historical memory in a negative way. Additionally the defeat of the 
Turkish-German alliance against Soviets put an end to Turkey’s pan-turkist adventures. 
These historical events explain political leaders’ distance from pan-turkism. On the side 
of the leaders of the Turkic Republics they are also comfortable that there is no place for 
Pan-Turkism in Turkey’s official policy since they all wanted equal relations with other 
countries and wanted to be respected.  
 
Turkey has an ethnic link with the five republics which are the subjects of this 
study. The Turks of Anatolia originally came from inner Asia and the Turks of the 
republics are aware of their common origin with those of the Turkish Republics. This 
sense of belonging has not been destroyed over time.  
 
In the case of language no other factor unifies Turkic people better than language. 
As French Turkologist Deny states dialects spoken in the regional countries are related 
with the Turkish tongue.84 Islam is the last explained factor that Turkish people of Turkey 
and the region can gather around.  
 
As it is apparent from the factors listed above Turkey is in a more advantageous 
position than any other country in the world in terms of integrating with the region and 
exploiting the potential of the region with its cultural closeness and familiarity of the 
language.  
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CHAPTER 3: ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE 
REGIONAL COUNTRIES  
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I will explore what the common ties that are explained in the 
previous chapter mean for the countries in practice by analyzing Turkey’s economic 
relations with the Turkic republics. My systematic approach is to talk about the countries 
in an alphabetical order.  
 
I will start with Azeri-Turkish relations. Azerbaijan, which is the major oil 
exporter of the region, is an economically significant country for Turkey, which is in 
need of energy for its growing industry. Next I will analyze Turkish-Kazakh economic 
relations. Kazakh economy displays strong growth with its gas producing areas and high 
oil prices and is open to foreign investors. Turkey did not want to lose the opportunity to 
exploit Kazakhstan’s openness to foreign investors and became one of the largest 
investors in Kazakhstan. I will continue with Kyrgyzstan which is the only country that is 
a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Despite the institutional and 
structural problems plaguing the Kirghiz economy, Kyrgyzstan is a promising country 
with its open market economy. Turkmen-Turkish economic relations form the next 
section in this chapter. Turkmenistan is a very important exporter of natural gas having 
the 4th largest natural gas reserves in the world. Estimates place Turkmenistan’s natural 
gas reserves among those of the world’s top 15 gas producing countries.85 It is important 
for Turkey to engage in international pipeline construction business relations with 
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Turkmenistan as a country, which needs natural gas for domestic consumption. The final 
part of this chapter is on Uzbek-Turkish economic relations. Turkey wants to take part in 
the reconstruction process of Uzbek industry and Turkey already has outstanding trade 
relations with Uzbekistan. 
 
3.2 Basic Drawbacks and Motivations to Invest in the Caspian Sea Region 
 
The Caspian Sea Region offers some challenges for foreign investors as well as 
opportunities. There is an unstable investment atmosphere in the post-Soviet region, 
where proper tax regulations and legal frameworks are missing. The regional countries, 
which gained their sovereignty at the beginning of the 1990s, are still in a period of 
transition from command economies to liberal ones. This transition period, however, is 
obviously not problem-free. The area has to deal with deficits, low output, unemployment 
and high inflation rate. 
 
Corruption is another pervasive problem of this region. The business groups 
operating in the region are affected by corruption which prevents companies from 
functioning well. This corruption might be normal to a certain extent considering that the 
regional countries are facing challenges in their efforts to develop their economic 
situation. One excuse local people pose for corruption is that the majority of the foreign 
companies are not contributing heavily to the country’s economy. They are operating 
independently rather than working in cooperation with local companies. In this way 
people lose the opportunity to learn from foreign companies’ experiences and they feel 
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alienated.  
 
Foreign direct investments are crucial for the ex-Soviet states to be able to 
modernize their economic structure and integrate to the rest of the world. Under Soviet 
rule people of the Caspian Sea Region supplied Moscow with raw materials as their 
primary economic activity. To free themselves economically from Moscow, people need 
to diversify their economies. They are desperately in need of foreign capital and new 
technology to become economically independent. FDI is also necessary to be able to 
extract and deliver oil, gas, mineral and other raw materials to increase the level of 
income. Their economic structure needs to be renewed with new regulations. At the same 
time new road and rail networks and oil and gas pipelines need to be constructed. 
Additionally businesspersons of the Caspian Sea Region need to export their raw 
materials like copper and cotton to the outside world to generate hard-currency earnings.  
 
It is worth mentioning that it is not as easy as it seems to make investments in 
these regional countries. Under current regulations, state monopolies restrict the entry of 
private firms into certain industries, such as pipeline construction. It has also become 
hard for Turkey, which is perceived as a brother company, to become involved in the 
region because of some economic policy constraints. 
 
Turkey is aware that fostering commercial activities in the region will make a big 
difference in the economies of the newly independent Turkic countries and will lead to 
economic cooperation. Furthermore a cooperative atmosphere will establish closer ties 
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among the ethnically and religiously diverse states that occupy the Caucasus and Central 
Asia. Turkey also expect to gain major economic benefits from the development of closer 
ties with the regional countries, which are seen as promising markets for the growing 
Turkish industry. Especially for small sized companies it is profitable to invest in the 
region in the absence of serious competitors at the initial stages of the republic’s 
independence. It was an opportunity for the Turkish entrepreneurs to locate their 
investment in a region where Western companies were slow in the region deferred by 
unstable business atmosphere. On the other hand Turkish entrepreneurs had very limited 
possibilities in Western countries where the market is more structured and the economy is 
more developed when compared to the Central Asian market.  
 
Among other investor countries particularly Turkey is quite motivated to do 
business in the region. Indeed, potential for economic cooperation is quite substantial, 
and the Turkish private sector, with the support of the government, has moved 
extensively to exploit the region's economic potential. In addition to economic gains, 
from a policy perspective, the expectation is that Turkey will become politically more 
effective in regional and global politics because of cultural and ethnic links with the 
region's large Turkic populations, which are undergoing profound political changes. This 
view is also based on the belief that Turkey's secular and emerging democratic 
credentials will enhance its importance as a model for the former Soviet republics. 
 
Turkish business groups are aware that there are many opportunities for small and 
midsized businesses in many sectors in Central Asia and the Caucasus because of a lack 
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of competition and the existence of several positions offering business opportunities. 
These benefits are valid for western investors as well. However, unlike Turkey, they need 
to overcome language and culture barriers first. Americans and Western Europeans often 
experience difficulties in negotiating and bargaining with their prospective Central Asian 
clients. Turkey, on the other hand, enjoys the privilege of language familiarity and 
cultural closeness.  
 
Turkish people can adopt themselves more easily than Western business people to 
the local conditions in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Considering these factors, for the 
Western company owners, who want to start business in the region, cooperation with the 
Turkish companies may be beneficial. Westerners can benefit from Turkish peoples’ 
cultural affinities with the local people. As Winrow suggests, although Turkey doesn’t 
have the capability to act as an original source it can act as a conduit for Western and 
Japanese capital.86 Winrow suggests that “Western companies can provide much needed 
capital and sophisticated technology while Turkish companies can provide quality labor 
at a reasonable cost.”87 Turkish businesspersons can also provide the necessary 
connections to start a business since they can establish social ties with the people 
relatively easily. Therefore it is recommended for multinational corporations to establish 
a base in Turkey to link up with Central Asia and the Caspian Region as well.88 By doing 
so; they will also utilize the services of Turkish sub-contractors and personnel to secure 
access to Central Asia.  
 
Economic relations between Turkey and the regional countries bring mutual 
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benefits as well. The new republics will gain by attracting investment and technological 
expertise as well as a secure route for distributing their products to the West. As former 
president Turgut Ozal recognized, Turkey does not possess the required capital, expertise, 
and technology to meet the needs of the newly emerging republics. For this reason, as 
Aras Argues, “Ozal marketed Turkey as a channel for Western and Far Eastern 
investments to explore, produce, and distribute the former Soviet republics' oil, gas, and 
mineral riches.”89 
 
Despite all these advantages Turkish investors, who enter the region with great 
enthusiasm, should question and calculate how the new republics would make payments 
to fund the projects or to meet the costs of Turkish exports. In the economic sphere, As 
Hale argues, “Turkish industry can fill some important gaps in the economies of the new 
republics but it can not directly supply more than a fraction of the capital and advanced 
technology that is ultimately needed.”90  
 
3.3 Bilateral Economic Relations between Turkey and the Regional Countries  
  
3.3.1 Turkey-Azerbaijan 
   
3.3.1.1 Turkey’s Oil Demand 
 
Turkey forms a strategic energy bridge between the major oil and gas producing 
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areas in the Caspian Sea Basin and the consumer markets of the West. This feature of 
Turkey makes it increasingly important to world oil markets. However Turkey lacks 
significant domestic energy resources.  
 
Turkey needs oil for its growing industry. It has been estimated that to maintain 
the present course of its economic development Turkey will require the importation of 
vast amounts of crude oil in the coming decades roughly 55 million tons annually by the 
year 2010.91 Figure 2 below illustrates that Turkey’s oil production has declined by half 
since 1991, when production peaked at 85,300 bbl/d. EIA forecasts that Turkey will 
consume 618,000 bbl/d of oil in 2006, down about 4 percent from 2005 figures. In 
general, as Turkey Energy Report indicates Turkish oil demand is mostly dependent on 
the country’s economic performance.  
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Source: Energy Information Administration 
Figure 2: Turkey’s Oil Production and Consumption between 1986 and 2006  
 
 
Turkey’s oil sector includes both state-owned and private oil companies. Turkish 
Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) accounts for roughly 70 percent of Turkey’s domestic oil 
output and this corporation is responsible for the oil exploration and production activities. 
The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources monitors the oil sector and makes 
decisions on the new projects.  
 
Turkish Petroleum Refineries Corporation (TUPRAS) is the company that 
dominates the storage and refining sector in Turkey. TUPRAS controls 85 percent of 
Turkey’s domestic refining activities. TUPRAS became a semi-private corporation with 
the Koc-Shell Joint Venture Group’s purchase of a 51 percent stake in TUPRAS for 
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$4.14 billion in September 200592 The company , which is in charge of the oil transport 
sector, is Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (Boru Hatlari ile Petrol Tasima A.S/BOTAS) 
and BOTAS owns the operations of virtually the entire Turkish pipeline network.  
 
In December 2003, Turkish parliament passed a petroleum market reform bill. 
The aim of this law is to liberalize pricing of oil and oil products, end restrictions on 
vertical integration, and integrate pipeline, refining, and distribution functions. 
Parliaments are planning to privatize both TUPRAS and POAS (Petrol Ofisis, Turkey’s 
major petroleum product retailer). Also, as a result of this law, price ceilings and import 
quotas on petroleum products were raised in early 2005.93  
 
3.3.1.2 The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Project 
 
According to Turkey’s Energy Report, Turkey had 300 million barrels of proven 
oil reserves as of January 2006. During the first nine months of 2006, Turkey produced 
an estimated 43,000 barrels per day (bbl/d) of oil, of which 99 percent was crude oil.94 
However Turkey’s growing industry needs more oil.  
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Source: A to Z of Azerbaijan. http://www.azerb.com/az-ceyhan-map.gif 
Figure 3: The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline  
 
 
As mentioned above, Turkey is an important transit country. It lies between the 
energy-rich countries of the Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf regions and energy importing 
countries in continental Europe. Turkish officials evaluated a number of projects that 
would transport oil into Turkey without the use of Bosporus Straits which already has a 
heavy traffic. Numerous Bosporus pipelines have been planned. The Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan Pipeline (BTC), which bypasses the Bosporus Straits oil transit chokepoint, is the 
first one that has been constructed.  
 
The main economic goal behind this project, at the stage of feasibility studies, 
was that it would create economic wealth for the three nations, Azerbaijan, Turkey and 
Georgia, through which it passes.  It is the first direct pipeline to deliver crude oil from 
the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean without crossing Russian soil or passing through 
the Bosporus or Turkish Straits. The 1,100-mile pipeline costs nearly $4 billion to build, 
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and is operated by a BP-led consortium of 11 national and international oil companies.95 
The Turkish section is 1,070 kilometres long. It includes 4 pump stations, two metering 
stations and the Ceyhan marine export terminal96 This is such a large project that through 
the Community Investment Program (CIP), the BTC and the South Caucasus Pipeline 
(SCP) projects are working with 120 communities in Azerbaijan, 72 communities in 
Georgia and 300 communities in Turkey.97  
 
In May 2005, Azerbaijan began test filling in the Azeri section of the pipeline 
during the opening ceremony of the pipeline.98 On 10 August 2005 the first volumes 
reached the Azeri-Georgian border and a year after the opening ceremony the first tanker 
at the Turkish port of Ceyhan was filled with oil from BTC.99 This stage by stage line fill 
enabled the workers to ensure the integrity and safety of each section prior to introducing oil.  
 
The line is estimated to have a peak capacity of more than one million bbl/d, and 
Turkey is expected to earn between $140 and $200 million per year in transit and 
operating fees from the project.100 The team that was leading the BTC project was also 
leading the construction of the SCP project.  
 
Some national and international environmentalist groups opposed the construction 
of the BTC pipeline claiming that it has serious environmental and safety risks. They 
argue that this pipeline construction causes damage to property, drinking water pollution 
and is non-compliant with Georgian state environmental permit conditions. British 
Petroleum (BP), the major company responsible for this project, responded to these 
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claims by stating that Environmental and Social Impact Assessments were being carried 
out by an international team of independent consultants. BP officials claim that they are 
very careful not to damage protected ecological, areas or archaeological sites, to require 
no resettlement of people, and to result in no permanent disruption to the livelihoods of 
local populations. These assessments were even made available for public comment and 
consultation in the mid-2002.  
 
3.3.1.3 The South Caucasus Gas Pipeline Project  
 
Turkey possesses limited oil and natural gas resources. Therefore special attention 
has been paid to exploration and production activities in Turkey and abroad. The 
southeastern part of the country, particularly Hakkari, and the northwestern part of 
Turkey are the oil producing regions in the country. The country has oil in the Black, 
Mediterranean, and Aegean Sea. Two foreign oil companies, which are Royal Dutch 
Shell and Exxon Mobil, operating in Turkey extract oil from these areas. The production 
costs for oil reserves are high in Turkey. Therefore the recent exploration activities have 
focused on Turkey’s offshore regions.  
 
In 2005, TPAO and its international partners drilled the country’s first exploration 
wells in the Black Sea. The TPAO-Torreador-Stratic joint venture oversaw the Western 
Black Sea Exploration and Development Project, while the TPAO-BP-Chevron joint 
venture ran the Eastern Black Sea Offshore Project.101 
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TPAO is also working for exploration and production projects along with the help 
of the Turkish Petroleum Overseas Company (TPOC). One of the company’s most 
significant overseas oil production assets is the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli (ACG) Project in 
Azerbaijan, which holds 5.4 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. TPAO has a 6.75 
percent interest in the ACG Project, which produced an average 350,000 bbl/d of oil at 
the end of 2005.102  
 
TPAO is also part of the Alov Exploration Project in the Azeri part of the Caspian 
Sea, which holds an estimated 5 billion barrels of recoverable oil reserves and sizeable 
natural gas reserves. The Alov exploration bloc formerly called Abikh Trend is located 
110 miles (180 km) south-southeast of Baku, the Azeri capital.103 Exploration activities 
are expected to be carried out between 2006 and 2008. 
 
Turkey has signed an agreement to import natural gas from Azerbaijan’s large 
Shah Deniz field. This gas pipeline is known as Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) or the 
South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP). This is a 692 km long pipeline designed to bring gas 
from the Shah Deniz Field in the Azerbaijan sector of the Caspian Sea through Georgia 
and on to Turkey-Georgian border. As it is mentioned above this line’s route is parallel to 
the BTC pipeline. The last point for the BTE pipeline is near Horasan in Turkey.  
  
 Construction on the $1.3 billion project began in late 2004, and the pipeline has 
been active since late 2006 transporting gas to Azerbaijan and Georgia from Shah Deniz 
Stage 1. This line is initially expected to carry 233 Bcf per year of natural gas to the 
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Turkish market, and can be increased to 700 Bcf with future additions of compressor 
stations. BP and Norway’s Statoil each hold a 25.5 percent stake in the project and serve 
as co-operators, with the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), Russia's 
Lukoil, Turkey's TPAO, France's Total, and Iran's NICO holding around 10 percent 
each.104  
 
According to information given on the BP website, “BP and Stat Oil, as the 
operators of the Shah Deniz gas condensate development project and Azerbaijan Gas 
Supply Company (AGSC) respectively announced that the first gas started to flow into 
BOTAS’s gas transportation system on July 3, 2007.”105 Azerbaijan Gas Supply 
Company (AGSC), which is responsible for the gas sales, sold the gas from Shah Deniz 
Stage 1 to Azerbaijan, Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation (GOGC), BOTAS and the BTC 
Company.  
 
This gas is transported to BOTAS’s gas transportation system through SCP. The 
pipeline was successfully tied to the Turkish pipeline system at the Georgian – Turkish 
border.  
 
3.3.1.4 Trade with Azerbaijan  
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Source: DEIK ( Foreign Economic Relations Board )   
Figure 4: Trade Volume between Azerbaijan and Turkey between 1992 and 2005 
 
 
Turkish businessmen are ranked top among the businessmen who make 
investments in sectors, excluding oil sector, in Azerbaijan. Companies, which were 
established solely by those Turkish businessmen or by partnership between Azerbaijani 
and Turkish businessmen, have provided thousands of people with jobs.  
 
As it is apparent from Graph 2, prepared by Foreign Economic Relations Board 
(DEIK), Azerbaijan's foreign trade volume reached 4 billion 37 million U.S. dollars 
between January 2003 and October 2003. Turkey has 4.32 percent of share in exports and 
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7.68 percent of share in imports of Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan has around 3 percent of 
share in foreign trade volume of Turkey. Turkey’s trade volume in Azerbaijan reached 
$800million in 2005. Variety of goods from electronic devices to automotive industry 
tools are being exported to Azerbaijan. As it is apparent in Graph 2 trade between Turkey 
and Azerbaijan shows an increasing trend starting from 2002. More than half of the 
Turkish imports from Azerbaijan are based on mineral oil. Recently many Turkish and 
Azerbaijani companies joined ‘The Seventh Turkish Exports Goods Fair’, which was 
held in Baku in September 2003, to further improve economic relations.106 
 
3.3.1.5 Eximbank Credits from Turkey 
 
 Upon the break up of the Soviet Empire the Turkish Foreign Ministry signed 
“Agreed Minutes” agreements with the Turkic Republics to contribute to their 
development projects to increase economic cooperation between Turkey and the post-
Soviet Turkic Republics. These agreements included articles about opening credit 
accounts in the related republics’ state banks to finance some of their national 
development plans.  
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Table 1: Eximbank Credits  
COUNTRIES TOTAL CREDITS USED CREDITS 
Azerbaijan $250 million $91.74 million 
Kirghizstan $240 million $213 million 
Kyrgyzstan $75 million $75 million 
Turkmenistan $134.76 million $133 million 
Uzbekistan $375 million $369 million 
Source: DEIK ( Foreign Economic Relations Board ) 
 
 
Turk Eximbank opened a $250 million credit account in 1992 with an agreement 
signed between Turkish and Azeri states. This account was specified as buyers’ credit 
guaranteed by the Turkish state. Initially Turk Eximbank credits were used for Turkish 
exportation projects and for emergent needs like medicine and nutrition. Azerbaijan has 
spent $91.74 million of the credit till now.107  
 
Turk Eximbank only meets the costs of goods and services which are provided 
from Turkey to use for projects which are carried out by Turkish building contractors. In 
addition to this Turk Eximbank pays for the articles that are exported from Turkey. The 
only country that opened credit accounts for the Turkic Republics at the initial stages of 
their independence was Turkey. Other organizations attempted to enter this market only 
after they witnessed successful business experiences of Turkey. 
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3.3.2 Turkey-Kazakhstan  
 
3.3.2.1 Turkish Investment in Kazakhstan  
 
Business relations between Turkey and Kazakhstan started immediately after 
Kazakhstan’s independence. Turkey soon became active in all sectors of the Kazakh 
economy from agriculture to hotel management. 
 
Kazakhstan hosts a big part of Turkey’s investments in Central Asia. It is 
estimated that Turkey’s investment is worth $1.5 billion.108 Turkey is the fourth biggest 
investor in the country following the US, South Korea and England. The investment areas 
that the US and England mostly focus on are the petrol and gas industry, electricity and 
mining sectors. Turkish businesspersons mostly invest in the areas of telecommunication, 
hotel management, agriculture, supermarket management, nutrition, products made from 
iron, steel and copper, and services.  
 
During the first few years of the Kazakh Republic Turkish companies mostly 
started business in building construction. Recently Turkish companies turned their 
attention to the production of goods and services. Turkey also achieved considerable 
success in renewing the infrastructure of Kazakhstan’s industry and transportation.  
 
There are 129 Turkish funded companies in the country and the capital of these 
companies is worth $1.3 billion.109 Petrol, hotel management and construction, education 
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and banking sectors constitute %80-90 of Turkish investments in the country. According 
to the Foreign Trade Secretariat in Turkey, 54 Turkish companies working in the area of 
building construction have taken the responsibility of 147 projects that are worth $3.2 
billion.110 After Astana became the capital of the country, many state buildings and hotels 
in this city have been constructed by Turkish businessmen. The major Turkish companies 
operating in Kazakhstan are Alarko, Ahsel, Aysel, Emsaş, Enka, İdil, İsot, Koray, 
Mensel, Tekfen, Üçgen and Zafer.  
 
Among the important projects that Turkish companies have completed are Astana 
International Airport, General Assembly Building, Presidential Residence, Regent 
Ankara Hotel, Okan Intercontinental Astana, Children Rehabilitation Center, National 
Museum, Ahmet Yesevi University, Astana Towers, GSM Telecommunication 
Infrastructure, Kazakh section of Tengiz-Novorossisk pipeline, shopping centers, 
highways and factories.  
 
Turkish businesspersons also contribute to Kazakh peoples’ income by employing 
them in foreign direct investment (FDI) and building construction projects. Turkish 
investors have employed over 10.000 people. %85 of this labor force is composed of 
Kazakh people.  
 
Apart from these projects TPAO made considerable investments in Kazakhstan in 
the area of energy. TPAO is a state-owned company that has the largest share in Turkish 
investment in Kazakhstan. TPAO has established a joint venture with Kazakh Oil 
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Company and created ‘Kazakturkmunay’ (KTM) Company. TPAO’s investment between 
1994 and 1999, in this country is worth $272.9 million KTM is a company that produces 
5000 barrels of crude oil daily.111  
 
A recent deal that TPAO has signed with Kazakhstan is worth $750 million. This 
agreement was signed to develop oil reserves in the northwestern Aktyubinsk region near 
the Caspian Sea. The contract is expected to last at least 29 years, and Kazakhstan could 
earn $1.8 billion in revenues. TPOA and Amoco will set up a 50-50 joint venture to 
finance and implement the project. The first four years of the contract are set aside for 
exploration and the following 25 years for production. Turkish officials estimate that the 
region contains about 327 million barrels of oil.112These are the courageous attempts of 
Turkey to have a say in the energy game in the region. 
 
Kazakhstan has more economic projects to accomplish on its agenda. However 
Turkey does not have much to offer Kazakhstan about their new projects because these 
projects require high technology and capital which is beyond the limits of Turkey’s 
economic capacity.  
 69
3.3.2.2 Trade with Kazakhstan 
 
                   (in millions)  
 
Source: DEIK (Foreign Economic Relations Board)  
Figure 5: Trade Volume between Kazakhstan and Turkey between 1992 and 2005 
 
 
According to the 2006 report of DEIK on Turkish-Kazakh Commercial and 
Economic Relations, in the last 12 years trade relations between Turkey and Kazakhstan 
have followed an increasing trend and trade volume, which was $30 million in 1992 and 
reached $465 million in 2000. In 2001, however, trade volume was amounted to $210.1 
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million resulting from the situation that Turkey did not import mineral oil, which takes a 
significant place in Turkey’s importation products from Kazakhstan. Trade volume 
increased again starting from 2002 and in 2005 it increased by 28% by exceeding 
$1billion. 
 
Among the products Turkey exports to Kazakhstan are industrial machines, 
plastic tools, carpets, products made from steel, iron, aluminum and plastic, furniture, 
detergents, sugar and motor vehicles. In the future Turkey’s export is expected to be on 
textile, ready-made clothing, home products, agricultural and construction machines and 
food. 
 
Turkey’s export to Kazakhstan has shown a stable increase between 1995 and 
1998. In 1999 Turkey’s export rate decreased by 55 % when compared to the previous 
year due to the financial crisis in Russia. Kazakh foreign trade was dependent on the 
Russian economic situation and the 1998 Russian economic crisis affected Kazakh 
economy negatively. People preferred to buy Russian products, which were cheap at that 
time, to Turkish products. This crisis also affected Turkish business in the country. 
According to Kazakhstan Country Report, which was prepared by KOSGEB in 2004, 
indicates that prior to the crisis there were 250 active Turkish companies; today only half 
of these companies are able to continue operating in the country. After the Russian 
financial crisis was over Turkish-Kazakh relations were recovered. In 2000 Turkey’s 
exports volume increased by 22.8% again. In 2001 exportation rate showed only a slight 
change with a 1% percentage increase and in 2002 Turkey showed a 32% percentage 
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increase in its exportation to Kazakhstan. However Turkey’s export rate for Kazakhstan 
was still behind the level of export rate in 1998 considering that Turkey’s general export 
rate was 12 % in 2002. Kazakhstan’s share was % 0.4 in Turkey’s total exports.  
 
According to KOSGEB’s report, Kazakhstan’s 72 % of exported commodity to 
Turkey is related with mining sector. Nearly half of Turkey’s import from Kazakhstan is 
composed of copper and copper-made products. Other than copper Turkey import 
cereals, leather, inorganic chemical materials, lead and products made from lead and zinc.  
 
Turkey’s import rate increased steadily until 2001. However due to the severe 
economic crisis in Turkey Turkey’s imports rate decreased by 74 % in 2001. Turkey 
experienced a strong financial crisis in 2001 and this led to the contraction of the 
economy. Chronic inflation undermined Turkish economic performance. Nominal and 
real interest rates were high, and unstable. The public debt burden was high and rising. 
Because of all these negative signs Turkey's growth record was weak and volatile. 
Eventually Turkey’s imports indicators started to reach its previous levels starting from 
2002. Despite these developments in Turkish exports to Kazakhstan the level of Turkish 
exports rate was still behind 1998 rates. This was because of the situation that 
Kazakhstan’s share in Turkey’s total exports was little with only a 4 percentage of total 
share.113  
 
 3.3.2.3 Eximbank Credits  
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Turk Eximbank has opened a $240 million credit account for Kazakhstan. $55.7 
million, $40 million of which has already been spent, is left for funding trade projects and 
$184 million, $173 million has already been spent, is left for investment projects.114 
 
Decisions to fund new projects are made by Turk Eximbank officials after a 
critical evaluation process. Turkey is willing to support all kinds of development projects 
which will bring mutual benefits to Turkey and Kazakhstan.  
 
3.3.3 Turkey-Kyrgyzstan  
 
3.3.3.1 Turkish Investment in Kyrgyzstan  
 
Kyrgyzstan is distinct from other Turkic Republics due to its membership in the 
WTO. Although this membership gives Kyrgyzstan the opportunity to be a partner of the 
global economy, Kyrgyzstan’s institutional and structural problems plague the 
development of its trade. The Kyrgyzstan Report, prepared by TICA in 2004, states that 
the Turkish-Kazakh trade was worth $100 million in 2005, four times the 2001 figures. 
Turkish exports constitute 90 percent of the bilateral trade volume, making it a key trade 
partner for Kyrgyzstan.115 
 
Turkish entrepreneurs were among the first foreign investors to bring technology 
and investment to the newly developing Kyrgyz economy and Kyrgyzstan was quick to 
instigate its liberal and democratic transition policies to reach macroeconomic 
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stabilization. Kyrgyzstan has one of the most open trade policies among former Soviet 
Union countries.116 That 90.7 percent of Kirghiz national income came from its foreign 
trade in 1991 may be appreciated as a sign of its openness to the outside world.117  
 
Turkish investments intensify in the areas of tourism, nutrition, beverage 
production, banking, furniture, tea packaging, plastic, education and production of 
building construction equipments. We learn from Dikkaya and Keles that one of the 
important business groups operating in Kyrgyzstan is the ATA Group, which was 
established in 1990. This group has three main business branches which are Detergent 
(Detas Co.), Food (Nobel Co.) and Furniture (Nobel Co.).This group, like any other 
business group, first made a feasibility study in Kyrgyzstan through personal 
acquaintances. When they saw that there is not much competition in the Kirghiz market 
they didn’t want to miss this opportunity. They sought out the best investment fields and 
soon they took a leading role in the market. There are two more major foreign direct 
investment motives in the region. One of them is the low labor costs and the other one is 
Kyrgyzstan’s proximity to other countries in the region, such as Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan. 
 
The ATA group has two factories and 300 workers in Kyrgyzstan. The group has 
a market share of 80 percent in detergent and is also well placed in the market for its 
chocolate products. This group also sells furniture from Turkey. They have a well placed 
market in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as well as in Kyrgyzstan. This kind of foreign trade 
has an important place in this group’s revenue.118 
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 Ucko Plastik Co. is another company that has been operating in Kyrgyzstan since 
1996. It has three separate business branches which are Bishkek Plastic Co. (plastic), 
Yukselen Ortaklar Co. (candy) and Hedef Co. (sugar and salt). Primary products, which 
are produced in Kirgizstan, of the company are plastic products, sugar and salt. This 
company is also exporting candies from Turkey. This company exports its products from 
Turkey to Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan as well. A big part of the company’s 
revenue comes from these four foreign markets.119 Beta Group is another Turkish 
company that operates in the area of tea production and packaging and has a significant 
market share in Central Asia. Beta Group diversified its investment areas by opening a 
shopping center called Beta Store and a restaurant called Beta Gourmet. Plaskap is 
another Turkish company that produces plastic lids for beverages in its factory which was 
opened in 1998 in Biskek.120 
 
In the area of building construction Turkish entrepreneurs have undertaken a 
smaller number of projects in Kyrgyzstan when compared to other Turkic Republics. 
Turkish contractors have completed 18 projects starting from 2002. System Engineering 
completed the construction of Hotel Biskek and undertook the responsibility of this 
hotel’s management with its Kirghiz partner. Some of the major projects that have been 
completed are Manas International Airport, Biskek Coca-Cola Factory, Hotel Biskek 
Pinara and Biskek-Os Highway Rehabilitation Project. Anadolu Group owns Coca Cola 
Biskek, 90 % of which belongs to the Turkish side, in association with Coca Cola 
Company. This company has 233 sale centers and has a 39 million tone production 
capacity. 
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 Turkey has an important place in banking and flight sector. Demir Kirghiz 
International Bank is one of the three big banks and the first international bank in 
Kyrgyzstan. The Turkish partner of this bank owns 70 % of this bank. Kyrgyzstan has 
only two airways operating in the country. One of them is Turkish Airways and the other 
one is British Airways.  
 
Additionally; six Kyrgyz companies have been operating in Turkey since 2003. 
Their total investment is worth 393 billion in Turkish Liras.121  
 
3.3.3.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Investing in Kyrgyzstan  
 
There are some disadvantages as well as advantages of investing in Kyrgyzstan. 
Some of these disadvantages are lack of regulatory rules, an unstable tariff system and 
unsatisfactory banking services resulting from the transformation of Kirghiz economy 
from Soviet style to a liberal one. There is no deposit insurance and the transaction fees 
are very high within the banks. One governmental regulation that makes things difficult is 
that acts which are passed on a particular date can affect transactions before the date 
these acts are approved. For this reason, the companies are forced to make some extra 
payments and edit their documents to make them in accordance with the laws. Apart from 
these the biggest problem is to get money from the Kirghiz creditors.122  
 
Investors in food business are not concerned about the quality of personnel. This 
situation directly affects the quality of products. The country offers cheap labor but 
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employees are not working as they are expected to work.123 Actually the problem with 
this country is that the communist work ethic is still pervasive. Thus employees can not 
adopt themselves to capitalist work practices overnight.  
 
One of the main obstacles that businesspersons have to deal with is a working 
infrastructure. There are no serious infrastructure problems in the capital city, Bishkek 
but the case is different for the other cities. Some cities experience irregular electricity 
cutoffs, tax, bribery, high turnover rate and difficulty in finding qualified employees. Red 
tape and the insufficiency of infrastructure affect small businesses negatively. However 
these companies seem to be content with cooperating in the region. They are in a 
leadership position in Kyrgyzstan. Moreover they wish to expand their businesses to the 
neighboring countries of Kyrgyzstan.  
 
The Turkish business groups are still satisfied with the current performance in 
spite of these drawbacks. They are making profits out of low competition in all sectors. 
FDI motives of the companies are mostly driven by Turkey’s economic conditions. Many 
groups decided to exploit economic opportunities when they faced the 2001 economic 
crisis. The company chose Kyrgyzstan to start a business mostly by their close contacts in 
the Kirghiz market. Lack of competition smoothed the progress of the company in the 
market. The other FDI motives in Kyrgyzstan were that cheap labor costs and 
Kyrgyzstan’s proximity to other countries in the region such as Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan.  
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In fact companies can make even more profits if they form partnerships in the 
region. This choice is not risk-free either; the problem with joint ventures is that the 
partner, who is expected to handle the drawbacks of the region, should be carefully 
chosen. 
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3.3.3.3 Trade with Kyrgyzstan  
                 (in millions) 
 
 
Source: Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency 
Figure 6: Trade Volume between Kyrgyzstan and Turkey between 1992 and 2004  
 
According to the Kyrgyzstan Country Report prepared by TIKA, trade volume, 
which was amounted to $3.2million in 1992 in Kyrgyzstan, reached $57.1 million in 
1997. Turkey’s trade volume in Kyrgyzstan increased starting from 2001 resulting from 
the fact that Russia’s financial crisis of 1998 and Turkey’s financial crisis in 2001 was 
over. 
 
Turkey’s exports to Kyrgyzstan are composed of woven textile goods, carpets, 
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electronic machines, plastics and plastic made products, cauldrons, soup, furniture, 
aluminum and aluminum made products. 
 
According to Kyrgyzstan Country Report prepared by Small and Medium Sized 
Industry Development Organization (KOSGEB), Turkey’s export rate increased by 5.2 % 
in 1997 and the trade volume was amounted to $29.6 million. In 1998 Turkey’s export 
rate decreased by 16.3 % and this decreasing trend in exports continued in 1999 and 
2000. In 1999 Turkey’s export volume to Kyrgyzstan declined by 44 % and in 2000 
Turkey’s export rate decreased even more than it was in 1999. However in 2002 Turkish 
export rate reached its level of 1999 with a 37 percentage increase. However Turkey’s 
export volume to this country has not yet reached its level which was reached before the 
Russian financial crisis. 
 
Product groupings such as fruits and vegetables, cotton, electronic machines and 
silk have an important place in Turkish imports from Kyrgyzstan. Turkey’s imports 
volume from Kyrgyzstan increased by 28.5 percentage in 1997 when compared to the 
previous year. In 1998 Turkey’s import rate decreased by 20.4 %. One year later 
Turkey’s import from Kazakhstan declined even more than 1998 with a 59 percentage 
decrease. This decreasing trend in the imports rate continued in 2000 as well with a 15.5 
percentage. In 2001 Turkey’s import rate increased by 156 %. The following year 
increasing trend in imports continued and imports from Kyrgyzstan increased by 150 % 
reaching a $15.7 million worth budget. Nearly 55 % of import is composed of eatable 
fruits and vegetables. 
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3.3.3.4 Eximbank Credits  
 
Credits from the Turkish Eximbank have done much to stimulate trade and 
business links between the two countries.Turk Eximbank opened a $75million credit 
account for Kyrgyzstan.124 Half of this credit would be used for national development 
projects and the second half was for financing trade in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz business 
groups used only $12.4 for development projects while they used all the money given for 
commercial projects.  
 
3.3.4 Turkey-Turkmenistan  
 
3.3.4.1 Turkey’s Need for Natural Gas  
 
Turkey’s need for natural gas has increased recently. According to Turkey’s 
Energy Profile Report, Turkey had 300 billion cubic feet (Bcf) of proven natural gas 
reserves as of January 2006.125 In 2004, Turkey consumed 793 Bcf of natural gas while 
only producing 24 Bcf of natural gas.  
 
The share of natural gas in primary energy consumption has been suggested to 
increase to 27 % in 2010. Natural gas consumption which is now 10 bcm, will reach 54 
bcm by 2010, increasing five times.126 Domestic natural gas production is expected to 
increase 250 million m3 in 1997 to 620 million m3 in 2000 and then the gas production 
will be decreased to 130 million m3 in 2005 and around 90 million m3 in 2010. These 
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figures show us the importance of natural gas imports for Turkey.127 
 82
 
          
 
Source: Energy Information Administration  
Figure 7: Turkey’s Natural Gas Consumption 
 
 
To meet the natural gas demand Turkey has been in pursuit of multiple 
international pipeline connections.  
 
Turkey wants to be a part of international pipeline construction business primarily 
because it needs natural gas for domestic consumption. Turkey’s gas demand is 
increasing rapidly and the prime consumers are industrial users and natural gas-fired 
electric power plants. Because of the severe economic problems the natural gas demand 
decreased from about 1.6 Tcf in 2005 to under 0.9 Tcf in that year, a 45 percent decrease 
according to Botas’s estimates.128 Another issue that these numbers indicate is that 
Turkey has more natural gas coming from different contracts than it is expected to 
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consume. To date, Turkey has signed deals for around 1.8 Tcf per year of natural gas 
imports in 2010, more than 25 percent above the Botas forecast for Turkish natural gas 
consumption (1.4 Tcf) in that year.129  
 
3.3.4.2 Turkmen-Turkey-Europe Gas Pipeline 
 
Turkey has rather debatable gas pipeline links with Russia and Iran. Turkey wants 
to further diversify its natural gas sources. To this end, Turkey has looked to other natural 
gas-rich countries in the region. There are a number of projects under construction or in 
the stage of planning. The question is whether or not Turkey is able to provide the 
sufficient funding for pipeline construction projects. The strongest motivation for Turkey 
to buy natural gas is the industrialized West and the newly industrializing central and 
eastern Anatolian regions. 
 
Turkish foreign policy makers are especially interested in bringing Turkmen 
natural gas to Turkey. The representatives from Botas and Turkmen Oil and Gas Ministry 
got together in a meeting in February 1996 to reach a decision on the gas pipeline 
options. According to Memorandum of Understanding signed between the two countries 
on 14 February 1996 Turkey would purchase two billion cubic meters of natural gas in 
1998, 5 billion cubic meters between 1999-2004 10 billion cubic meters between 2005-
2009 and 15 billion between 2010-2020.130 
 
A number of routes have been discussed for the Turkmenistan-Turkey-Europe gas 
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pipeline. The French Sofregaz Company offered a few possible routes and several 
options for the gas transportation to the Turkmen government in January 1998.131 One of 
these plans located the starting point as Shatlyk gas deposit in Turkmenistan. The road 
would go from the east to the west of Turkmenistan and parallel to the operating 
Turkmen Iranian Korpeje Kord Kuy gas pipeline.  
 
Eventually in May 1999, BOTAS signed an agreement in Ashgabat to build a 
1,050-mile natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan that would travel underneath the 
Caspian Sea, across Azerbaijan and Georgia, and on to Turkey.132 When it reached Baku 
it would be connected with the SCP, which is also known as “Trans-Caspian Pipeline”. 
The Turkmen option would carry between 16 and 28 billion cubic meters of gas annually 
to Turkey and then to Europe.  
 
Within a few months major oil companies, General Electric, Bechtel, Royal Dutch 
Shell, established a joint venture to work on this project. In spring 2000 this group had to 
stop the construction process due to the arguments that erose from among the Trans-
Caspian participant nations over allocating quotas for Azerbaijan's use of the pipeline. 
Furthermore upon the discovery of the Shah Deniz natural gas field in Azerbaijan this gas 
pipeline lost its importance.   
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3.3.4.3 Trade with Turkmenistan   
                  (in million) 
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Source: KOSGEB (Small and Medium Sized Industry Development Organization)  
Figure 8: Trade Volume between Turkmenistan and Turkey between 1992 and 2005  
 
 
Turkmenistan is the region’s third largest Turkish trade partner after Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan. As Figure 6 shows the volume of bilateral trade nearly doubled between 
2001 and 2005, increasing from $175 million to $345 million. Turkish trade makes up 
about 5 percent of Turkmenistan’s total trade. 
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Some of the major products that Turkey exports to Turkmenistan are electronic 
devices, both whole and individual parts in addition to products made from iron and steel, 
and soap.  
 
KOSGEB’s report on Turkish-Turkmen economic relations explain that Turkey’s 
trade volume with Turkmenistan was amounted to $28.5 million in 1992 but it showed a 
continuous increase and reached $191 million in 1997. However the 1998 financial crisis 
in Russia affected regional countries and Turkey’s export rate showed a decreasing trend 
but increased by 11% in 1999.  
 
The trend of Turkey’s increasing export to Turkmenistan continued in 2000 as 
well and the export rate increased by 13,6 % when compared to 1999. The export rate 
reached a high point in 2000 and remained same as it was in 1999 in 2000.  
 
Cotton is the main raw material source for the Turkish textile industry. Therefore 
Turkey imports cotton in large amounts from Turkmenistan. For example, Turkey spent 
$91 million on its cotton imports, which was worth $97 million in 2000.Among the other 
products that Turkey imports from Turkmenistan are knitting wool and raw leather. 
Turkey’s decreasing trend of imports from Turkmenistan between 1995 and 1998 has 
changed starting in 1999 when Turkey’s import rate increased by 60 %. In 2000 it 
increased by 52,8 %.133  
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3.3.4.4 Problems that Businesspersons Face In Turkmenistan  
 
Like the other NIS of Central Asia, Turkmenistan poses some challanges for 
foreigners. Turkish entrepreneurs face some problems in Turkmenistan. One of the 
biggest problems of trade relations between Turkey and Turkmenistan is about 
transportation. There is no direct transportation link between Turkey and Turkmenistan 
and this causes difficulties in transmitting goods and services to Turkmenistan. People 
need to pass through Iranian territory to reach Turkmenistan and they need to pay 
transaction fees to the Iranian government. The telecommunication network is also 
insufficient in Turkmenistan. The Turkmen government is aware that these kinds of 
problems are making investment in the country unattractive for foreigners. Therefore 
among the plans of the Turkmen government is to implement communication and 
transportation development projects in cooperation with foreign investors until 2010. An 
underdeveloped banking system, insufficient tariff system and lack of legislation in 
Turkmenistan are among other reasons that make trade difficult. 
 
Additionally most of the time people in Turkmenistan use a barter system instead 
of using cash.134 In Turkmenistan one dollar equals 5.200 manats and in Turkey  one 
dollar equals 21.000 manats. This difference in Turkey’s exchange rate and 
Turkmenistan’s exchange rate makes it difficult for Turkish tradesmen to make profits for 
their businesses.  
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3.3.4.5 Eximbank Credits  
 
Agreed Minutes, which was signed between Turkey and Turkmenistan on 2 May 
1992, included an article stating that Turk Eximbank would open a $75 million worth 
credit account for State Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs of 
Turkmenistan (Vnesheconombank of Turkmenistan).135 Within this context Turk 
Eximbank and State Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs of Turkmenistan signed a 
Financing Trade Agreement. This credit was specified as buyers’ credit. According to the 
Turkmen officials’ list that they submitted to Turk Eximbank this credit was used for 
medicine, purchase of veterinary medicine, climatic devices and equipments for hotel 
construction.  
 
In January 1993 a $16 million credit account was opened due to the Turkmen 
demands for a hotel construction in Ashgabat.136 With this project Turmenistan’s credit 
limit reached $91 million. Turk Eximbank credits also helped Turkmens finance their 
$43.76 million refnirey projects which are Turkmenbashi Refinery CCR Unit and 
Turkmenbashi Refinery MSCC Unit. However Turkmenistan had some difficulties in 
making payments back to Turkey and so signed ‘The Delaying Debt Agreement’ in 
August 2000. Turkey worked as a co-financer for these projects.137 In these projects 
Turkey worked in cooperation with COFACE (France), ONDD (Belgium) Eximbank.  
 
All these credits have been guaranteed under the state guarantee letter, which 
ensure the payment of dept in a certain period. Additionally Turkey launched assurance 
mechanisms which are called escrow accounts. Recently all debt that Turkmenistan owes 
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to Turkey has been paid.  
 
Totally Turkmenistan used $133 million out of Turk Eximbank credit which is 
worth $135 million.138 Turkey is willing to work in Turkmenistan as long as Turkish 
companies undertake new projects in Turkmenistan and new guarantee mechanisms, 
which are approved by Turk Eximbank, are established. Furthermore Turk Eximbank 
supports Turkish exporters with short term credit and insurance programs. 
 
3.3.5 Turkey-Uzbekistan 
 
3.3.5.1 Turkish Investment in Uzbekistan  
 
Chufrin notes that “Uzbekistan maintained the most integrated economy of the 
Central Asian region through its effective use of its resources.”139Upon gaining their 
independence Uzbeks tried to maximize competition rather than cooperation as a national 
strategy to strengthen the Uzbek economy. Olcott states that “Uzbekistan has the 
capability to become a regional producer of textiles, processed foods, and clothing.”140  
 
Turkish investors mostly focused in the sectors of textile, automotive, tourism, 
banking and foodstuff. For example, Bursel Holding is the biggest investor in Uzbek 
textile industry. The partners of this holding are the Uzbek government and Japan 
Mitsubishi Company. They produce shirts, underwear, socks and fabric. The cotton used 
for production comes from the local cotton fields. Also Tekfen opened a thread factory, 
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which is “Papfen”, in Uzbekistan in 1998.141 Tekfen manages this factory and is also 
responsible for marketing activities. These are the big Turkish companies. Although 
small and medium sized companies were investing at the initial stages of the Republic, 
big industrialists also started to enter the Uzbek market starting from 1995.  
 
As in other Central Asian states, Turkish construction companies are very active 
in Uzbekistan, with over 50 projects.142Koc Holding operates in the automotive industry. 
Koc Holding established a joint venture called Tashkochavto in collaboration with the 
Uzbek company, Uzatozlash. This company offers service in providing the necessary 
pieces for automobiles. Another Koc investment is Samkoçauto which started operating 
in Semerkand in 1998. Samkoçauto’s business focuses on the production of automobile 
and vans and exports them to Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Additionally, Arcelik, 
which is the branch company of Koc Holding, started business in the area of home 
appliance in Uzbekistan.  
 
Turkish companies working as building contractors are highly active in 
Uzbekistan. According to the data by the Foreign Trade Undersecretariat gives us 
Turkish building contractors have undertaken the operation of 63 projects the total cost of 
which is $1.589 billion. The major companies are Alarko, Ekpar, Gama, Makimsan, 
Mensel JV, Tekfen, Yapı Üretim, Yüksel and Zafer and the major projects that these 
companies have completed are Taskent International Hotel, Radisson SAS Hotel, 
Tashkent International Trade and Exhibit Center, Aquapark, Tashkent Airport Tower, 
Central Bank Building, Coca-Cola Factory, British American Tobacco Factory, Papfen 
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Thread Factory, Horezm Sugar Factory, renovation of American Ambassadorship and the 
terminal buildings of Semerkand, Buhara and Urgenç Airports.  
 
Turkish companies, which are Dedeman Holding and Aysel Construction 
Company, are active in the area of hotel management as well. Dedeman opened a hotel in 
Tashkent in 2006. Turkish business groups also serve in banking sector. Ziraat Bank of 
Turkey manages Utbank, which has a $5 million capital, in collaboration with Pahtabank 
of Uzbekistan.143  
 
Apart from the investment areas that have been mentioned above, it is also 
possible for Turkish entrepreneurs to invest in the areas of medicine, health, foodstuff 
and the stock market in the future. 
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3.3.5.2 Trade with Uzbekistan   
                (in millions) 
 
 
Source: Turkey Statistics Institute  
Figure 9: Trade Volume between Turkey and Uzbekistan between 1992 and 2005  
 
As Figure 9 illustrates, trade volume, which was amounted to $75.5 million in 
1992, showing an increasing trend, exceeded $300 million in 1997. It has been observed 
that Turkey’s trade volume declined resulting from the decrease in Turkey’s general 
exportation volume starting from 1997. Turkey’s main exportation to Uzbekistan occurs 
in the areas of technology, copper and energy. Trade volume decreased to its lowest level 
in 2001 and started to increase again from then on. In 2003 it increased by 40 % when 
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compared to 2002. In 2004 and 2005 Turkey’s exportation volume did not change much 
but due to the increase in imports from Uzbekistan trade surplus started to decrease in 
2004 and 2005. This was because of the heavy purchase of copper and copper-made 
products as well.  
 
One of the major problems that foreign investors face in this country is that Som, 
which is the Uzbek monetary unit, is not convertible. Luckily banks have been allowed to 
sell foreign currency starting from 16 June, 2003 and so Som has been convertible. 
However there are still some limitations in practice.144 The banking sector in Uzbekistan 
is not developed enough and companies sometimes face unpredictable problems. It takes 
a long time to transfer money. Companies, particularly the ones operating outside 
Tashkent, are experiencing important problems because of the insufficient banking 
system. Also the high level of state intervention in the economy slows down the foreign 
investments in the country.  
 
3.3.5.3 Eximbank Credits  
 
Uzbekistan is the only country that pays its credit debts on a regular basis among 
the Turkic Republics. Turkey and Turkmenistan signed a Goodwill Agreement stating 
that Turk Eximbank would give credits to Uzbekistan.  
 
It was estimated in 1999 that Turk Eximbank had given credits worth $375 
million, of which $125 million would be used for funding exportation and $250 million 
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of which would be used for development projects. Uzbekistan spent a significant portion 
of this credit. Uzbekistan used $124.6 million of exports credits and $244.5 million of 
project credits.145  
 
Uzbekistan tries to reform its industrial sector. It is important to watch for the 
latest improvements in the industrial sector and let the Turkish investors benefit the new 
opportunities in the sector.  
 
3.4 Conclusion  
 
Trade analysis, in this chapter, reveals that Turkey’s trade volume with each of 
the five countries shows an increasing trend only after 2001. This is the result of two 
economic crises: the 1998 financial crise of Russia and the 2000 and 2001 economic 
crises of Turkey. Foreign trade of the ex-Soviet states was dependent on the Russian 
economic situation. During the 1998 economic crises in Russia, people of the region 
preferred to buy Russian products, which were cheaper than Turkish products. Turkey 
also experienced a strong financial crisis in 2001 and this led to the contraction of the 
economy. Interest rates and public debt increased and economic growth became unstable. 
This economic weakness was inevitably reflected in Turkey’s foreign trade and 
investment.  
 
One common theme, which attracts attention when Turkey’s investment capacity 
in the region is considered, is that Turkey enjoyed the privilege of exploiting the Central 
 95
Asian Market in the absence of serious competitors. Post-Soviet countries are still in a 
challenging transition from Moscow’s command economy to a liberal economy. There 
are unstable tariff systems and unsatisfactory banking services and they lack regulatory 
laws. Some of them have long conducted business by using their local monetary units, 
which do not exactly match the value of Turkish lira and this has resulted in a loss of 
money for Turkish businesspersons. These types of structural problems prevent big 
companies from doing business there and small and medium sized Turkish companies 
enjoy the privilege of being monopoly companies in their sectors.  
 
During the Soviet rule, the regional economies were agricultural based. Farmers, 
who produced raw materials for Russia, fell behind the technological developments in the 
world. As a result of this situation, one of the major product groups that Turkey exports 
to these countries are electronic devices both partial and as a whole. Another major 
product of Turkey’s exports is automobiles because post-Soviet governments have been 
unable to develop an automobile industry and to the demand for passenger automobiles. 
Many new cars are foreign, exclusively Audi, Mercedes or Volvo. On the other hand, 
Turkey mostly imports commodities like copper, leather, silk, mineral oil and cotton from 
the Turkic countries. Turkey uses cotton, leather and silk for its textile industry which has 
an important place in the Turkish economy.   
 
One of the findings of this chapter is that the Turk Eximbank has done much to 
stimulate trade and business links in the region. One point that is common to all five 
republics is that they received Eximbank credits from Turkey for their national 
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development projects and financing trade.  
 
One crucial area where Turkey’s economic interests lie is energy. It is important 
for Turkey’s domestic energy consumption to supply oil and gas from the region’s energy 
reserves. The two profound projects that Turkey was able to realize are the Baku-Tbilisi 
Ceyhan Oil Pipeline Project and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Gas Pipeline Project.  
 
The BTC Project serves to interests of Turkey in two ways: It is the first 
constructed pipeline which bypasses the Bosporus Straits, and Turkey has the privilege of 
earning transit and operating fees from this project since the pipeline passes through 
Turkish territory.  
 
The Bosporus connects the Black Sea with the Sea of Marmara, and the 
Dardanelles link the Sea of Marmara with the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. However 
this Turkish waterway is no longer an appropriate energy transit route because an 
increasing volume of tanker traffic from the Black Sea can lead to accidents in the narrow 
straits and it is quite busy because it supplies Europe with oil from the Caspian Sea 
Region. The BTC pipeline was the best option for Turkey because Turkey does not want 
to take the risk of heavy traffic in the straits.  
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CHAPTER 4: POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE 
REGIONAL COUNTRIES 
 
This chapter aims to explain Turkey’s engagement in the Caspian Sea Region 
from a policy perspective since we are now acquainted with Turkey’s economic position 
in the region. The time period that will be analyzed is from 1991 to the present.  The 
methodology used in this chapter is to analyze the five countries according to their 
alphabetical order. 
 
It is significant to examine the initial interactions between Turkey and the five 
Turkic countries following the break up of the Soviet Union since this initial stage reveals 
how enthusiastic the involved sides were to develop their traditional friendship into future 
cooperation.   
 
Following the initial relations of the early 1990s, I will continue with Turkey’s 
constructive policies that contribute to these countries’ national development. Fields that 
give Turkey and the regional countries the opportunity to establish close relations are 
culture, education and communication which are analyzed in this chapter. I also looked at 
Turkish military aid in support of the US security policies in the region. Also this chapter 
explains Turkey’s attempts in the complex energy game which gathers worldwide 
attention and which is quite complex. 
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4.1 Political Relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan 
4.1.1 Initial Interactions between Turkey and Azerbaijan  
 
Since the establishment of the republic in 1923, Turkey has avoided pan-Turkic 
policies and has not shown special interest in the Turks living outside Turkey. Turkish 
politicians have considered supra-nationalist policies as adventurous and have been aware 
of the dangers of such policies since the last days of the Ottoman Empire. Thus “when 
faced with the opportunity to establish close relations with the Soviet Republics after 
Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika policies”, as Aydin argues, Turkey still preferred to 
keep some distance not to give the impression that it was seeking to undermine the 
USSR.146 Foreign private companies and individuals were trying to create contacts with 
these countries but Turkey avoided establishing official relations with the Soviet 
Republics until the mid 1991s. 
 
However Azerbaijan was an exception and the earliest governmental connection 
with Azerbaijan occurred when the Azerbaijani president, Ilham Aliyev, visited Turkey 
in January 1990. We can say that Turkey has a special relationship with Azerbaijan 
among all the Turkic Republics in the Caspian Sea Basin. Azeris, who live in Azerbaijan 
and in some adjacent areas and whose dialect is closest to the Turkish spoken in 
contemporary Asia, acknowledge the Turks living in Turkey as their brothers. They often 
refer to the phrase, “We are two states and one nation” to express their sympathy for 
Turks in Anatolia. In the northeastern corner of Turkey there are still families or their 
descendants who have migrated from Azerbaijani lands. The Turks and Azeris have 
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always been conscious of this kinship. The two countries are linked by strong historical, 
cultural, and linguistic ties.  
 
Aliyev’s first visit to Turkey was in 1990. During this visit Turkish politicians 
were very cautious in their speeches knowing that Azerbaijan was still not an 
independent state and was part of the Soviet Union. For example, when asked about 
Turkey's view of events in Soviet Azerbaijan in 1990, then President Turgut Özal was 
very careful, arguing that Turkey was concerned solely with its own internal problems, 
and that the Azerbaijan crisis was an internal affair of the Soviet Union. Additionally he 
emphasized that “Turkey was not nurturing aspirations of a Turkish empire that would 
encompass the Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union; rather it would continue to follow 
Atatürk's policy of non-entanglement in foreign disputes, and the principle of ‘peace at 
home, peace in the world’.”147 
 
Azerbaijan has remained as part of the Soviet Union as the Azerbaijan Soviet 
Socialist Republic from 1920 to 1991. Azerbaijan participated in the referendum about 
the preservation of the USSR which took place in March 1991. The idea that came out of 
this referendum was that people were supporting the preservation of the USSR. However 
Azerbaijan declared its independence on 18 October 1991 and prepared a new 
constitution and with this action Azerbaijan had declared itself as a presidential 
Republic.148  
 
Turkey became the first country to recognize Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan reacted 
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warmly to Turkey’s interest. As an example of this closeness, in January 1992, Ayaz 
Mutalibov visited Turkey. “We want Turkey to represent us to the outside world” said 
Hasan Hasanov, the Prime Minister of Azerbaijan.149 Furthermore Salih Mehmedov 
advisor to the Azeri Parliament and an academician at Baku University said, “If the 
Turkish world is a body Turkey is its eyes and brain.”150  
 
Ebulfez Elchibey got elected as the president in June 1992. Turkish politicians 
increased their hopes to realize their policy goals in Azerbaijan especially after Elchibey, 
who was a strong advocate of Turkey, became the president of the country. Following 
Elchibey’s death, as letters of condolences emphasized, Elchibey was a strong Turkish 
nationalist and during his life he had served to advance the position of the Azeri Turks in 
the Turkish world.151 
 
The Azeri leader attended the 1992 Ankara meeting, which took place among the 
presidents of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan.152 A declaration emphasizing common cultural values and the intention to 
recreate common cultural elements including language was announced after this meeting. 
 
At this summit Ozal delivered a message by saying that “if Turkey had used the 
opportunity that was born after the break-down of the Soviet Union appropriately the 
twenty first century would be the Turks’ century.”153 After explaining the brotherhood 
among the Turkic world and pointing out the strength of solidarity and cooperation 
among the Turkic people he added, “Our peoples are expecting this kind of cooperation 
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because we are from the same origin; we are branches of the same great tree and we are a 
big family”.154  
 
Azerbaijan, in response, put Turkey in its foreign policy priority list. Azerbaijan 
adopted the secular and multiparty system of the Turkish model. For example, twenty 
two parties were registered following the 1992 election. Because of their secular 
education during the Soviet era Azeri politicians and intellectuals felt close to secularism. 
Zakir Hasimov, the Undersecretary in the Embassy of Azerbaijan in Ankara, underlined 
that “they approved of the secularism of the Turkish model and had established their new 
state according to this principle.”155 
 
When Azerbaijan won its independence, the new nationalist president of 
Azerbaijan, Ebulfez Elchibey, pursued an openly pan-Turkist policy. “He championed 
close ties with Turkey and the adoption of the Latin alphabet for Azerbaijani Turkish."156 
He was an admirer of Ataturk and a friend of Turkey. However he did not stay long in 
office. He was dismissed in a coup, which attempted to disarm mutinous paramilitary 
forces, in June 1993.157 This coup provided the opportunity for Aliyev’s return to power. 
Elchibey’s dismissal seemed to underline Turkey’s plans to see Azerbaijan as a main 
base to expand its influence in the Caspian Sea Area.  
 
In the opposite direction to what the Turkish leadership was thinking Elchibey’s 
replacement with Aliyev was not a situation against Turkey’s interests. Many political 
analysts say that Aliyev was a more independent- minded leader than people had 
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expected. Like Elchibey, Aliyev, a member of the Soviet Politburo in the Brezhnev era, 
also tried to strengthen ties with Russia. At the same time Aliyev pursued a pro-Western 
policy. As Larabbe and Lesser point out “the success of Turkey’s policy in the Caucasus 
depends to a large degree on a continuation of the westward-leaning policies pursued by 
President Aliyev in Azerbaijan and President Shevardnadze in Georgia.”158 Therefore 
Aliyev’s pro-western approach complemented Turkish foreign policy goals. On the other 
hand, Aliyev’s moderate policy towards Russia was mainly because he regarded Russia 
as the main power of the region. This development did not mean that Turkey was no 
longer important for Azerbaijan but that Azerbaijan had started to follow a more 
pragmatic and realistic policy by balancing relations with Russia Turkey and Iran.  
 
4.1.2 Turkey’s Reaction towards the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict  
 
A conflict has been going on between the South Caucasian nations of Azerbaijan 
and Armenia over the disputed area of Nagorno Karabakh since the beginning of 1988. 
As Cornell notes, “the conflict has led to over twenty thousand casualties and almost one 
and a half million refugees, a refugee flow which has resulted in a considerable crisis 
especially in Azerbaijan, with the number of displaced persons numbering close to one 
million.”159 The occupied territory of Azerbaijan has been cleansed ethnically of its Azeri 
population by Armenian forces within the course of warfare.  
 
During the course of warfare some clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijani 
forces increased public tension in Turkey from time to time and this led Turkish policy 
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decision makers to feel pressured to take military action against Armenia. One particular 
event that caused Turkey’s concern for the peace of Transcaucasia was when Soviet 
forces entered Baku following attacks on the Armenian minority in January 1990 and 
several hundred Azeri demonstrators were killed.160 There was widespread sympathy for 
the Azeris in Turkey resulting from the close historical and cultural ties. Turkish people 
organized mass meetings to demand the Turkish government action against Armenian 
forces. However the Turkish government adopted a very cautious approach insisting that 
the events in Azerbaijan were purely an internal Soviet affair.  
 
Another clash that renewed Turkey’s concern for the Azeris was the events of 26 
February 1992. Armenian forces captured the suburb of Khojali next to Stepanakert and 
massacred some 500 civilian on 26 February 1992.161 This event ended the détente 
between Azeri and Armenian forces. The Khojali tragedy reignited widespread public 
protests in Turkey and provoked President Turgut Ozal to suggest that “we should 
frighten the Armenians a little.”162 However Turkish Prime Minister Demirel again did 
not share Ozal’s view. Demirel criticized the President’s remarks as very mistaken since 
they would prejudice the chances of a settlement between Azerbaijan and Armenia.163  
 
Historically Azerbaijan has remained weak in the face of Armenian military 
superiority. It has been suggested that a part of the responsibility in this weakness 
belongs to Turkey for Turkey has been reluctant to help Elchibey. Turkey, on the other 
hand, preferred to rely on international institutions for the resolution of this case.   
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Turkey raised the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict before the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation (CSCE) in Europe and the Atlantic Cooperation Council (ACC) 
condemning the alteration of frontiers by force. United Nations had stayed in the 
periphery of the conflict but, as Cornell says, “the CSCE was the only institution to have 
made significant efforts to achieve a lasting solution.”164Turkey confirmed that Nagorno 
Karabakh was part of Azerbaijan. This had little effect on the Armenians who captured 
the town of Shusha, the last Azeris stronghold in Nagorno Karabakh, in May 1992. This 
marked the first significant military victory of Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave 
during the Nagorno-Karabakh War. Turkey found it threatening when Armenian forces 
also attacked the western end of the Azeri enclave of Nakhichevan close to the frontier 
with Turkey. The Turkish military was worried about the possible Russian advance in the 
Trans-Caucasus. Even in the face of this critical event, the Turkish Prime Minister 
Demirel avoided applying military means.   
 
Demirel decided to resolve the crisis by diplomatic rather than military action. 
According to some scholars’ interpretation Demirel could have acted with the assurance 
he got from the United States because the United States expressed that “it would act 
against any change in the status of Nagorno Karabakh or Nakhichevan on the basis of 
force.”165 Moreover Russian military officials’ explanation also affected Turkey’s 
decisions, which were on the side of diplomatic rather than military action. For example, 
at the time of the crisis, which occurred in May 1992, Russian commander Marshal 
Yevgeny Shaposhnikov declared that “Turkish military intervention could result in the 
outbreak of a third world war.”166  
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Although the Turkish government avoided intervening militarily in the region, 
news alleging that Turkey had sent equipment and military personnel to help the 
Chechens and Azeris have frequently appeared in the Russian and Armenian media. 
Turkish officials denied these statements, declaring that, “in addition to some bilateral 
agreements (that is, modernization projects) only a limited number of military officers 
from the new republics were in Turkey for training.”167 Moreover Chief of Staff Mattei 
Dogan Gures stated frankly that “the Kurdish threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity rather 
than Transcaucasia was the military’s first priority.”168 This attitude of politicians and 
military men certainly excluded serious military action for Azerbaijan in its crisis.  
 
Turkish officials most of the time took action in accordance with NATO decisions 
and peace programs. Azerbaijani officials, on the other hand, have never concealed their 
desire to integrate themselves into NATO's military structure. The Partners for Peace 
program was seen as a link in this regard by military commanders in Baku. Turkey was 
perceived as a unique bridge that would allow Azerbaijan to get closer to the zone of 
interests of the north Atlantic bloc. 
 
Scholars and academicians agree on the issue that Turkey’s policy toward 
Azerbaijan is mostly shaped by Turkey’s relations with Armenia. Any kind of action that 
eases Ankara’s position on Nagorno-Karabakh put relations with Baku into trouble. The 
events of September 11 have also affected the Caspian Basin region. With Russia seeking 
better ties with the United States and NATO, Ankara and Yerevan have begun quietly to 
explore ways to improve relations.169 Actually the only way to improve relations is to 
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settle the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. The common approach of Turkish officials is that it 
is unlikely to improve diplomatic relations with Armenia without settling down the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  
 
4.1.3 Turkey’s Energy Politics towards Azerbaijan 
 
4.1.3.1 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Project 
 
Azerbaijan is an oil-rich country. However new pipelines need to be built to 
transfer the energy to international markets since the Caspian resources are landlocked. 
The issue of Caspian energy pipelines has assumed increasing importance resulting from 
the fact that the way through which the oil will be transported is geopolitically very 
important. Furthermore as Larabbee and Lesser say “a modern version of the 19th 
century Great Game has emerged in recent years with pipelines replacing the railroads as 
the main means for exerting political influence.”170  
 
The EU and the US are interested in the proliferation of pipelines in exploiting the 
crude oil and natural gas reserves of the Caspian region. The European Union (EU) 
Member States and the US have promoted the development of east-west transportation 
corridors to deliver energy to European markets.  Turkey, on the other hand, is not a 
significant energy producer but it might be a key transit state due to its geographical 
location. Consequently, Turkish policymakers can use this energy card to influence the 
West by emphasizing its strategic value.  
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Turkey has been seeking for the best option to bring the Azeri oil to the country. 
Although the shortest route for a pipeline from Azerbaijan to the Mediterranean can be 
constructed by passing through the Armenian territory, the Karabakh conflict makes this 
route unachievable.171 Aydin argues that “this, coupled with the US opposition to passing 
the pipeline through Iran, left Georgia as the only possible route for the western line; 
however, Georgia, too, has been struggling with a number of internal conflicts, a situation 
that has obviously been in Russia's interest.”172 On the other hand, the US has supported 
the BTC project politically from the beginning. Furthermore, as Aydin points out, “the 
arrival of the US advisers in Georgia after the September 11 attacks, among other things, 
has given a boost to the BTC project.”173  
  
 In March 1999 Richard Morningstar, the Secretary of State for Caspian Basin 
Energy Diplomacy, explained why the US backed multiple pipelines and energy 
corridors. Morningstar noted that “such a proliferation would strengthen the 
independence and prosperity of the former Soviet republics as well as encourage 
economic and political reforms; regional cooperation would be enhanced, and US 
companies would benefit from commercial opportunities.”174 
 
Turkey initially proposed to finance the Baku-Batumi pipeline project, which 
offered very advantageous conditions, to Azerbaijan International Operating Company 
(AIOC) before proposing the BTC project. This project would allow Turkey the 
opportunity to control the flow of Azeri oil however AIOC did not approve this proposal. 
According to the analysis of Aras and Foster, “before it fully realized the politically 
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charged nature of the debate and the complexity of the factors involved, the AIOC 
consortium decided to transport its oil to Western markets via an existing pipeline to the 
Russian port of Novorossisk.”175 Then the consortium changed its course and decided to 
transport its oil by tanker through the Black Sea and into the Mediterranean via Turkey's 
Bosphorus Straits. Oil from the Chirag offshore field in Azerbaijan reached to the port of 
Novorossisk in November 1997.176  
 
Transporting oil through the Bosporus Straits raised objections from Turkey due 
to the great environmental threat posed by the increased shipping volume. Aras notes that 
“The Bosporus is one of the most difficult and busiest waterways in the world to 
navigate.”177 Aras adds that, “nearly 45,000 vessels pass through the Straits each year, 
and there are frequent accidents.”178 The Azeri officials were aware of the situation that 
the Turkish government would not want to allow the massive increase in the Bosporus 
traffic that would result from the usage of the Black Sea route for Azerbaijani oil. 
Therefore the AIOC began to look for various alternative routes. One such route would 
involve the transport of oil from Baku to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the 
Mediterranean. Ankara highlighted that Ceyhan has a greater capacity to handle shipping 
volume than Novorossisk, the Russian port. Moreover due to the smooth climate 
conditions of the Mediterranean, Ceyhan is rarely shut down in a year. As expressed by 
Ahat Andican, a former government minister and an influential figure in shaping Turkish 
policy toward the Turkic republics of the FSU, "the total output from the Caspian and 
Central Asia will eventually be 50 to 60 million tons a year, but the Baku-Novorossisk 
and Baku-Supsa routes have a combined capacity of 16 million tons [a year]”.179 
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Therefore the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline was seen as the most inevitable and stable option. 
Some critics of the Baku-Ceyhan route had attempted to bring the Kurdish insurrection in 
eastern Turkey to the forefront of the debate, portraying that it was a potential threat to 
the pipeline's security. But, by the end of 1997, this argument seemed to lose its force, 
given that the Turkish army began to have considerable success in suppressing Kurdish 
military activity. 
 
Turkey was far from being alone in advocating the Baku-Ceyhan route. Jim 
Norosky, vice-president of U.S. oil giant Amoco (which holds a 17.01 percent stake in 
the AIOC), also suggested that “the Baku-Ceyhan route was preferable, despite the extra 
cost imposed by its greater length” and he suggested that,” such extra cost should be 
offset by tax breaks or other measures.”180 Turkey had also succeeded in gaining the 
support of Azerbaijani president Heydar Aliyev, who was in favor of giving priority to 
the direct Baku-Ceyhan line.  
 
In March 1998, the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
and Turkmenistan met the president of the AIOC in Turkey.181 The primary purpose of 
the meeting was to brief the four other countries about the feasibility of the Baku-Ceyhan 
pipeline. These states confirmed their support for the project. Turkish and U.S. officials 
went to great lengths to influence the decision. In Ankara, John Wolf, the U.S. 
government's Caspian representative, said that the Azerbaijan International Operating 
Company "must stop using the process of negotiations to block the solid test of Baku-
Ceyhan in the marketplace."182 Eventually on 18 November 1999, leaders of the involved 
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parts signed an agreement to construct the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline.The US 
President Bill Clinton was also present at the meeting as a witness to the parties' 
commitment. 
 
In May 2005, Azerbaijan began test filling in the Azeri section of the pipeline 
during the opening ceremony of the pipeline.183 On 10 August 2005 the first volumes 
reached the Azeri-Georgian border and a year after the opening ceremony the first tanker 
at the Turkish port of Ceyhan was filled with oil from BTC.184 
 
Pipeline projects through Turkey such as the Baku Ceyhan or the Trans-Caspian 
pipelines are political issues. Therefore the Western support for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
Pipeline, when regarded from a policy perspective, was especially important for the US 
to boost Western influence in the region at that time. These pipelines are equally 
important for competing Russian influence in the region as well as to maintaining the US 
containment policy towards Iran. Iran could provide an existing network of pipelines 
easily expandable to transport oil and gas from Central Asia to Europe and South Asia. 
International oil companies are advocating this cheap pipeline solution however this case 
has developed into grand geo-strategic competitions.  
4.1.4 Turkey’s Constructive Policies in Azerbaijan  
 
4.1.4.1 Turkey’s Contributions to Azeri Education 
 
Education, which is expected to build bridges between Turkey and the Turkic 
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Republics, is an important tool of Turkish foreign policy. There are some organizations 
working to increase the educational standards of the Central Asian countries.  
 
TICA is one of the most involved organizations of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, 
to develop relations between the Turkic Republics and Turkey. This relationship between 
Turkey and the Turkic Republics is exercised in the following areas; the agreement for 
cooperation in economy, trade, transportation, communication, tourism and sports, the 
search for Turkish investment, the opening of Turkish cultural centers, student and 
teacher exchange programs, academic conferences, providing scholarships for university 
students, opening Turkish language schools, offering training for banks, the foundation of 
Turkish banks, broadcasting to Eurasia and providing of help in the training of public 
administrators and bureaucrats.185 TICA has a coordination office in Azerbaijan operating 
since 1992. 
 
TICA is working actively in the area of education. TICA’s projects within the 
context of ‘Support for the Education System in Azerbaijan’ aims to help the education 
system in various regions of Azerbaijan reach international standards and operate in 
modern facilities. 
 
TICA’s Baku Program Coordination Office obtained materials including reading 
books, student desks and chairs, teachers’ desk and chairs, bookshelves, blackboard, 
computer, printer, cassette player, satellite dish and DVD players. According to the 
announcements made on TICA’s official website, School Number 149, which is part of 
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the Ağdam Rayon Tahsil Branch, is one example, the needs of which were met by TICA. 
Migrant children having migrated from upper Karabakh as a result of political discord are 
receiving education at this school.  
 
TICA carried out repair and maintenance work within the framework of the 
request by the school’s management for the establishment and fit out of a Turkish 
education classroom.186 
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 Table 2: Number of Turkish Schools in the Region  
 
The Community of Gulen Turkish World Research 
Institute  
COUNTRY Turkish 
Ministry* of 
Education 
 
Number of High 
Schools 
Number of 
High Schools 
Number of 
Universities  
Number of 
High 
Schools 
Number of 
Universities 
Azerbaijan 1 11 1 1 2 
Kazakhstan  27 1 3 2** 
Kyrgyzstan 2 11 1  1 
Turkmenistan 4 16 1  1** 
Uzbekistan 7 18 1   
 
Source: Aras, Bülent (2000) 'Turkey's policy in the former Soviet south: Assets and options', Turkish 
Studies, 1:1, 36 – 58 
* Turkish Ministry of Education, Educational Statistics, 
http://www.meb.gov.tr/Stats/ist97/MYHTML45.htm, (accessed 01.18.2008) 
**These are departments located in different universities of countries mentioned  
 
 
Other than TICA, there are more Turkish communities working in the area of 
education in Azerbaijan. One strong example is the Gulen Community which displays 
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special interest in education. Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, followers of 
the Gulen Movement have been vigorously involved with the new Turkic Republics. 
They have founded nearly eighty high schools in the Central Asian countries.187 In 
Azerbaijan they opened eleven high schools and also the Caucasian University. (see 
Table 2) M.F.Gulen, who is a moderate Islamic scholar, encourages ties to the newly 
independent Turkic states.  
 
Members of the Gulen Movement see Central Asia as the cradle of Turkish 
Sufism and historical homeland of the Turkish people.188 It is not only a matter of making 
profits out of their businesses but also a mission to introduce the Turkish Islamic culture 
and help them in their struggle to open up to the outside world. Human resource of this 
community is composed of entrepreneurs, students, teachers and journalists.  
 
Teachers and administrators working in Turkish schools see themselves indebted 
to Central Asia and they want to make contributions to this region’s development in order 
to pay back to the Sufis who provided great historical service to Anatolia and the Balkans 
to bring peace. As Sen says, “having had a close relationship with the Seljuk and 
Ottoman Beys, many dervishes and sheiks inculcated Islam throughout the countryside 
and spread the new devotional life towards the frontiers.”189 Sen notes that “for Gulen 
they were the so called colonizer dervishes and ghazis who devoted themselves to God’s 
service and who played a decisive role in the Islamization of Anatolia and the 
Balkans.”190  
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Gulen’s community separates itself from other groups with its Turkish identity 
along with its Islamic identity. Currently Turkish schools continue their educational 
activities successfully with a sufficient educational infrastructure. Islamic circles, on the 
other hand, generally work to spread Islamic identity rather than Turkish identity. To this 
end Islamic groups heavily opened Quranic schools and built mosques and neighborhood 
centers to increase Islamic awareness.191 These institutions play a crucial role in teaching 
and disseminating religious values and practices. 
 
These efforts of Turkish groups have been fruitful. The Turkish schools are 
people’s favorite schools in Azerbaijan. Students affiliated with these schools return to 
their countries with awards from science Olympiads. Moreover teachers offer classes in 
official Turkish as an elective subject by the Azerbaijan Department of Education in 
some schools based on an application by the school administration due to student 
requests to learn Turkish.  
 
4.1.4.2 Turkish Policy in Culture 
 
One of the Turkey’s policy goals was to promote Latin the alphabet and Turkish 
language in Azerbaijan in the last decade of the 20th century. It would be easy to 
communicate once Azeris started to use the Latin alphabet. The use of a common Turkic 
alphabet within the Turkic world would even be better. In accordance with Turkey’s 
goals, Azeri academician Kamil Veliyev also argued that “without a common language 
and a common alphabet it would be impossible to solve major problems” and he 
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advocated that “Anatolian Turkish should be the common language for Turkic 
peoples.”192 At the beginning of February 1992 the Azerbaijani government decided to 
abandon the Cyrillic alphabet and revert to the Latin alphabet.193 Azerbaijan’s adoption 
of the Latin alphabet was regarded as a success, by some sources, for Turkey’s and the 
Turkish model by some sources.  
 
Turkey has tried to be active in the religious field as well. A revival of Islam had 
occurred in the Turkic Republics following independence. However there were some 
deficiencies to truly practice Islam. They needed books on religion and their mosques 
needed repairing. Although their aims were different, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia 
began to send Korans and other religious books to the republics and experts were sent to 
teach Islam. Considering that the majority of the population is Shiite in Azerbaijan, Iran’s 
eager help was quite considerable. Iran distributed tens of thousands of copies of Koran. 
Turkey sent thousands of books to the Muslim Republics. Not only the Turkish state but 
also the Turkish private sector was involved in this issue. Turkish voluntary organizations 
also provided books on religion and Turkish culture.   
 
Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs sent imams to the Azeri community to 
teach Islam and built mosques to let people practice their daily praying ceremonies.  
 
As a non governmental endeavor TICA also works in the area of culture with the 
intention to emphasize common values with the Turkic states to move closer to them. 
TICA explains in its website that it supported the foundation of Turkology Department as 
 117
part of the Turkey Research Institute of Azerbaijan Slavian University and supplied the 
needs of this department such as desks, computers, curtains and air conditioners.194  
 
4.1.4.3 Technical Cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan  
 
Turkey has devoted great attention in the field of telecommunications and 
transport since 1991. Ankara has been able to create a dependent relationship for access 
to international lines. The Turkish Communications and Transport Minister Yasar Topcu 
went to the Turkic Republics accompanied by fifteen deputies and a large number of 
bureaucrats and journalists and inaugurated a 2500-line capacity digital telephone 
exchange established by the Turkish PTT in Azerbaijan.195 Since 1991 Turkish 
companies such as Netas and Turkcell have assumed an important profile in the strategic 
sector providing the infrastructure for telecommunications. In 1999 Netas was operating 
in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan through its subsidiaries, Ultel and Vesnet, respectively. In 
the growing sector of mobile telecommunications, Turkcell plays a leading role running 
GMS services in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.196 Indian and Pakistani companies also 
helped the Central Asian Republics to modernize and improve the poor telephone system 
inherited from the USSR.  
 
Important steps were also taken in the field of broadcasting. Turkish Radio and 
Television Corporation TRT INT Avrasya TV Channel began broadcasting to the Turkic 
Central Asian states and Azerbaijan on April 27, 1992, the day when the Turkish Prime 
Minister started his tour to the Turkic Republics.197 Avrasya TV was supposed to further 
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the existing cultural and social ties with these countries and to form a solid bridge. As 
Baharcicek mentions, the Turkish broadcasting “was an important move that could 
develop closer cultural relations and understanding among the people of the region and 
contribute to Turkish political influence.”198  
 
Upon the demand of Azerbaijan Ministry of Agriculture, TICA started the project 
for the restoration of Abseron, Guba and Gence Chemistry Research Stations’ 
infrastructure. TICA contributed to the installation of modern equipment for the 
laboratories organizing various training programs for the personnel and increased 
personnel standards in 2004. Moreover TICA has offered technical cooperation to the 
Azeri Ministry of Tariffs based on the protocol signed on June 7, 2002 between the 
Turkish Republic Prime Ministry and Ministry of Finance. Within the scope of this 
project TICA offered consultation services about tariff system in Baku and internship 
opportunities in Turkey.199  
 
Other than TICA, Turkish institutions such as the Turkish Standards Institute, the 
State Statistics Institute and KOSGEB began to offer technical training and consultancy 
services for diplomats from Turkic Republics as well.  
 
4.1.4.4 Turkey’s Contributions in Azerbaijani Transportation 
 
Turkey wanted to develop transportation projects so that Azeris and Turks would 
not be dependent on land links so that the geographical gap between the two countries 
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would be lessened. Turkish Airlines had already initiated direct flights to Baku. However 
it was more difficult to improve land transport than to improve airway transportation.  
 
Turkey focused its attention on Georgia. Georgia bordering Azerbaijan could 
provide the Anatolian Turks with a land bridge to the Turkic world. For this purpose 
Turkey adopted a plan to build a highway, which would join the Caucasian region 
extending from Kars to Baku, along the Black Sea Coast within the EU’s transport 
corridor program between Europe, Caucasus and Asia. Jung and Piccoli explain that 
Turkey and Azerbaijan signed several agreements for the joint use and restoration of 
Georgia’a Batumi airport. They add that “even more important is the intended 
construction of a direct rail link between the Turkish and Georgian cities of Kars and 
Tiflis which once completed would be connected to the railway to Baku.”200 These are 
planned projects to ease the geographical distance which is still important in this age of 
fast communication. One project that Turkey has already achieved through TICA is the 
renovation of highways in Azerbaijan. 
 
4.2 Political Relations between Turkey and Kazakhstan  
 
4.2.1 Initial Interactions between Turkey and Kazakhstan  
 
The Kazak Soviet Socialist Republic became the Republic of Kazakhstan on 10 
December 1991. Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev was supporting the unity of the 
USSR but when the three Slav Republics established the CIS on 8 December 1991 
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Kazakhstan also declared its independence on 16 December 1991. Kazakhstan became 
the last of the former Soviet Republics to declare its independence after the Soviet Union 
had effectively collapsed.  
 
In the last quarter of the 20th century, Kazakhstan followed a policy line, which 
encouraged the country to keep equal distance with other countries, including Turkey. 
There were some reasons for Kazakhstan to keep itself distant from Turkey. As Bal 
explains, firstly Kazakhstan’s territory is the largest among the Turkic Republics and it is 
also rich in natural resources. Moreover Kazakhstan possesses nuclear weapons inherited 
from the USSR.201 Bal notes that “these reasons in general and additionally the Western 
world’s interest in Kazakhstan since the early days of its independence gave Kazakhstan 
a feeling that it was superior to the other Central Asian Republics.”202 The second factor, 
affecting Kazakhstan’s approach towards Turkey, was related with the ethnic 
composition of the country.  
 
It has been suggested that Kazakhstan remained impartial towards the Turkish 
model not to disturb the large Slavic groups in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan’s ethnic 
composition had been an excuse for Nazarbayev’s reluctance to give full support to some 
aspects of Turkey’s foreign policy. For example; Nazarbayev evidently refused to sign a 
statement implying the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as an 
independent state.203 It was the Turkish officials’ strong wish from the Turkic Republics 
to recognize North Cyprus. It has been argued that the Kazakh president had some 
concerns in approving North Cyprus as an independent country because parallels could 
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be drawn between the position of the Russian minority in Kazakhstan and that of the 
Turks in Cyprus. Kazakhstan’s large Russian minorities put significant pressure on the 
Kazakh leadership. The third factor may be regarded as valid for all Turkic peoples. 
Kazakh people were not willing to have another big brother and feared that Turkey might 
seek to play this role.204 Kazakhs believe that their country’s geo strategic position is 
sufficient to make it a regional power.205 Lastly, Turkey’s decreasing interest towards 
Kazakh politics, particularly after President Ozal’s period, was an important factor 
preventing the two countries from moving close to each other. 
 
Despite these factors Kazakh people have shared a desire to develop their 
relations with Turkey. President Nazarbayev expressed this wish as well. For example 
when Nazarbayev was asked in an interview by the Washington Times whether he saw 
Kazakhstan as directed more to the North, to the Russian and European traditions or to 
the South and Islamic traditions that lay deep in the country’s roots his reply was: “As 
you know Kazaks are Muslims and historically Kazaks belong to a Turkic group of 
people; the Soviet states have separated us from maintaining a relationship with those 
cultures and those peoples so naturally we are inclined toward Turkey and the Southern 
Muslim states.”206 
 
Nazarbayev, as an expression of his sympathy for Turkey, paid his first official 
visit to Turkey on 25 September 1991 after the unsuccessful August coup in Moscow.207 
When Kazakhstan declared its independence on 16 December 1991 the Turkish 
parliament was the first to recognize Kazakhstan only 30 minutes after the declaration of 
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independence. 
 
The Kazakh President wanted Kazakhstan to be identified as a Turkic Republic 
and therefore attended the Ankara Summit of the Presidents of the Turkic Republics in 
October 1992. By doing so the Kazakh president hoped to improve the political relations 
with Turkey and the Turkic Republics. However at this summit when Ozal proposed a 
common market Nazarbayev did not welcome this offer enthusiastically. He said, “Now a 
Turkish common market is a subject of secondary importance. Above all a unity should 
be achieved among the Republics created by the disintegration of the USSR.”208 
 
Actually several conferences regarding the newly emerging Turkic world were 
held outside Turkey. One of these conferences was organized by Kazakhstan Democratic 
Party in Alma Ata in January 1992.209 The participants appealed for the establishment of 
a Turkic state stretching from Kazan to Alma Ata gathered around the idea of Turkism. 
However these initiatives did not receive official Turkish support. Ankara, has always 
kept itself distant from such movements.  
 
Turkish officials have always been aware that any kind of pan-Turkic movements 
are not popular among Turkic people of the post-Soviet region and are repressed by the 
Central Asian governments. Therefore Ankara cannot have control over pan-idealistic 
movements. Additionally extremist pan-Turkic groups are not popular in Central Asia 
and their activities are closely monitored and sometimes repressed by governments. From 
an economic perspective of the 1990s the Muslim republics were reluctant to install 
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Turkish monopolies. They encouraged instead the involvement of Russians and Turks 
together in economic and trade projects and ventures. Furthermore Kazakhstan has its 
own agenda independent from Turkey and Russia. For instance, Kazakhstan, as a 
republic of minorities has been inclined to encourage Kazakhs to return home, in order to 
alter the demographic balance.  
 
Kazakh leaders favored the Turkish model in economy. Now and then Kazakh 
leadership expressed that Kazakhstan was attracted by the economic development that 
Turkey successfully achieved so quickly. At the same time, Kazakh leaders did not 
preclude other success stories. For example, they looked at Asia for economic models. 
Strategically Nazarbayev was careful not to leave Turkey out either. He said that “the 
only state in front of them was Turkey” and he added that “South Korea is close to us” 
but their historical ties with Turkey and Turkish success in the short term was 
necessitating to give priority to Turkey.210 
 
Kazakhstan perceived Turkey as a representative of the Western style of 
democracy and of moderate Islam in contrast to Russia or Iran. Turkey was supposed to 
bring US economic and financial support to Kazakhstan. Actually support for Turkey 
would be stronger if Western businessmen had shown up immediately following the 
declaration of independence to make investments in the country with the efforts of 
Turkey. 
 
In the eyes of Kazakh leaders Kazakhstan and Turkey shared some similar 
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features. The constitution describes Kazakhstan as a democratic, secular and unitary state 
and grants full rights to all citizens.211 Furthermore Kazakhstan makes similar claims as 
Turkey to being a bridge between Asia and Europe, emphasizing its strategic position in 
the region. 
 
The Turkish people, affiliated with whether governmental or private 
organizations, have tried to be very active in attempting to expand their economic and 
cultural roles but, like other states involved in Kazakhstan, they have not been able to 
make much impact on a generally problematic environment. Although there is political 
pluralism to some extent Kazakhstan is not a democratic state. After the collapse of 
communism the president rigged elections jailed oppositionists and undermined 
parliamentary power in order to strengthen their executive rule.212 Islamist groups are 
present in Kazakhstan leading the country to instability. In contrast to their broader 
appeal in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan however the Islamist groups in Kazakhstan tend to 
be concentrated in specific regions and among specific ethnicities namely among Uzbeks 
living in cities along the borders.  
 
4.2.2 Turkey’s Constructive Policies in Kazakhstan  
 
4.2.2.1 Economic Relations  
 
Kazakh leaders had been positive about economic cooperation but their general 
approach was not to support groups based on religion and ethnicity. The goal of the 
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Kazakh foreign policy makers was to improve political and economic relations with 
Turkey but at the same time not to block other options. For example, Kazakhstan signed 
twelve joint venture projects with foreigners immediately after gaining its 
independence.213 Nevertheless Turkey was also important for Kazakhstan. Turkey would 
connect this country to Europe by recreating the Silk Road. To bring this idea from 
theory into practice, Kazakhstan organized a meeting in Alma Ata on 22-24 April 1992 at 
which the opening of a Trans-Asia railway was proposed arguing that the Silk Road had 
become important again and that this road would belong to the Turks.214 Also, in 
reshaping itself, Kazakh leadership expressed that Kazakh people thought of Turkey as a 
good example with its development and modernization history starting from its 
independence in 1923 to present time.  
 
Kazakhstan supported Turkey in the operation of the BTC Pipeline. In March 
2001 the Kazakh President offered an interesting argument. He said that oil from 
Kazakhstan’s East-Kashagan field would be transported through Baku-Ceyhan.215Kazakh 
oil was worth considering as an alternative. It could back up any deficiencies in the Azeri 
oil. However, as Larrabee and Lesser say, “industry spokesmen now claim that reserves 
in Azerbaijan are sufficient to make Baku-Ceyhan commercially viable even without 
Kazakh oil.”216  
 
Other than these projects, TICA contributed to Kazakh economic development 
with its projects at the state level. One of the contributions of TICA is the ‘Modernization 
Project of Kazakh Ministry of Economics.’ Within this project TIKA offered consultation 
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services, expert training courses and provided software for economic development 
programs. TICA also established an education center for training the labor force in the 
business fields where foreign investors are heavily making investments. 
 
4.2.2.2 Turkey’s Contributions to Kazakh Education 
 
One of the major educational projects of Turkey is the establishment of Hoca 
Ahmet Yesevi International Turkish University in cooperation with the Kazakh 
government. Ahmet Yesevi is the first Sufi mystic who lived in the 12th century and a 
prominent leader for the whole Turkic world. He gathered his poems in his masterpiece, 
Hikmet (Wisdom), in Turkish. He was the first intellectual to use Turkish language in a 
period when all other intellectuals were writing in Arabic and Persian. This project is 
important for both countries considering that future policy initiatives are launched not 
only but governmental circles but also they are planned in universities. 
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Table 3: Number of Turkic Students in Turkey in 2001 
COUNTRY Middle 
School 
Tomer Pre-College College Grad. School TOTAL
Azerbaijan  64 61 313 212 650 
Kazakhstan  93 21 384 127 625 
Kyrgyzstan 3 7 82 421 208 721 
Turkmenistan   7 877 86 970 
Uzbekistan    4 2 6
TOTAL  3 164 171 1999 635 2872 
Source: Turkish Ministry of Education 
 
 
Kazakhstan welcomed the opening of Turkish high schools, the total number of 
which is 14. (see Table 3). Kazakhstan also responded positively to Turkey’s offer and 
sent 1,109 students for higher education and 169 students for secondary education in the 
1992-1993 education term. In 2001, there were totally 625 Kazakh students continuing 
their education in Turkish schools in Turkey. (See Table 3)These students, whose 
 128
countries have fallen behind the world in technology, are taught the knowledge and skills 
related to recent technological developments. By doing so, these schools contribute to the 
development of Kazakhstan.  
 
Additionally TICA opened its Program Coordination Office in June 1995 in Alma 
Ata and TICA’s most recent project in the area of education is about Kazakhstan’s 
statistical activities. TICA shared its experiences in compiling and recording statistics in 
accordance with the Turkish Statistical Institution (Turkstat). With the help of Turkish 
statisticians the first Agricultural Census was conducted and the preparation of 
questionnaires, methodology activities etc, has been completed in 2006.217 This project 
also offered consultancy services, working visits and on the job training activities. The 
statistics is an important field in this age of communications and technology and this 
project will enable Kazakhstan to plan its future.  
 
4.2.2.3 Cultural Relations 
 
During Nazarbayev’s visit to Turkey on 29 September 1992, Turkish and Kazakh 
officials signed a Cultural Cooperation Agreement.218 It was decided that the tombs of 
Seyh Ahmed Yesevi and his teacher Hodja Aslan Baba in the city of Turkestan in South 
Kazakstan would be repaired by Turkey. Seyh Ahmed Yesevi is an important figure for 
Turks. Seyh Ahmed Yesevi, who lived in the 12th century and who was an influential 
religious leader of his time, helped the founders of the Ottoman Empire by uniting people 
around Islam.  
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 Ankara wanted the Latinization of the languages in Central Asia. For this reason, 
Turkish media circulated its newspapers and publications in the Muslim republics and 
hoped to make Turkish the dominant language of the area. However, as Bal explains, 
unlike other Turkic Republics, Kazakhstan did not welcome the quick adoption of a Latin 
alphabet to replace Cyrillic. Nazarbayev remained neutral on this issue. Although Kazakh 
leaders believed that using the Latin alphabet would further draw them near to the 
Western world they never intended to change the alphabet. In addition to economic and 
practical reasons the large Russian population in Kazakhstan would never allow this 
change.219 
 
TICA also made some cultural contributions to Kazakhstan. TICA chose specific 
projects that would increase the cultural awareness of the citizens of the two countries on 
common Turkic-Islamic values. With this aim in mind, TICA has provided financial 
assistance for printing the books which are, ‘Principles of Turkism’ by Ziya Gokalp and 
‘History of Turkish Folklore’.  
 
The TICA Alma Ata Program Coordination Office has also helped Philosophical 
and Political Sciences of Kazakh Institute organize a conference on Farabi’s Heritage and 
World Culture. Farabi is an important Muslim scholar who united metaphysics and 
politics. TIKA printed the articles presented at this conference. Division of Kazakh-
Turkish Traditional Ornaments as part of the Traditional Kazakh-Turk Arts was opened 
in 2000 following the protocol signed between TIKA and Kazak Korkut Ata Kizilorda 
State University Presidency. Moreover ten different carpeting courses are being given in 
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Kazak-Turk Crafts Center which operates in coordination with Kazakh Turkish 
Traditional Ornaments Division.220 Furthermore TICA opened Alma Ata Cultural Center 
in Kazakhstan in 1997. Some of the activities carried out in this center are organizing 
educational conferences, exhibits and offering series of courses in arts and sciences.  
 
4.2.2.4 Technical Cooperation between Turkey and Kazakhstan  
 
After Kazakhstan proclaimed its independence Ankara assisted in rebuilding the 
telephone, computer, television and satellite communication systems cut by Moscow in 
1992. Turkey was willing to renew telecommunications and transportations networks and 
became quite successful in this area. As Robins says “Turkey’s public sector 
telecommunications giant was quick off the mark in providing equipment free of charge 
to the value of some $25 million to the five republics.”221 Since then Turkish private and 
joint venture communication companies Netas, in particular, have strengthened this link 
with factories opened in Kazakhstan. As Jung and Piccolli mention “Netas was operating 
in Kazakhstan in 1999 through its subsidiaries Ultel and Vesnet, respectively.”222 
 
In the growing sector of mobile telecommunications, Turkcell also plays a leading 
role running GMS services in Kazakhstan. Other than Turkey, Indian and Pakistani 
companies also help the Central Asian Republics to modernize and improve the poor 
telephone system which was left from the Soviet period.  
 
Turkey was enthusiastic to develop cultural links in Kazakhstan, which was seen 
 131
as an area of expansion, through broadcasting. TICA’s goals in Kazakhstan were to 
provide 24 hour non-stop and qualified broadcasting, to deliver this service to all parts of 
country, to encourage media officials to open new channels, and to exchange ideas about 
TV and radio programs in order to get closer ties between the countries. In this direction 
TRT-Eurasia Channel started broadcasting in Kazakhstan in 1992.223 This channel, by 
emphasizing common values and fostering close relations between the two countries, 
would serve as an agent of Turkey in the country. However three years later Kazak 
officials ceased the broadcasting because they couldn’t afford to meet the broadcasting 
costs. In addition to this some republics were cautious about allowing broadcasting 
directly to their citizens without official oversight.  
 
In addition to these developments a technical cooperation agreement was signed 
between TSE and the standardization of institutions Azerbaijan, Bashkiria, Chuvashistan, 
Kazakstan, Kirgizstan, Mongolia, Uzbekistan, Tatarstan, Turkmenistan. Besides the 
Unity of Standardization between Regions (Bolgelerarasi Standardizasyon Birligi ) was 
established among Turkey and the Turkic Republics.224  
 
4.3 Political Relations between Turkey and Kyrgyzstan   
 
4.3.1 Initial Interactions of Turkey and Kyrgyzstan Following the Independence of 
Kyrgyzstan  
 
Kyrgyzstan declared its sovereignty on 12 October 1990 and Askar Akayev was 
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elected as president unopposed on October 13, 1991 following the August Coup on 31 
August 1991. The Communist Party was banned.  
 
Following the declaration of independence the Foreign Minister of Kyrgyzstan 
Roza Otunbayeva, who has explored the best possible ways to promote friendly political 
relations, gave importance to Kyrgyzstan’s relations with the US, Europe and the regional 
countries. After the declaration of independence Kirghiz President Akayev paid an 
official visit to Turkey on 22 December 1991. Akayev, in Turkey, said that their aim was 
to recreate the ties which were broken during the Communist period with their brother 
country, Turkey, and to improve their relations in all aspects.225  When Akayev received 
the letter proving Turkish recognition of Kyrgyzstan’s independence from Demirel, he 
poetically defined Turkey as “the morning star” that would guide the path of the Turkic 
Republics.226 Akayev saw Turkey as an important country providing the model of a 
secular state which looks more to the West than to the Islamic world. Kyrgyzstan’s goal 
was to establish a state built around the ideals of democracy, secularism, respect for 
human rights and the rule of law. During his visit to Ankara in December 1991, the 
Kirghiz President gave emotional speeches emphasizing Turkey’s leadership role in the 
Turkic world. Also Kyrgyzstan opened its first embassy in Turkey. 
 
Turkish political leaders were also satisfied with the Kirghiz President’s closeness 
to Turkey. President of Turkey, Turgut Ozal, visited Kyrgyzstan in 1991. During this 
visit to Alma Ata, Ozal signed a protocol defining future relations.227 This protocol 
addressed issues regarding the expansion of relations in all fields, especially direct 
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contacts between business firms as well as between governments. Following 
Kyrgyzstan’s Declaration of Independence Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin also visited 
Kyrgyzstan officially along with other Turkic Republics. The aim of this visit was to 
examine the needs and deficiencies of this country and to prepare for future projects. 
During this visit some agreements to promote relations particularly in the areas of culture 
and education were signed.  
 
Kyrgyzstan, without committing itself to following the Turkish model, welcomed 
the main characteristics, in particular secularism and a market economy of that model. 
Kirghiz leaders see Turkey and the Turkish model as an instrument to understand the 
West and Western culture. They quite often underline the strong ties between Turkey and 
Kyrgyzstan in terms of ethnicity, culture, language, religion and history but like other 
newly independent Turkic republics, Kyrgyzstan wanted equal relations with Turkey 
while trying to open up to the outside world.  
 
Turkey’s successful economic transformation and democratization of its social 
structure was being closely watched by Kirghiz politicians. Kyrgyzstan was also decisive 
to change its centralized economy to a market economy. At every opportunity the Kirghiz 
Prime Minister pronounced Turkey’s economic progress as a meaningful goal for the 
entire Turkic world. At the 3rd Economy Congress, which was held in Izmir between 4-7 
June 1992, Deputy President Kulov of Kyrgyzstan said: “We are now studying Turkey’s 
economic system in detail; we will soon change to a free market economy and we want 
extensive cooperation with Turkish businessmen.”228 Turkey had limited sources to aid 
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Kyrgyzstan economically. Despite this fact in order to establish better relations with 
Kyrgyzstan, Turkey volunteered an assistance of 75 million dollars.229  
 
A liberal and democratic system appeared to be created out of the break up of the 
Soviet system in Kyrgyzstan. However the government and elections turned out to be 
corrupt. After the collapse of communism the Kirghiz president, who is accused of dirty 
elections, responded severely to criticisms and weakened parliamentary power in order to 
strengthen the executive rule.230 There are also Islamist groups, many of them originally 
extending from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, in this country. Radical Islamist groups, which 
are concentrated in specific regions and among specific ethnicities, threaten the political 
and economic destabilization in the country. In relation with this situation one of the 
features of Turkey that the Kirghiz leaders appreciate the most was the secular character 
of the Turkish model. They wanted to maintain a moderate form of Islam in the country 
and to achieve this they wanted help from Turkey. For example Kyrgyzstan asked Turkey 
to build a mosque in Bishkek and wanted religious books.  
 
Neither the efforts of Kyrgyzstan nor the efforts of Turkey to get closer in the last 
years of the 20th century can be interpreted as a sign of pan-Turkic policies. However 
some explanations of Turkish leaders had been interpreted in this direction at that time. 
For example, Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel declared in February 1992 that 
“with the disintegration of the Soviet Union a gigantic Turkish world was currently being 
formed stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China.”231  This declaration 
was interpreted as sing of Turkey’s pan-Turkic policy intentions. Apparently slogans, 
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which referred to an enlarged Turkish world, would undermine the trust between Turkey 
and Russia. To fix the situation Demirel made another speech in Kyrgyzstan emphasizing 
that, Turkish politicians were considering Turks as a big family but they were not 
actually pursuing pan-Turkic policies. It was Turkish politicians’ approach to refer to 
Central Asia and Azerbaijan “as a new Eurasian community populated by Turks”.232 It 
was not the wish of Turkish policy makers to administer Turks in other parts of the world 
but they wanted to integrate Kirghiz people with the rest of the world.233  
 
Although there are some organizations displaying pan-Turkic leanings the 
regional leaders have always been against any kind of ultra nationalist formations. 
Kirghiz leaders are of the same view as well. Kirghiz leaders are in favor of nationalism 
rather than pan-ideals. This is because, as Fawn says, “nationalism provides a critical 
source of social cohesion for states in the midst of profound transformation.”234 They are 
opposed to the setting of a supranational mechanism to coordinate the Turkic world such 
as Turkic Common Market or Turkic Bank. Knowing the sensitivities of the Turkic 
leaders, the Ankara Declaration, which was published as a result of the First Turkic 
Summit, made no reference to any organizations based on ethnic grounds. Furthermore 
the Kirghiz leaders wanted their population to think themselves as a national community 
distinct from the former Soviet Union. As Huskey suggests, “designed in part to prevent 
the rise of pan-Turkic sentiment in Central Asia, the formation of separate republics in 
the 1920s developed pan-Kyrgyz, pan-Uzbek and pan-Kazakh communities in areas 
where the forces dividing these ethnic groups such as tribalism and regionalism were 
often as potent as the forces uniting them.”235 
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4.3.2 Turkey’s Constructive Policies in Kyrgyzstan  
 
4.3.2.1 Turkey’s Contributions to Kirghiz Military  
 
Turkey supports Kyrgyzstan militarily as well. Turkey, which is a NATO 
member, trains Kirghiz servicemen. Recently Turkey and Kyrgyzstan decided to act 
together to fight against terrorism. The Turkish and Kyrgyz presidents decided to create 
an expert group to combat international terrorism in October 2000.236 The Turkish 
delegation donated some money for non-lethal military equipment to the Kirghiz armed 
forces. This was the third Turkish donation since the 1999 incursion of Islamist 
insurgents into Kyrgyzstan. In 1999 Turkey granted $210,000 to Kyrgyzstan for the 
purchase of modern communications equipment and agreed to fund logistical and 
military technical assistance for over 3000 Kirghiz armed forces personnel.237 This 
donation was to support Kyrgyzstan against the Islamic incursions in August 2000. 
 
Another military agreement signed between General Staff Head of Logistic 
Deparment Unal Ozsipahioglu and Kyrgyz Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of 
General Staff Nuredin Comoyev in June 2000 foresees military cooperation in the realm 
of education, science and technology in Kyrgyzstan's capital Bishkek. This agreement 
includes training of Kyrgyz military units, increasing defense and assault capacity of 
these units and financial and technical assistance to Kyrgyz army. According to the 
agreement, the Turkish General Staff will offer equipment and technical assistance worth 
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of one billion U.S. dollars to the Kyrgyz army. Ozsipahioglu said at a press briefing that 
“Turkey's main goal is to help Kyrgyzstan to fight against terrorism and help it maintain 
security not only in its own land but also in its border regions.”238 
 
4.3.2.2 Turkey’s Contributions to Kirghiz Education  
 
Historically education has been the most effective tool to create a peaceful 
society. This function of education is also applicable to the NIS of Central Asia and the 
Caucasus in transforming the society.  
 
Turkish and Kirghiz leaders have started to work for educational projects in 1992. 
The Ministers of Education of the Turkic Republics and Turkey met at the First 
Conference of Ministers of Education of Turkish Republics in Ankara in 1992.239 One of 
the decisions taken in this meeting was the creation of a common Turkish language apart 
from emphasizing student exchanges and cultural activities. The Second Conference of 
Ministers of Education of Turkish Republics took place in Bishkek between 29 
September and 3 October 1992.240 In this conference participants decided to create a 
‘Common Program of History and Literature in the Turkish World’. A commission was 
created to make initial preparations. It was also seen as an important step to begin 
preparations to adopt the Latin alphabet for the unification of the Turkic world. 
 
Turkey has been cooperating with Kyrgyzstan to establish vocational training 
schools, high schools and even universities. Many of these activities are coordinated with 
 138
the contributions of TICA, the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Education. 
 
There are thirteen high schools and also Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University 
funded by Turkey in Kyrgyzstan.241 As Balci, Demir and Akkok explain the curriculum 
of these schools is the same as in schools in Turkey. Additionally the Turkmen/Kyrgyz 
language and the Russian language are taught as elective courses. These schools provide 
one year for teaching a foreign language. The instruction in social studies is in Turkish 
however the science and math courses are taught in English. Four of these schools were 
opened by Turkish Ministry of Education. The remaining schools were opened by the 
Sebat Education Company in Kyrgyzstan.242  
 
Kyrgyzstan also welcomed Turkey’s offer and sent 384 students for higher 
education and 344 students for secondary education in the 1992-1993 educational term. 
Totally there were 721 Kyrgyz students receiving their education in Turkey in 2001.(see 
Table 3) 
 
Kyrgyz parents mention as one of the reasons for sending their children to 
Turkish schools, mention the close relationship between the Turkish and 
Turkmen/Kyrgyz people because of cultural, religious and linguistic affinities. One 
Turkmen parent said: “Students who finished in these schools will have important 
positions in Turkmenistan in order to take the country to world standards because they 
can attend universities in any Western country with the qualifications gained at this 
school.”243 Moreover the common characteristics of Turkish school students, as 
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frequently stated by all the participants, are being “well-bred, hard working, honest, goal 
oriented, self-disciplined and rational individuals who appreciate the modern way of 
living.”244 Generally these activities are regarded as a welcome supplement to Turkey’s 
official endeavors in cultural and educational cooperation with the Turkic states.  
 
4.3.2.3 Cultural Relations  
 
Turkey and Kyrgyzstan display mutual willingness to get closer in terms of 
culture as well as education. Kyrgyzstan reacted positively to the Turkish offer of 
adopting a Latin based alphabet, which was seen as an important instrument for the 
unification of the Turkic world.  
  
Both Turkish and Kirghiz leadership saw a common alphabet as a significant tool 
to ease the relations between the two countries in the areas of culture, education and 
economics.  
 
As a sign of close relations the Ankara meeting on 30-31 October 1992 among the 
presidents of the Turkic Republics, was held245and the idea of using a common Latin 
based alphabet was raised in the Ankara Meeting, which was held in 1992 among the 
presidents of the Turkic Republics. The intention of this meeting was to reproduce 
already existing common values the most important of which was language. The leader of 
Kyrgyzstan also attended this meeting. The declaration which was announced following 
this meeting emphasized the common cultural values between Turkey and the Turkic 
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Republics. Turkish leaders were enthusiastic in exploiting the historical opportunities in 
the best possible way influenced by the spirit of this meeting. Kirghiz leaders also gave 
emotional speeches upon this gathering in Ankara.  
 
Tunegun Kasymbegov, advisor to the Kirghiz president and head of the 
Commission on Culture to the Kirgiz Assembly, said that, “we Turkic peoples used to 
have one common language” and stressed that the reason why there was currently no 
common language was because “some Turkic peoples were subject to Russia, China and 
Iran.”246 He talked about the will of Kyrgyzstan to adopt the Latin alphabet and reminded 
the audience that the Kirghiz president had established a commission in the Kirghiz 
parliament to administer the adoption of the Latin alphabet. In response to these claims 
Turkish Minister Koksal Toptan promised to publish the necessary books in Turkey and 
send them to the Turkic Republics.247 Furthermore Anvarbek Mokeev, who was an 
undersecretary at the Kirghiz Embassy, even advocated the development of a common 
written language based on Anatolian Turkish in the long term.248 Despite this positive 
exchange of ideas, Kyrgyzstan never implemented the alphabet change. Actually 
Kyrgyzstan wanted to replace the Cyrillic alphabet with the Latin alphabet but because of 
economic problems they did not have the opportunity to put theory into practice.  
 
Additionally TICA, which is a unique  technical assistance organization affiliated 
with the Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry, operating in 37 countries across 3 continents 
including Europe, Asia and Africa, established a new computer library, which would 
serve 300 students, in the Brigadier, General Aliev Police Academy in Kyrgyzstan. This 
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lab would enable security personnel to record criminal data to assist in the struggle 
against crime. TICA’s Bishkek Program Coordinator Office has been operating in 
Kyrgyzstan since 1993, and particularly in 2006, TICA was quite active implementing 51 
projects in the country. The educational and social projects include provision of on the 
Job Training for Teachers, training for Kirghiz Police Radio Media Members, training 
support for Kyrgyz TV Personnel, Support for Kyrgyz News Agency, Equipment and 
Expert Support for the Kyrgyzstan KABAR International News Agency. Some of the 
cultural projects provided Support for the World Folk Epics Festival in Bishkek and 
Support for the Kyrgyzstan Cultural Week Celebrations.249  
 
4.3.2.4 Technical Cooperation between Turkey and Kyrgyzstan  
 
Turkey established technical cooperation between Turkey and Kyrgyzstan. A 
technical cooperation agreement was signed between the TSE (Turkish Standardization 
Institute) and the matching standardization of institution in Kyrgyzstan. Also Unity of 
Standardization between Turkey and the Turkic Republics was established.250 
Additionally The Turkish Standards Institute and the State Statistics Institute (TICA) and 
the Center to Develop and Support Small and Medium Scale Industry (KOSGEB) began 
to offer training technical and consultancy services in Kyrgyzstan.  
 
Kyrgyzstan was still using the poor telecommunication system inherited from the 
USSR. In order to modernize the telephone system in Kyrgyzstan, Turkey installed a 
2500-line capacity digital telephone exchange established by the Turkish PTT.251 Turkey 
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was also enthusiastic to broadcast Turkish programs in Kyrgyzstan. Turkish Radio and 
Television Corporation (TRT INT), Avrasya TV Channel began broadcasting in 
Kyrgyzstan on April 27, 1992.252 Avrasya TV was described as cementing the existing 
cultural and social ties with these countries and forming a solid bridge between Turkey 
and Kyrgyzstan. 
4.4 Political Relations between Turkey and Turkmenistan  
 
4.4.1 Initial Interactions of Turkey and Turkmenistan Following the Independence 
of Turkmenistan  
 
On October 1991 the Turkmen voters opted for independence in their national 
referendum and the next day the Supreme Soviet declared the country’s independence. 
Eventually the Republic of Turkmenistan was born.  
 
After Turkmenistan’s Declaration of Independence Turkey became the first 
country to recognize it and to open an embassy in Turkmenistan and Turkmenistan in 
return opened its first Embassy in Turkey. Saparmurat Turkmenbashi also paid his first 
visit abroad to Turkey in 1991.253 Turkmenbashi with his seventy delegates spent four 
days in Turkey. This visit led to several agreements related with economic, commercial, 
scientific and technical co-operation communications. Both sides’ leaders launched 
regular flights as a result of this visit.  
 
Saparmurat Niyazov, Turkmenbashi, had very positive thoughts about Turkey. He 
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welcomed the characteristics of the Turkish model, secularism and market economy in 
particular. Furthermore Niyazov, personally, was an admirer of Ataturk and he even 
called himself as Turkmenbashi which has a similar meaning with Ataturk. Ataturk 
means ‘father of all Turks’ and Turkmenbashi means ‘head of all Turks’. While returning 
from Turkey to Turkmenistan, Turkmenbashi said:  
 
We are expecting many things from Turkey. Firstly we want to be 
recognized by Turkey. I explained in Turkey that we would give 
citizenship and soil to those who want to come to Turkmenistan from 
Turkey. We not only regard Turkey as a gate open to the West, but with its 
big potential we regard Turkey as a partner which will show the path to 
the Turkmen economy. It is possible to establish a Turkic common 
market.254  
 
Turkmen leaders, like other Turkic leaders, attended the 1992 Ankara Summit. 
Newspapers reported that it was the first time a meeting had taken place among the 
Turkic states in history and with this meeting the Turkish world was about to be officially 
born.  255 It should be noted that Turkish politicians were not pursuing pan-Turkic 
policies but held this meeting to revitalize the common cultural values. Turkish President 
Turgut Ozal promised to explore the needs of Turkmenistan and to give support to 
Turkmenistan at all levels.  
 
This meeting the first major visit to Turkmenistan took place in March 1992.256 
The Turkish Minister of Education Koksal Toptan, Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin, State 
Minister Serif Ercan, officials from the Ministry of Education and Foreign Ministry, and 
businessmen and members of the Turkish Press participated in the visit, to a total of a 
hundred and fifty people. Several decisions were taken during this visit for future 
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cooperation.  
 
Despite these developing relations in the last years of the 20th century, meetings 
and contacts between Turkey and Turkmenistan cooled down later on. This is partially 
related with Turkmenistan’s neutral status in its external policy. As London explains 
“neutralism is somewhat related to isolationism although it does not actually rule out 
foreign contacts rather it is isolation from political commitments to either the West or the 
East.”257 Turkey respects Turkmenistan’s choice of such a neutral line but this kind of 
policy does not offer a profitable basis to engage in collective actions in fields such as 
security or economy. Turkmenistan, on the other hand, sees neutralism as the best option 
to protect itself. Turkmenistan is among the richest countries in the world in terms of 
hydrocarbon resources and Turkmen leaders saw neutrality as the best way to protect its 
raw materials from becoming an object of discord between the regional centers of power. 
The leadership thought that this neutrality would also ensure the country’s territorial 
integrity and security.  
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4.4.2 Turkey’s Energy Politics towards Turkmenistan  
 
4.4.2.1 The Blue Stream Project  
 
Source: www.economist.com/images/20070414/CEU957.gif 
Figure 10: The Blue Stream Project  
 
 
The Blue Stream Project was a complex project because it combined the issue of 
oil pipelines with those of gas pipelines. Turkey used to meet its natural gas demand by 
deliveries, which reach the country via Bulgaria, from Russia. To increase natural gas 
delivery to meet rising needs Turkey and Russia decided to build a gas pipeline through 
the Black Sea to the Turkish port of Samsun. From Samsun the gas would be delivered to 
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the Anatolia. The Russian Energy giant Gazprom has concluded a joint venture with the 
Italian ENI to realize the Blue Stream Project. This is a very important project for 
Turkey’s energy politics. Therefore Turkey is careful not to hamper Russia from using 
the Bosporus Straits as an energy transit route.258  
 
The problem with the Blue Stream was that there were problems between Iran, 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. They had different claims on the ownership of Caspian 
resources. Turkmenistan took a position on the side of Iran and against Turkey. Analysts 
argue that Turkey has a chance to avoid dependence on Russia with the Transcaspian Gas 
Pipeline (TCGP) project. Opponents of the project also argue that the Blue Stream would 
damage relations between Turkey and such states as Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, which 
would stand to benefit if Turkey buys its gas from the Caucasus and Central Asia instead 
of Russia. The Turkmen President Niyazov and the Azeri President Aliev were concerned 
about Turkey’s pipeline selections. Aliev said, “Turkey doesn’t need Blue Stream.”259 
 
Moreover the technical feasibility of the Blue Stream Project raised some 
questions. The Black Sea section of the Blue Stream would be the deepest gas pipeline in 
the world and that the Black Sea is one of the most polluted seas in the world is an 
important problematic issue to consider. This presents dangers of pipe corrosion from 
acidity and possible pipe collapse as a result of hydrostatic pressure. The Black Sea is 
also susceptible to earthquakes, which could not only result in costly repairs but could 
present environmental hazards. 
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 Despite these discourses Turkey and Russia initiated this pipeline officially in 
November 2005 with the attendance of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Turkish Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. 
 
4.4.2.2 Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline Project  
 
Turkey’s foreign policy towards Turkmenistan is mostly shaped by the energy 
issue. Turkey has been looking for alternative gas supplies to decrease dependence on 
Russia. Turkey’s search for alternative routes is a challenging path, however. For 
example one gas deal with Iran, planned by Necmettin Erbakan, who was in office as the 
prime minister of Turkey in 1996, with Iran severely annoyed the US administration 
because the US administration decided that this gas deal was violating Iran-Libya 
Sanctions Act. Upon the US’s reaction Turkey planned to combine the Iran-Turkey 
pipeline for a larger project. This project would aim to bring Turkmen natural gas to 
Europe via Iran and Turkey. Washington finally accepted that Turkey’s gas deal with Iran 
does not violate the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. Turkish officials were thinking about 
signing an agreement with Iran to create a competitive environment. Eventually this 
would lead to a decrease in the cost of natural gas in Turkey. However this project has 
never been realized and it remained on paper.260  
 148
 
 
 
Source: www.transatlanticpolitics.com/category/russia/ 
Figure 11: Trans-Caspian Pipeline Project 
 
Turkey’s other plan was to bring gas from Turkmenistan to Turkey. The Clinton 
administration was also advocating that a trans-Caspian gas pipeline from Turkmenistan 
to Baku and on to Turkey as part of the east-west transportation corridor. 
 
Turkey organized a meeting for foreign ministers of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan and Georgia to build support for its preferred pipeline route. Some 
agreements were signed concerning the development of the Trans-Caspian pipeline at the 
Istanbul Summit Meeting in November 1999 of the Organization for Security and Co-
Operation in Europe OCSE. The key document was a multilateral agreement on the 
construction of the pipeline between Azerbaijan Georgia Turkey and Turkmenistan. This 
document was a follow up to one already signed on 29 October 1998 between 
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Turkmenistan and Turkey on the export of Turkmen gas to Turkey. The two countries 
agreed on 30 bcm per year. Turkey would consume 16 bcm and the rest would be re-
exported to European markets.261 Moreover Niyazov signed an agreement with the 
Minister of Energy of Turkey. This agreement offered the two companies, Botas and 21. 
Asir Turkmenin Altin Asri, to sell the Turkmen gas to the Turkish and European markets. 
Turkmenistan has the greatest gas reserve and potential to create a satisfactory business 
environment that would encourage major gas projects rather than discourage investors. 
However any development in the Turkmen-Georgian section has not yet been achieved.  
 
4.4.3 Turkey’s Constructive Policies in Turkmenistan  
 
4.4.3.1 Economic Relations  
 
Turkmenistan has one of the least developed economies of the former Soviet 
republics. It has been reflected in the speeches of Turkmen leaders that Turkmenistan 
welcomed the market economy example of the Turkish model. Turkmenistan, like the 
other Turkic Republics, has tried to transform its centrally planned economy into a 
market economy. Turkmenistan saw Turkey as a model in this transformation and wanted 
to be a friend of Turkey to find its path to success. Turkmenistan and Turkey enjoy good 
economic relations. Turkey gave Eximbank credits which were worth $75 million to 
Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan, on the other hand, is Turkey’s largest trade partner in 
Central Asia. Also Turkmenistan offers a huge regional market for Turkish construction 
companies.  
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 Some projects towards the goal of promoting Turkmen economy have been 
implemented by TICA. TICA sent a group of experts in economics to Turkmenistan 
between 6-12 June 2004 to exchange ideas with administrators in the Turkish Ministry of 
Economics and Finance working in the area of taxes. The two parts designated areas 
where Turkmen officials need help and they also made a schedule of proposed events.  
 
During this visit the Turkmen side had been informed about taxing applications 
and financial politics of Turkey. Turkmen officials prepared a list of topics on which they 
need training and submitted this list to TICA. TICA announced, in its website, that it 
would start the necessary training programs upon the signing of Financial Cooperation 
Protocol directed towards Eurasian Countries between TICA and Turkish Ministry of 
Finance.  
 
4.4.3.2 Turkey’s Contributions to Turkmen Education  
 
Turkey made some contributions in Turkmen education system as it did in other 
Turkic Republics. There are 20 Turkish schools established by Turkey in Turkmenistan. 
Four of them were opened by the Turkish Ministry of Education and sixteen of them 
were opened by Baskent Education Company262 (See Table 2). One of these schools is 
called Turgut Ozal High School and the university’s name is International Turkmen-
Turkish University. The curriculum of these schools is the same as in schools in Turkey. 
Additionally the Turkmen/Kyrgyz language and the Russian language are taught as 
elective courses. These schools leave one year for teaching a foreign language. All 
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courses are given in English except social sciences classes.  
 
The Turkmen parents provide their reasons for their preferences for the Turkish 
schools, such as “the opportunity to learn four languages (English, Turkish, Russian and 
Turkmen/Kyrgyz languages); more discipline, the training of students as well-behaved 
and hardworking individuals; the high quality of instruction (e.g. education at world 
standards); and the opportunity to develop computer skills.”263 
 
Turkmenistan also positively responded to Turkey’s offer and sent 1,185 students 
for higher education and 519 students for the secondary education in the 1992-93 
education terms. Turkish Ministry of Education gave scholarships to close to one 
thousand students for their undergraduate and graduate education. (see Table 3)  
 
TICA has opened a coordination office in Ashgabat and has been actively 
working in Turkmenistan since 1997. The most important project of TICA in terms of 
culture is the restoration of the mausoleum of Sultan Sancar. Sultan Sancar represents a 
shared treasure of Turkey and Turkmenistan and TICA’s projects bring the two countries 
closer by revitalizing this common historical and cultural heritage. TIKA has restored the 
mausoleum of Sultan Sancar and organized a conference on Sultan Sancar and His 
Period following the opening ceremony of the mausoleum on 18 November 2004. Sultan 
Sancar is the last Seljuk leader who lived in the 11th and 12th centuries. This story of this 
project goes back to 2001. Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party, 
has promised to restore the tomb of Sultan Sancar during his visit to Turkmenistan. This 
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tomb is among the World Heritage List of UNESCO.  
 
TICA also met the modification and installation costs of Turkmen-Turk Library, 
which is based on a 222m² area and has books more than 10.000 books, 8000 of which 
are Turkish books. This library is a division of World Turkmens Humanitarian 
Association, the president of which is Saparmurat Turkmenbashi.  
 
Regarding the alphabetical change Turkmenistan welcomed Turkey’s offer of 
Latin alphabet. The Turkmen leader Saparmurat Turkmenbashi said that they would 
begin to use the Turkish Latin alphabet and the Turkish books donated by Turkey. 
Turkmenbashi believed that to use the Latin alphabet would bring Turkmen people 
spiritually closer to the civilized world.264  
 
4.4.3.3 Technical Cooperation between Turkey and Turkmenistan   
 
It was important for Turkey to give technical training and consultancy services to 
respond to Turkmenistan’s demands on its way to development. Staff members are like 
the wheels of a working industry. Being aware of this Turkish institutions such as 
Supporting Small and Medium Scale Industry (KOSGEB) began offering courses to train 
Turkmen staff. Also diplomats from Turkmenistan attended courses organized by the 
Turkish Foreign Ministry. Turkey and Turkmenistan also signed a technical cooperation 
agreement between the Turkish Standardization Institute and The Standardization 
Institute of Turkmenistan.265  
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 Turkey also helped Turkmenistan to modernize Turkmenistan’s transport and 
telecommunications system. Turkish companies along with Indian and Pakistani 
companies helped Turkmenistan to improve the poor telephone system, which remained 
from the USSR. Turkey launched phone lines for digital telephone exchange in 
Turkmenistan.  
 
To develop closer cultural relations and understanding among the people of the 
region and to contribute to Turkish political influence Turkish Radio and Television 
Corporation TRT INT Avrasya TV Channel began broadcasting in Turkmenistan on the 
day the Turkish Prime Minister started his visit to the Turkic Republics. This channel was 
a bridge between Europe and Asia. The TV programs beamed to the Turkic Republics 
were met with pleasure.  
 
4.5 Political Relations between Turkey and Uzbekistan  
 
4.5.1 Initial Interactions between Turkey and Uzbekistan  
 
Uzbekistan was founded as a Union Republic of the USSR in 1924. This republic 
declared its sovereignty in 1990 and became independent on 1 September 1991. Islam 
Kerimov arose as Uzbekistan’s leader and the Communist Party was renamed as the 
People’s Democratic Party.  
 
Turkey was an example for the Uzbek Republic in terms of economic reforms, the 
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balance between religion and state and the experience of overcoming ethnic and cultural 
difficulties. These features of Turkey made it a useful model for Uzbekistan. The 
apparent approach of the Uzbek leadership was that, because of the ethnic and linguistic 
links between the Uzbeks and Turks, Uzbeks were attracted by the Turkish model.  
 
Kerimov visited Turkey between the 22nd and the 24th of December 1991. In his 
speeches and declarations he described the path that Uzbekistan would follow:  
As the state of Uzbekistan we are taking Turkey as an example in all its 
aspects. We will establish the state from A to Z by taking Turkey as a 
model. If Turkey supports us no one else can enslave the Uzbeks.266  
 
Uzbek leadership was an admirer of Ataturk and Uzbek leaders hoped to realize 
what Ataturk had succeeded in Turkey. The principles of Ataturk were parallel to those 
that Islam Kerimov wanted to install in Uzbekistan. Another important indicator of 
Uzbekistan’s warm welcome to Turkey and the Turkish model was that Kerimov gave 
the headquarters of his country’s Foreign Ministry to Turkey to use as its embassy.267 
These factors suggest that Turkey enjoyed unrivalled prestige in Uzbekistan by the ethnic 
links with Uzbeks and by its economic success.  
 
One area in which Uzbekistan has been rather reluctant to adopt from Turkey’s 
political system was a multiparty system. The Uzbek political system was not yet ready 
for plural democracy. One important factor which causes instability and disunity in the 
country is that Uzbeks are the major diaspora in the region.268 They form considerable 
minorities in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and some Kirghiz leaders supported by 
some Kirghiz people are threatening to intervene in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to defend 
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their co-ethnics or drive them towards secession. Moreover some Tajik intellectuals are 
dreaming to regain Samarkand and Bukhara, the lost Islamic lands of Tajikistan, back. 
For these reasons stability was obtained at the price of repressing almost all dissent inside 
and outside Kerimov’s administration in Uzbekistan. In other words, President Kerimov’s 
priority is to guarantee a stable political environment, even at the cost of undermining the 
basic rights and liberties of the Uzbek people.269 
 
An exchange of official visits occurred between the two countries’ leadership in 
1992. The Turkish Ministers visited Uzbekistan between the 28th of February and the 6th 
of March 1992 with the aim to observe the needs of these countries on the spot and obtain 
information for future projects. This visit helped to improve cultural and educational 
relations between Turkey and Uzbekistan. Eight agreements in different fields were 
signed in Uzbekistan.270 
 
While the two parties’ leadership was trying to get closer, nationalist fractions 
were surfacing in Uzbekistan. For example Aras says that “The leader of the banned Erk 
Party in Uzbekistan, Muhammed Salih, argues that Turkmenistan is more than a 
geographical term; it also means an ethnic term.271From nationalists’ perspective, 
Moscow is blamed for dividing Turkestan into different nations such as Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan.  
 
Furthermore these movements had close relations with nationalist parties in 
Turkey but this closeness and support of Turkish parties were not approved by the former 
 156
Soviet states’ governments. Islam Kerimov was against a supranational mechanism 
which would coordinate the Turkic world. He was clear in expressing his limitations in 
his involvement of any pan-Turkic movement. On the Turkish side, although there were 
nationalist fractions leaning towards pan-Turkic policies such as The National Movement 
Party and its local organizations gathered around the ideal of Turkism. Turkey’s general 
approach towards purely ethnic ideologies was negative. Most importantly Uzbekistan, 
similar to the other Turkic Republics, was still a weak state. It needed to restructure and 
modernize the economy, build its state from scratch, and it had to deal with its own 
domestic problems like public health problems, high inflation and unemployment.  
  
In general, Uzbekistan welcomed some of the aspects of the Turkish model such 
as secularism market economy and closeness to the West. Uzbekistan wanted to benefit 
by Turkey’s experience in economic transformation from a centrally controlled economy 
to a market economy. Moreover Turkey was expected to help Uzbekistan attract foreign 
investments. Turkey, on the other hand, was willing to meet Uzbekistan’s expectations 
and to establish joint business councils with Uzbekistan. For example the first such 
council, the Turkish Uzbek Council, was set up as early as November 1991.272  
 
As mentioned above although the multiparty aspect of the model was nominally 
welcomed in practice it has not been accepted and the authorities claim that for the sake 
of stability implementation of democracy has been delayed.  
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4.5.2 Turkey’s Constructive Policies in Uzbekistan  
 
4.5.2.1 Turkey’s Contributions to Uzbek Military   
 
Uzbekistan is the most strategically located country among the Central Asian 
states. While it has the largest population and the most significant military capability, it 
has also been a center of regional tension. In Uzbekistan radical Islamist groups, which 
are Hizb-üt Tahrir, Al Qaida and The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) cause 
political instability. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which is based in Tajikistan 
and in Taliban controlled areas of Afghanistan and which tends to attack the Fergana 
Valley, the area between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, is one of the greatest 
threats to Central Asian security.273  
 
 In 1999, Tashkent was plagued with several bombings which have been linked to 
the IMU.274Three suicide bombings blasted outside the embassies of Israel and the US. 
Innocent Uzbeks were killed at this event. The IMU was probably behind car bombs in 
Tashkent in February 1999 that aimed to assassinate Uzbek President Islam Kerimov and 
that killed 16 persons.275 The IMU also launched a series of attacks in 2000.To combat 
the threat of the IMU, the Uzbek government has preempted with a policy of arresting 
thousands of alleged terrorists.276 However this policy backfired as the repression of 
human rights and civil freedoms has promoted radicalism and militancy within 
Uzbekistan.277 
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Following the August 2000 Islamic incursions Turkey immediately offered 
Uzbekistan financial aid. Turkey promised to train Uzbek-counter terrorism teams in its 
military academies. Under a 16 October 2000 military cooperation agreement the two 
countries further agreed to jointly fight international terrorism and other criminal 
activities and discussed the possible transfer of Turkish arms and other military 
equipment to Uzbekistan’s armed forces.278  
 
Moreover the events of September 11th opened new opportunities for Turkish 
diplomacy, especially in the military field. Currently Turkey is providing important 
military assistance to train and equip the Uzbek army in the war against terrorism. This 
assistance has helped ease the tensions evident in the mid and late 1990s and has given 
Turkish-Uzbek relations important new impetus.279 
 
Turkey and Uzbekistan became partners in countering terrorism however 
Uzbekistan creates a contradictory situation by its own human rights abuses. According 
to the Human Rights Watch Report there are major abuses of the rights to freedom of 
religion, expression, association, and assembly. Moreover Uzbekistan justifies its human 
rights abuses by referring to the global campaign against terrorism. The same report 
states that “the government justifies this campaign by referring to the “war on terror,” 
failing to distinguish between those who advocate violence and those who peacefully 
express their religious beliefs.”280 Although Turkey shares Uzbekistan’s concerns about 
Uzbekistan’s security threats and supplies aid and military education to this country281, 
Uzbekistan’s weaknesses in the areas of democracy and human rights are likely to 
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impede Turkish-Uzbek relations in the long term. 
 
4.5.2.2 Turkey’s Contributions to Uzbek Education 
 
Turkey invited students from Uzbekistan between the years 1992 and 1993 
following Prime Minister Demirel’s official visit to the Turkic Republics as part of 
cooperation in education. These students learned Turkish in their first year and the next 
year they attended Turkish universities and colleges. However a major problem in the 
educational exchange program occurred when Uzbekistan called its students back to 
Uzbekistan.  
 
The Uzbek government believed that Uzbek students in Turkey would be 
influenced by the Uzbek opposition in Turkey. It was suspected that some of these 
students were attending street demonstrations with members of the Uzbek opposition. In 
the 1992-93 academic year 1120 students and in 1993-94 244 students were called back 
to Uzbekistan. By 1997 only 438 Uzbek students were registered at Turkish schools.282 In 
2001 there were only six Uzbek students continuing their education in Turkey. (See Table 
2) 
 
People of this region believe that the Turkish schools make a big contribution to 
the improvement of close relations between Turkey and the host countries. There are 25 
high schools and one university established by Turkey. (see Table 2) Parents increase 
their knowledge of Turkey through their children and the teachers and administrators 
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working in these schools get extensive information on Turkey’s politics, economics, 
social and cultural life through their Turkish colleagues. Special days of Turkey are also 
celebrated by all students and parents, such as the foundation of the Turkish Republic and 
the annual commemoration of the death of Ataturk.  
 
Moreover Turkish teachers establish close friendships with local people by 
inviting students’ parents to their homes for dinners to introduce Turkish meals, family 
patterns and culture. It is not hard to see that the most important factor that carries these 
schools to success is teachers’ work with enthusiasm. They feel part of the Turkic world 
and see what they are doing as a historical mission since they share the same religion, 
history and a similar culture with the Turkic people.  They are also in good relations with 
the Turkmen government which supports Turkish schools.  
 
These schools give people hope for a better future. Administrators and teachers 
believe that their students are offered a high-quality education and they will carry their 
countries to the world standards by catching up with the universal values.  
 
Education can be used as one of the most direct means to mould the political 
culture of a target country by attempting to create a generation of elites familiar with and 
sympathetic to the culture and to the country that provides the education.283In this 
direction, Uzbeks strongly believe that the Turkish schools train the future bureaucrats, 
leaders and technocrats who are equipped with various skills such as language, computer 
and leadership skills. After graduation students hope to get into the Turkish universities 
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and find a good job in Turkish companies. They trust in themselves since they can work 
in any part of the world with their foreign language, which is English, and academic 
skills. Students who are trained in Turkish schools are the pioneers in the development of 
their countries.   
 
4.5.2.3 Cultural Relations   
 
Uzbekistan has an important place in the Islamic culture. Moreover Tashkent was 
chosen as the Capital of Islamic Culture in 2007 by ISESKO which is a subsidiary 
organization interested in education, science and culture of the Organization of the 
Islamic Culture.284 However, Uzbeks, under the Communist Soviet Rule, have felt the 
negative government pressure in openly confessing and practicing their religion. 
Religious teachings at schools were banned and people were exposed to atheist 
propaganda. By the late 1980s, as Kendzior argues,  “the Soviets had succeeded in 
curtailing religion in Uzbekistan by removing its outward manifestations: closing 
mosques and madrasas; banning sacred texts and languages; outlawing non-state-
sanctioned religious leaders and congregations.”285 
 
Within this context Kerimov says that they were raised up in nihilist and atheist 
conditions without knowing the value of Islam. He adds “To my understanding Islam is a 
democratic regime and encourages love for human beings. Islam means purification. It 
doesn’t allow you to exceed certain moral limits.”286During the presidency of Islam 
Kerimov mosques and religious schools increased in number.  
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Turkish officials opened educational centers in Uzbekistan to teach Islam and 
they sent imams to serve people at mosques. TICA and other numerous voluntary 
organizations gathered books and Qurans to send to their Uzbek brothers. Apart from 
Turkish religious aid, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Libya and Egypt have sent Korans and 
other religious books to the Headquarters of the Religious Board in Tashkent and helped 
to build new mosques and seminaries.  
 
TICA’s presence in the country was felt by its financial aids as well. TICA has 
donated a $5000 financial source for the project which would generate electricity from 
solar power. TIKA has also provided assistance to Uzbekistan in various areas such as 
training for Uzbek diplomats, Uzbek radiobroadcasters, building greenhouses and 
milling.  
 
In the case of alphabet reform, although Uzbekistan considered both Arabic and 
Latin alphabets, it later decided to adopt the Latin alphabet which would strengthen the 
relations between Turkey and Uzbekistan by easing communication between the two 
sides. At the same time the adoption of the Latin alphabet brought Uzbekistan closer to 
the West. Kubicek notes that “scholars in Uzbekistan proposed to create a common 
language from the various Turkic tongues spoken in the region, and received initial 
backing from President Islam Kerimov.”287 On this issue Kerimov said that in the case of 
the alphabet they would make a decision between the Arab and Latin alphabets and their 
preference would be on the side of the Latin alphabet.288 
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4.6 Conclusion  
 
Turkish leaders were quite satisfied that the ex-Soviet states had approached the 
Turkish development model with great willingness. The Turkish model offered a Western 
type of political and economic system. The common features of this model are a secular 
and democratic political system, a liberal economy and closeness with the West. For 
these features, Turkey had credibility in the eyes of the Turkic governments. Since the 
characteristics of the Turkish economic and political system were supposed to integrate 
these states with the rest of the world it was crucial for the states of Central Asia, which 
was called as “periphery”, “isolated” or landlocked, to connect to the global system in 
this new post-Soviet international system.  
 
One of the findings of this chapter is that despite the alleged brotherhood between 
Turkey and Azerbaijan, Turkey avoided the option of helping Azeris with military 
intervention during the discourse of warfare in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Turkey 
and Azerbaijan shared the same goal to liberate occupied Azeri territory from Armenia. 
Moreover there was great public pressure resulting from the common socio-cultural ties 
on Turkish government to fight with Armenia militarily in cases of severe crises such as 
the massacre in Khojali in1992. Turkey is Azerbaijan’s only ally in this conflict, however 
Turkey officially did not respond to the expectations of the Turkish citizens and the Azeri 
government. Turkey avoided military confrontation with Russia who has been on the side 
of the Armenians. Above all, Turkey’s general stance in case of conflicts is to apply to 
the international institutions for a resolution. Turkey prefers to work in cooperation with 
the UN and CSCE in Europe to alleviate the conflict.  
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 In all the republics Turkey has been actively implementing educational policies. 
The role of education is crucial in transforming the economic, political and cultural 
systems of the former Soviet Republics. The Turkish Ministry of Education and some 
private groups like the Gulen community have opened high schools and universities in 
these states. These schools have been able to build up a good reputation throughout the 
region. Students gain awards from the international scientific contests. Most importantly 
they contribute to the reformation of society by turning out to be responsible and well 
behaved individuals as graduates from Turkish schools.  
 
Like education, culture is another field that Turkey gives importance to achieve 
its policy goals. As London notes “the advantage of cultural exchange probably is the 
contact it creates and the possibility that some stereotyped prejudices old or new can be 
eliminated.”289One major goal of Turkey in the area of culture is to promote the Latin 
alphabet and Turkish language. All republics except Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan changed 
their alphabets. A common language and a common alphabet would ease any kind of 
relationship whether it’s political or economical. Common language would strengthen the 
Turkic identity and bring people closer.  
 
Turkey has been actively working in the area of religion as well. Following the 
independence of republics people of the region have made their needs well known to 
Muslim communities outside the region. In response to this demand Turkish Ministry of 
Religious Affairs and some voluntary organizations sent thousands of books on Islam. 
Fuller says that “As a result there is a profusion of literature in local Central Asian 
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languages about Islam and its meaning.”290 Turkey also tried to meet peoples’ demands 
about learning Islam by opening religious centers.  
 
Turkey has the strongest energy link with Azerbaijan. Not only oil but also natural 
gas is exported from Azerbaijan. Turkey needs natural gas for domestic consumption and 
Turkey’s first gas supply from Azerbaijan’s Shah-Deniz-Guneshli field started to flow in 
2007.  
  
 Turkey’s choice of Azerbaijan as an oil and gas exporting country proves that 
common socio-cultural ties are important for Turkey in doing business with other states. 
Turkey can buy oil from Russia and Iran as well. However Turkey is not comfortable in 
doing business with these two countries as much as it is comfortable with Azerbaijan. 
Cultural patterns of Turkey and Russia are quite different with the former based on an 
Ottoman-Islamic heritage and the latter based on a Christian- heritage. Moreover there is 
a 500-year history between Turkey and Russia and they are considered to be 
“archrivals.”291 As far as Iran is concerned Turkey is not enthusiastic to engage in 
business relations with this country considering the conflicting relations between Iran and 
the US, which is a strong ally of Turkey. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION  
5.1 Findings 
 
This thesis reveals that both Turkey and the five Turkic republics were eager to 
expand their relations in every field into future cooperation following the break up of the 
Soviet Union. During the time period between 1991 and 1993 Turkey had its closest 
relations in the Caspian Sea Region. In these years official and work visits occurred and 
several agreements on economic, scientific and technical cooperation were signed. 
 
Turkish leaders were quite satisfied that the ex-Soviet states had approached the 
Turkish development model with great willingness. Since the characteristics of the 
Turkish economic and political system were supposed to integrate these states with the 
rest of the world, it was crucial for the states of Central Asia which were described as 
“periphery”, “isolated” or “landlocked” to connect to the global system in this new post-
Soviet international system.  
 
The Turkish model offered a Western type of political and economic system. The 
common features of this model are a secular and democratic political system, liberal 
economy and closeness with the West. For these features Turkey had credibility in the 
eyes of the five Turkic republics. Moreover the US presence in this region had positive 
impacts on Turkish policy. The US’s major concern in the area is to prevent the spread of 
radical terrorist activities and to limit the Iranian influence in both political and economic 
terms. Turkey, in this context, as an ally of the US, could avoid the US’s such concerns 
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by acting as a stabilizing factor in the region. For Turkish policy makers, on the other 
hand, a US dimension, supporting Turkey’s economic and political interests, is quite 
attractive. In the view of this background information on Turkish-American agreement, 
we can better understand US’s moves towards supporting Turkey.  From a policy 
perspective, the US supports Turkish development against Iranian influence. Turkey 
offers its model of secularism in a mostly Muslim population, parliamentary democracy 
and a free market economy.  
 
These republics’ political leaders all expressed their wish to follow the guidance 
of Turkey in their path to democratization and marketization and extended their goodwill 
and desire to be close partners with Turkey in the future. They have a communist political 
culture separating them from democratic societies and they looked to Turkey in their 
efforts to establish democratic systems. As Kazemin and Ajdar stated “there is an elite 
class that was reared and socialized in a highly restrictive and controlled Soviet 
system.”292  
  
 Numerous speeches of Turkic leaders of the period emphasized that they had 
chosen Turkey as the leading country to help them integrate with the rest of the world. It 
was reflected in these speeches that common ethnic, historical and religious ties 
explained their preference for Turkey as the best country to help them in their transition 
from Soviet rule to independence. Turkey shares a friendly history rooted in the Ottoman 
Empire with those countries. Their ethnic commonality as Turks dates back to 2000 BC 
from origins in inner Asia and they all speak Turkic dialects. Adding to these assets they 
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are the members of the same religion, Islam. For example the Kirghiz president Akayev 
saw Turkey as “the morningstar of the Turkic world showing guidance to other 
Republics”293 or Azeris consider Turkish people in Turkey as part of their nation. As 
Aras says “The historical and linguistic ties Turkey maintains with much of the region 
allows for it to be perceived a s a model for these countries to leave their Soviet past and 
enter today’s society in their unique identities.”294 Turkey enjoyed the privilege of its 
common ties with the Turkic countries in easily establishing the initial contacts with 
these countries. In other words Turkey’s past experiences with regard to the Caucasian 
and Central Asian region served as strong references for its role as the major actor in the 
future.  
 
Factors other than common ties that help to fully understand Turkey’s role and 
function in the Caspian Sea Region are to act as a bridge between the regional countries 
in the Caspian Region and the West to offer a successful development model, which was 
mentioned above, for the developing countries of the region.  
 
Turkey was quite attractive for Central Asian Republics as a strong member of the 
Western alliance. As political observers state “throughout 1991–1992 nearly all Central 
Asian leaders mentioned that they perceived Turkey as the model to follow since they 
believed that their relations with Turkey could ease their entry in to the Western world; 
those countries established an extensive network for cultural, economic and, to a degree, 
military cooperation with Turkey.”295 
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Moreover having gained independence, many Caspian states became determined 
to move away from Russian influence. The mean that would be used to realize their wish 
would be to seek to enter the Western alliance. Turkey would be the bridge between the 
Turkic states of Central Asia and the West. Turkey was supposed to attract foreign 
investment and to build contacts between the sides by using its familiarity with the 
culture and similarity of the language. Consequently this would contribute to the 
economic development of the countries by providing capital and sophisticated 
technology. Another way of looking at the Turkic countries’ willingness to join the 
Western alliance is that countries like to act in the same direction with the compatible 
states as the best policy option to preserve themselves. As London mentions it, “many of 
the newer states which undergo a stage of rampant nationalism have no choice but to 
affiliate with others of similar interest.”296 
  
 Particularly Turkic leaders tied their hopes to Turkey’s EU membership. Turkey, 
as an EU member, would be the agent to meet European entrepreneurs and natural 
sources of the Caspian Sea Region. However it is in question if this expectation can be 
fulfilled considering that Turkey is still far from changing its status from a candidate to 
full EU membership.  
 
As mentioned above Turkey’s offer of a Western type of development model 
received positive responses and this gave the hope to Turkey to become a major player in 
the region. However one disadvantage for Turkey in its historical past was the possibility 
of leaning towards pan-Turkism, the ideology to unify all the Turks. Turkic peoples’ 
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reactions to pan-Turkic tendencies have always been negative.  
 
The five post-Soviet republics were against any kinds of pan-movements at a time 
when they were trying to build their own nations and identities. Rather they were fans of 
Ataturk who pursued territorial policies with his famous motto “Peace at home, peace in 
the world”. For example Turkmen leader Saparmurat Niyazov was an admirer of Ataturk 
and he even called himself as Turkmenbashi, which has the same meaning with Ataturk, 
the head of Turks. Ataturk’s nationalist principle was distant from pan-ideals. Ataturk 
acknowledged that the origin of the peoples of today’s Anatolia was in Central Asia but 
he never advocated pan-Turkism, which is the ideology of the union of all Turks. Ataturk 
rather pursued nationalist policies focusing on the development of the country.  Actually 
Turkic leaders’ admiration of Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, increased Turkey’s 
credibility in the region. In opposition to Ataturk’s nationalist principle, pan-Turkism 
suggests that the gathering of all Turkic people of the post-Soviet region under the 
control of the same state. The pan-Turkist policies of Enver Pasha, who saw himself as 
the ruler of a realm embracing Chinese Turkestan, Russian Turkestan, Kazakhstan and 
Afghanistan, and who was the commander of the 3rd Caucasian Army in the WW I, 
brought Turkey to a complete catastrophe. Thousands of qualified Turkish military troops 
were killed in their struggle against the Soviets to help Central Asians free themselves 
from Moscow’s authority. This is an important event that holds an unfortunate place in 
Turkish historical memory. Additionally the defeat of Turkish-German alliance against 
Soviets put an end to Turkey’s pan-Turkist adventures.  These historical events explain 
political leaders’ distance towards pan-turkism. Except some marginal groups Turkish 
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official policy has never supported any pan-Turkic formations.  
 
Violent conflict is an ongoing problem in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. 
Causes of these conflicts can be defined as a mix of religious, ethnic and political in 
addition to foreign interests. The Nagorno-Karabakh is an ethnic conflict between the 
Azeris and the Armenians and it is a border clash that Azeris and Armenians experience 
in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh. The boundaries of Caucasian states like those of 
Central Asian and Middle Eastern states have been drawn artificially. Ethnically defined 
republics have been separated with artificial lines. As Ajdari and Kazami say 
“Everywhere people with the same religion, customs and language live on both sides”297 
of the frontiers. On the other hand Oliker and Szyana suggest that the major cause of a 
regional conflict is “the regimes themselves; their weaknesses and volatilities leave them 
increasingly unable to withstand challenges posed by other fault lines.”298 
  
 The focus of attention here is not to discuss the causes of conflicts but Turkey’s 
common approach towards these conflicts. This thesis shows that despite the alleged 
brotherhood between Turkey and Azerbaijan, Turkey avoided the option of helping 
Azeris with military intervention during the course of warfare in Nagorno-Karabakh. 
Turkey and Azerbaijan shared the same goal to liberate occupied the Azeri territory from 
Armenia. Moreover there was great public pressure resulting from the common socio-
cultural ties on Turkish government to fight with Armenia militarily in cases of severe 
crises such as the massacre in Khojali in 1992. Turkey is Azerbaijan’s only ally in this 
conflict. Turkey did not officially respond to the expectations of Turkish citizens and the 
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Azeri government. Turkey avoided military confrontation with Russia which has been on 
the side of Armenians. Above all Turkey’s general stance in case of conflicts is to apply 
to the international institutions for a resolution. Turkey prefers to work in cooperation 
with the UN and CSCE in Europe to alleviate the conflict. Actually this is the visible side 
of the iceberg. It has been alleged that Turkey provides equipment and military personnel 
to not only Azeris but also to Chechens in their struggle against Russia. It is an 
interesting phenomenon that numerous solidarity groups have emerged with this intention 
of helping Turkic people of the region. As Aras points out “there are an estimated 4-5 
million Turkish citizens who regard the peoples of Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, 
Georgia, Abkhazia, Azerbaijan and other places as their relatives.”299 These types of 
solidarity groups influence the Turkish government as lobbyists. Their demands rank 
high on Turkey’s domestic political agenda during the Chechen War, the Abkhazian 
crisis and with the entry of Russian troops to Azerbaijan.  
 
The hypothesis that the stronger the socio-cultural ties are between Turkey and 
the Turkic states the closer the foreign relations between Turkey and the Turkic countries 
are is applicable to all five republics. The Turkic states welcomed Turkey’s educational 
and cultural policies with great willingness. In all the republics Turkey has been actively 
implementing educational policies. The role of education is crucial in transforming the 
economic, political and cultural systems of the former Soviet Republics. Turkish Ministry 
of Education and some private groups have opened high schools and universities in these 
states. These schools have been able to build up good reputation throughout the region. 
Students gain awards from the international scientific contests. Most importantly they 
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contribute to the reformation of society as turning into very well behaved and responsible 
students.  
 
From a policy perspective, educational projects can be considered as a tool of 
Turkish foreign policy. As Yanik mentions the goal is “to create a stratum of people who 
will be well versed in Turkish culture and language, which then would act as a bridge 
between their countries and Turkey.”300 Other scholars like Akkok and Balci also foresee 
that “these schools will serve the political and economic goals of Turkey in relation to the 
Central Asian countries.”301 Graduates of these schools are perceived as the pioneers to 
establish successful foreign relations with the West and Turkey as well. In short the 
politics behind the Turkish schools and student exchange programs is the improvement of 
political and cultural relations between Turkey and the republics.  
 
 Turkish schools are among the favorites in the region. In these schools students 
meet the Western economic and political culture. They learn English, which allow them 
to work in any part of the world. It is significant for students to learn about market 
economy at a time of their countries’ transition from a centrally planned economy to 
market economy. Among the schools founded by Turkey, especially vocational high 
schools serve to realize this goal. Students learn the essentials of market economy, which 
is something these students are not familiar with as being individuals raised up in a 
socialist system. Additionally it is a great opportunity for students to use new 
technologies since ex-Soviet republics have fallen behind the developments in agriculture 
and industry. Vocational high-schools also provide skilled manpower for the factories as 
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well. 
 
Parents are also quite satisfied about the behavioral changes they observe in their 
children. The identity formation of both the students and the states give people a hard 
time. From this problematic period emerges the use of drugs and alcohol. Thankfully the 
educational training, given by devoted Turkish teachers, ameliorates this crisis of society 
by turning students into well behaved individuals. The common characteristic features of 
the students are “being well-bred, hard working, honest, goal oriented, self-disciplined 
and rational individuals who appreciate the modern way of living.”302 These schools have 
had a positive influence on the shaping of the students’ identity. As Akkok, Balci and 
Demir say parents think that those schools “seemed to fill a value gap which has emerged 
in the transition period.”303 
 
Like education, culture is another field that Turkey gives importance to achieve 
its policy goals. As London notes “the advantage of cultural exchange probably is the 
contact it creates and the possibility that some stereotyped prejudices old or new can be 
eliminated.”304 
 
One major goal of Turkey in the area of culture is to promote the Latin alphabet 
and Turkish language. All republics except Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan changed their 
alphabets. A common alphabet would ease any kind of relationship whether it is political 
or economical and a common language would strengthen the Turkic identity and bring 
people closer. The switch from Cyrillic to Latin may also be interpreted as a move away 
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from the Russian sphere of influence at a time when they want to position themselves in 
the post-Soviet space and they want to implement their own unique identities.  
 
Apart from its ideological and political aspect, adopting the Latin alphabet is 
practical as well. On this practical side the Latin alphabet is often cited as important for 
computer compatibility. As Nazarbayev told to the Assembly of Peoples, "Latin script 
dominates in communications”.305 The young and old generations are affected by this 
switch in different ways. It is hard for old people, who are the least likely to learn 
English, to adapt to the new alphabet. The young generation, on the other hand, has less 
difficulty in learning Latin alphabet. Turkey had a similar experience of adoption of a 
new script. One of Ataturk’s reforms was to change the Arabic script with the Latin script 
in 1938. Like the people in Central Asia, the young Turkish generation found themselves 
cut off from their cultural past resulting from the script change. Turkic peoples of the 
region experience the same hard transition as well. The future generations will feel 
foreign to their literary heritage since the vast majority of literature is in Cyrillic.  
  
 Turkey also puts emphasis on institutions which would increase peoples’ 
consciousness of common Turkic values. Turkey especially offered courses on Turkish 
art and opened Turkology departments in universities. It was Turkey’s hope that its 
contributions in this field would lead to partnerships in economic and political fields. 
Turkey funded projects like printing books or conferences on pan-Turkism not to 
revitalize the ideology but to strengthen Turkic identity which would lead to a 
rapprochement of Turkic peoples. Local people were quite satisfied with Turkey’s 
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contributions in the cultural field. The Turks of the Soviet Union have also been aware of 
their common origin with those in the Turkish republics. This has not been destroyed 
through time.  
 
As it is apparent from the factors listed above Turkey is in a more advantageous 
position than any other country in the world in terms of integrating with the region and 
exploiting the potential of the region with its cultural closeness and familiarity of the 
language.  
 
 Central Asia is an honored region in the Islamic world with its cities of Bukhara 
and Samarqand. These cities, which have important Islamic teaching and learning centers 
and where famous religious figures have lived, are directly linked with the Islamic 
culture. Historically the people of the Eastern Turkish world have been affected by the 
developments and initiatives from Istanbul, the former capital of the Caliph and the 
Turkish sultans. These people were drown toward Islamic culture and society.  
 
However the offensive period under Soviet control has weakened this link. For 
example; Kendzior states that “the Soviet regime had succeeded in curtailing religion in 
Uzbekistan by removing its outward manifestations: closing mosques and medreses; 
banning sacred texts and languages; outlawing non-state-sanctioned religious leaders and 
congregations.”306 Now that the regional countries are free from Soviet rule, people 
returned to learning their faith as they had in the past.  
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People of the region have made their needs well known to Muslim communities 
outside the region. To meet this demand, the Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs and 
some voluntary organizations sent thousands of books on Islam. Today the Turkish 
Republic, which is the inheritor of the Islamic civilization, still has influence over the 
cultural and religious lives of the Turkic people and pays attention to these peoples’ 
demands. Fuller says that “As a result there is a profusion of literature in local Central 
Asian languages about Islam and its meaning.”307 
 
Generally speaking the strong interest towards Islam is not a consequence of 
political Islam emerging from the region but rather it is a way to improve solidarity 
between people. In support to this idea Fuller says that “the nomadic traditions of 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan all emphasize traditions of folk 
Islam.”308Islam also has the function of strengthening nationalism. In this respect Kazakh 
President has mentioned that “Islam could serve to strengthen a sense of Kazakh 
nationalism.”309Eventually a combination of Islam and nationalism is likely to strengthen 
an awareness of a shared civilization. 
  
With regard to Turkey’s economic interests in the region Turkish trade relations 
in the Caspian Sea Region started in 1992. We find that Turkish economy follows a 
similar pattern in its relations with the Azerbaijani and Central Asian markets. The values 
indicating the total costs of trade volumes are quite close to each other. The only two 
countries which reached trade volumes above average are Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan 
with the former having a $1 billion trade volume and with the latter having a $800 
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million trade volume in 2005. 
 
Trade analysis reveals is that Turkey’s trade volume with each of the five Turkic 
countries shows an increasing trend only after 2001. This is the result of the two 
economic crises: 1998 financial crises of Russia and 2001 economic crise of Turkey. 
Foreign trade of the ex-Soviet states was dependent on the Russian economic situation. 
During the 1998 economic crises in Russia, people of the region preferred to buy Russian 
products, which were cheaper than Turkish products. Presumably half of the Turkish 
companies operating in the region were closed. Turkey also experienced a strong 
financial crisis in 2001 and this led to the contraction of the economy. Interest rates and 
public debt were high and economic growth was volatile. This economic weakness was 
inevitably reflected in Turkey’s foreign trade and investment.  
 
The US also gives importance to the economic growth, which is supposed to lead 
to political stability, of the regional countries. The US companies are heavily involved in 
the infrastructure development projects. Regional economic growth is acknowledged as 
one of the important factors that would secure the sovereignty of the regional countries. 
In this context there is an improved Turkish-American joint action towards the economic 
and political transformation of the Turkic countries.  
 
 One common theme that attracts attention when Turkey’s investment capacity in 
the region is considered is that Turkey enjoyed the privilege of exploiting the Central 
Asian Market in the absence of serious competitors. Post-Soviet Turkic countries are still 
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in a transition from Moscow’s command economy to a liberal economy. There are 
unstable tariff systems, unsatisfactory banking services and they lack regulating laws. 
Some of them have long done business by using their local monetary unit, which does not 
exactly match the value of Turkish lira and this may result as loss of money for Turkish 
businesspersons. These types of structural problems prevent big companies from doing 
business there. Moreover they do not want to take the risk of doing business in an 
unstable environment where they encounter high inflation rates, low output, red tape and 
bribery, which are the common problems in the regional countries. Another difficulty is 
to find qualified labor force. It is a significant problem because mostly it depends on how 
qualified workforce is to take progress in running successful production. The regional 
countries offer cheap workforce but businesspersons complain that employees are not 
working in the way they should work.310  This is a significant issue that needs to be 
resolved before demanding that foreign investors engage in business in the area. 
 
An important business field where mostly Turkish entrepreneurs work is building 
construction. Turkish people usually built hotels and airports. This can be interpreted as a 
way to make the cities like Tashkent or Manas more attractive and welcoming to 
foreigners.  
 
The regional economies were mostly based on the agricultural industry and 
farmers were producing raw materials for Russia and they have fallen behind 
technological developments during the Soviet rule. In relevance with this situation one of 
the major product groups that Turkey exports to these countries are electronic devices 
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both partial and as a whole. Another major product of Turkey’s exports is automobiles 
resulting from the situation that post-Soviet governments cannot respond to the 
enterprises in automobile industry and cannot respond to the demand for passenger 
automobiles. Many new cars are foreign, exclusively Audi, Mercedes or Volvo. On the 
other hand Turkey mostly imports commodities like copper, leather, silk, mineral oil and 
cotton from the Turkic countries. Turkey uses cotton, leather and silk for its textile 
industry which has an important place in Turkish industry.  
 
Turk Eximbank has done much to stimulate trade and business links in the region. 
One point that is common to all five republics is that they received Eximbank credits 
from Turkey for their national development projects. Looking at the used partition of the 
credits given by Turk Eximbank to the Turkic countries from 1992 to 1998 one can see 
how much these countries were in need of economic aid. These credits were used for 
national development projects and financing trade. Also they were used for purchasing 
emergency needs like medicine and food. Turkey was comfortable in giving hard cash 
since these credits were guaranteed under state guarantee letters. This was a mutually 
beneficial deal for the republics and for the Turkish entrepreneurs.  
  
 While the republics found a funding source to realize their projects, Turkish 
exporters received Eximbank credits for their short term projects. Turk Eximbank 
encouraged businesspersons to invest in the region.  
 
Common policy goals of Turkey and the five republics led Turkey to establish 
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close foreign relations with the regional countries. Turkey tried to give military aid to the 
Turkic republics of Central Asia in their struggle against terrorist groups which have the 
capacity to destabilize governments to threaten international security and which are 
mostly located in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Turkey’s aid substantiated in the form of 
sending military equipment and money and also Turkey offered training the military 
servicemen through NATO. Particularly after 9/11 Turkey and the regional countries 
turned out to be strong partners by signing military agreements within the scope of global 
war against terrorism.  
 
The hypothesis that the more Turkey has business interests in the Caspian Sea 
Region the more Turkey will have closer foreign relations with Turkic countries is mostly 
apparent in the case of Azerbaijan. In the area of energy politics Turkey has its strongest 
link with Azerbaijan. Moreover, in the area of energy politics, the US shows significant 
support for Turkish interests. The US acknowledges Turkey’s concerns for the Bosporus 
Straits which is exposed to shipping congestion and environmental risks resulting from 
the inconvenient way of the transition of oil in large amounts. As Chufrin notes “ since 
1995 the US government has assertively backed this route not only to show support for 
Turkey but also because it believe s that such a pipeline enhance economic and political 
ties in the region and cement its independence from the undue influences of Russia and 
Iran. ”311  
 
Not only oil but also natural gas is exported from Azerbaijan. The two profound 
projects that Turkey was able to realize are the Baku-Tbilisi Ceyhan Oil Pipeline Project 
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and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Gas Pipeline Project. 
 
The BTC Project serves to the interests of Turkey in two ways: It is the first 
constructed pipeline which bypasses the Bosporus Straits and Turkey has the privilege of 
earning transit and operating fees from this project since the pipeline passes through 
Turkish territory.  
 
The Bosporus connects the Black Sea with the Sea of Marmara, and the 
Dardanelles links the Sea of Marmara with the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. This 
Turkish waterway is quite busy because of supplying Europe with oil from the Caspian 
Sea Region. Increasing number of tankers from the Black Sea can lead to accidents in the 
narrow straits. It has become quite risky to use the Bosporus Straits as an energy 
transition corridor and Turkey does not want to take this risk anymore by letting pipeline 
routes pass through the straits. The BTC Pipeline, on the other hand, extends from the 
Azeri-Chirac-Guneshli oilfield of Azerbaijan to Georgia and from there to a terminal at 
Ceyhan on the Mediterranean coast of Turkey. 
 
Turkey has oil in the Black, Mediterranean and Aegean Seas but it depends on 
foreign companies to extract oil from these areas. British Petrol (BP) or Shell is the two 
responsible companies for energy projects in the country. Turkey needs to pay high costs 
for the production of oil since national companies. This situation forms an impediment 
for Turkey’s economic growth.  
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TUPRAS and TPAO are the two national companies for exploration, storage and 
refining of oil. However these companies do not have sufficient technology and capital to 
exploit Turkey’s resources. Apparently Turkey does not have the privilege to rely solely 
on national energy industry for its energy projects. However Turkey may gain well from 
doing energy business if it can work with joint ventures to produce oil and gas by being 
the major responsible country in the joint venture rather than having a small share in 
ventures. One way of convincing foreign companies is to use its energy card wisely by 
opening its sources to foreign companies. Actually the Petroleum Market Reform Bill, 
which was passed in December 2003 and which aims to liberalize the oil economy, was a 
good starting point to attract foreign companies do business in the country.  
 
Turkey has the strongest energy link with Azerbaijan. Not only oil but also natural 
gas is exported from Azerbaijan. Turkey needs natural gas for domestic consumption and 
Turkey’s first gas supply from Azerbaijan’s Shah-Deniz-Guneshli field started to flow in 
2007.  
 
Turkey’s choice of Azerbaijan as an oil and gas exporter country proves that 
common socio-cultural ties are important for Turkey in doing business with other states. 
Turkey can buy oil from Russia and Iran as well. However Turkey is not comfortable 
with these two countries as much as it is comfortable with Azerbaijan. Russia worked to 
undermine the Ottoman control in the Balkan region as Sezer says “by acting as the 
patron liberator of Balkan peoples most importantly of Greeks and Serbs.” A second 
point that causes the two countries nourish negative perceptions of each other is that 
 184
Russia has never supported the nationalist awakening of the Turkic Muslim people in the 
early 20th century.  
 
Cultural patterns of Turkey and Russia are quite different with the former based 
on an Ottoman-Islamic heritage and the latter based on a Christian- heritage. Moreover 
there is a 500-year history between Turkey and Russia and they are considered to be 
“archrivals.”312  
 
As far as Iran is concerned Turkey is not enthusiastic to engage in business 
relations with this country considering the conflicting relations between Iran and the US, 
which is a strong ally of Turkey. Additionally, unlike Azerbaijan, Turkey is different 
from Iran in terms of ethnicity and religious sect. Iranians are Persians and mostly Shia 
while Turkish people are mostly Sunni.  
 
This study shows an important aspect of the Turkish-American alliance that the 
US has considerable presence in the region and its presence has positive impacts on 
Turkish policy towards this region. The US has supported both political and economic 
interests of Turkey. The NIS is also very interested in forming strong bilateral relations 
with the US. As Hunter says, “as the only remaining superpower and leader of the 
Western world the US has been extremely important to the Central Asian countries”313 
Starting from the 1990s the post-Soviet countries seeked for possible ways to establish 
ties with the US at different levels. Hunter explains that “a continuous stream of US 
academics, business people, journalists, and non-governmental organizations began 
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flowing into Central Asia and there was a reverse flow of similar groups to the 
US.”314Apart from these positive impacts of the US on Turkish policy in the Caspian Sea 
Region, Turkey and the US share some common goals which are “ensuring that the 
region does not become a breeding ground for illicit trafficking in arms, controlled 
technologies and drugs or a center of ethnic and religious separatism that could spread 
political devolution to other countries like China, Russia, Turkey or South Asia.”315 
 
A final finding that this study shows is about the contextual factors of Turkey and 
the regional countries. The contextual factors which act as driving forces of Turkish 
policy can be categorized as economic and political factors. The contextual economic 
factors Turkey’s need for natural gas and oil, Turkey’s need for new pipelines which 
would avoid oil transition through the Bosporus Straits and Turkey’s need for the Central 
Asian market to sell its products which can not be sold to Western markets. Turkish 
entrepreneurs’ willingness to invest in the region while other foreign companies abstain 
from starting business in the region because of the risky business environment is another 
contextual factor leading Turkey to move closer to the Caspian Sea Region.  
 
On the political and social level, contextual factors can be listed as follows. 
Turkish politicians’ strong will to support their Turkic brothers in cases of trouble as in 
the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, to try to meet their needs such as books teaching Islam; 
voluntary organizations’ efforts to achieve infrastructure projects to contribute to the 
regional countries’ national development and Turkish politicians’ eagerness to establish 
official ties with the Turkic leaders with whom they share certain characteristics.  
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 On the other hand the common themes of the internal contexts of the regional 
countries are their poor infrastructure inherited from the USSR, their need for technology 
and hard currency. On the political level they had a strong desire move away from the 
Russian influence and establish their own unique identities. They did not want to be 
labeled as ‘isolated’ and for this purpose; they were enthusiastic to establish political ties 
with different countries. These factors led them to be open to the rest of the world and at 
the same time they avoided coming under the influence of any supra-national ethnic or 
religious organization. Lastly; the region’s exposure to terrorist activities is another 
contextual factor which leads the states to act against terrorism in cooperation with the 
international community.  
 
5.2 Some Questions for Future Studies 
 
Looking back over to this study it is unlikely that Turkey will become a leading 
superpower in the region. Turkey lacks the necessary economic and financial resources to 
have a major influence in the region. Nevertheless the Turkish government started 
initiated various activities directed towards the development of the regional countries. 
Turkey offered training services, educational and cultural assistance to the republics. 
Turkey gave scholarships to the Turkic students and gave them the opportunity to receive 
their college and graduate education in Turkey. Turkish programs were broadcast by 
satellite and Turkish development agencies opened numerous cultural centers in the 
region. However these policy efforts are insufficient, as Fuller says, “to reorient the 
Republics toward Turkey”.316  
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 Findings showed that both Turkey and the five Turkic republics were enthusiastic 
to carry their relations in every field to future cooperation following the break up of the 
Soviet Union. The time period between 1991 and 1993 was the period when Turkey had 
its closest relations in this region. In that period official and work visits occurred and 
several agreements on economic, scientific and technical cooperation were signed.  
 
Turkey was in a more advantageous position than any other country in the world 
in terms of integrating with the region and exploiting the potential of the region with its 
cultural closeness and familiarity of the language. However the Turkic Republics’ interest 
in Turkey gradually declined starting from the 1994s. One reason for their declining 
interest in Turkey is that the original expectations were not met. Winrow notes that 
“Turkey initially had made unrealistic promises and proposals by offering up to $3 billion 
in support to the Turkic states.”317 Turkey had given promises beyond its capacity. Also 
Turkey’s offer of economic success was questionable since Turkey had its own economic 
problems at home. In this context some scholars offered that these republics may have 
more to gain from the western industrialized nations in terms of economic development 
models and technical advice than they will gain from Turkey.318 Other than the West 
there are the industrializing nations of East Asia which also offer successful economic 
models. The Turkic leaders’ hiring of Korean economists serves as an example of their 
appreciation of the advantages offered by East Asian countries.  
  
 Actually given Turkey’s economic and political expectations it is not reasonable 
to expect Turkey to be a superpower like Russia. Moreover, given the problematic 
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domestic environments of the republics, not only Turkey but also none of the regional 
states has the resources to give full support to their economic development. Above 
everything, the republics need to seek solutions for poverty and turmoil prevailing in their 
territories.  
  
 The recent Turkish political atmosphere shows that it is more important for the 
AKP government to work for long term and stable relationships than to try to fulfill 
exaggerated expectations. The AKP government puts more emphasis on economic 
cooperation than cultural similarities. We can say that today Central Asian politics is less 
central to Turkey than before. But the question is at what level Turkey will maintain 
interest in the region in the future. Is Turkey likely to revive its initial enthusiasm towards 
the region or is Turkey going to be distracted by its busy foreign policy agenda?  
 
A number of points need to be considered before one can make a prediction. The 
future of Turkish foreign relations in the region will mainly be determined by the pipeline 
selected for oil and gas transportation from the Caspian Region. The crucial states, in this 
regard, are Kazakhstan with its oil reserves and Turkmenistan with its gas reserves. Will 
Turkey be able to transport natural gas from Turkmenistan or will Turkey be able to 
realize its Kazakh oil transportation project as a back up to the BTC pipeline?  
 
Also Turkey’s future politics will be affected by the actions that Azerbaijan and 
Armenia will take towards the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Will the 
Azeri and Armenian side be able to agree on a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
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conflict and normalize their relations? Turkey as the strongest ally of Azerbaijan is likely 
to support Azerbaijan fully while at the same time Ankara wants to improve its relations 
with Yerevan. It is unlikely to resolve this conflict until the Nagorno-Karabakh 
Armenians give up claiming their unapproved independence over the enclave and Azeris 
accept some limitations over the same territory. With a resolution to this conflict, Turkey 
will be able to strengthen its relations with Azerbaijan.  
 
Uzbekistan is criticized in the fields of human rights and democracy. The progress 
made in these fields will accelerate the development of Turkish-Uzbek relations. 
However Uzbekistan’s human rights records include serious violations of the right to 
freedom of religion, expression, association and assembly.319 Although Turkey shares 
Uzbekistan’s concerns about Uzbekistan’s security threats and supplies aid and military 
education to this country320, Uzbekistan’s weaknesses in the areas of democracy and 
human rights are likely to impede Turkish-Uzbek relations in the long term. Therefore it 
is important to answer the question of how and when Uzbekistan is going to ameliorate 
the domestic situation in human rights and democracy.  
 
Despite the risky business environment in Kyrgyzstan, Turkey is a key economic 
partner of Kyrgyzstan. Thus Kyrgyzstan wants to strengthen its relations with Turkey. 
The question is whether Turkey and Kyrgyzstan will be able to institutionalize their 
economic relations through a joint economic commission as both sides plan to form an 
economic cooperation organization.  
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 An 
important issue, which is raised by this study for future exploration, concerns identity. 
The regional countries are under the influence of different identities. As Ajdari and 
Kazemi mention “these countries borrowed several critical elements from three Islamic 
groups; religion from Arabs, administration and bureaucracy from the Persians, and 
military from the Turks.321” The question is whether each of the republics will preserve 
their own unique nationalities. Will they be a part of the Western system or a Russian 
system? 
 
 191
REFERENCES 
 
Ajdari, Zohreh and Farhad Kazemi. 1998. Ethnicity, Identity and Politics in 
Central Asia Meets the Middle East, ed. David Menashri. London: Frank Cass 
Publishing. 
 
 Akbarzadeh, Shahram. 2005. Uzbekistan and the United States: Authoritarianism, 
Islamism, and Washington’s Security Agenda. London: Zed Books. 
 
 Akkok, Fusun, Ayse Balci and Cennet E. Demir. 2000. The role of Turkish 
schools in the educational system and social transformation of Central Asian countries: 
the case of Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. Central Asian Survey, 19(1): 141-155 
 
Akturk, Sener. 2006. Turkish–Russian Relations after the Cold War (1992–2002). 
Turkish Studies 7(3): 337-64. 
 
Aras, Bülent. 2000. Turkey's policy in the former Soviet south: Assets and options. 
Turkish Studies, 1(1): 36 – 58 
 
_________. 2002. The New Geopolitics of Eurasia and Turkey’s Position. Frank 
Cass Publishing: London 
 
Aras,Bulent and George K. Foster. 2003. Turkey and the Azerbaijani Oil 
Controversies: Looking for a Light at the End of the Pipeline. Haifa: The 
 192
Interdisciplinary Center for the Study of Business, Law & Technology, available from 
http://meria.idc.ac.il/books/azerbaijan.htm 
 
Aydin, Mehmet. 2004. Foucault's Pendulum: Turkey in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. Turkish Studies, 5(2): 1-22. 
 
Bacik, Gokhan. 2001. The Blue Stream Project. Turkish Studies, 2(2): 85-93. 
 
Bal, Idris. 2000. Turkey’s Relations with the West and Turkic Republics. England: 
Ashgate Publishing 
 
 Bohr, Annette. 1998. Uzbekistan: Politics and Foreign Policy. London: Royal 
Institute of Internal Affairs 1998 
 
Cagaptay, Soner. 2006. Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: 
Who Is a Turk? London: New York Taylor & Francis Routledge. 
 
Chufrin, Gennady. 2001. The Security of the Caspian Region. Stockholm: 
International Peace Research Institute 
 
Cornell, Svante E. 1999. The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. Report no. 46. 
Department of East European Studies, Uppsala University, available from 
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/publications/1999_NK_Book.pdf  
 
 193
Foss, Clive. 2005. When Turks Civilized the World. History Today, 55(8). 
 
Dave,Bhavna. 2004. Entitlement through numbers: nationality and language 
categories in the first post-Soviet census of Kazakhstan. Nations and Nationalism, 10 (4): 
439–459. 
 
 Dikkaya, Mehmet and Ibrahim Keles. 2006. A case study of foreign direct 
investment in Kyrgyzstan. Central Asian Survey, 25(1-2):149-156. 
 
El Azayem, Gamal Abou and Zari Hedayat-Diba. 1994. The Psychological 
Aspects of Islam: Basic Principles of Islam and Their Psychological Corollary. 
International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, (4)1: 41-51  
 
Esposito, John L. 2002. What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam. Oxford, 
New York Oxford University Press. 
 
Fawn, Rick. 2003. Ideology and National Identity in Post-Communist Foreign 
Policies. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 19(3): 1-41  
 
Findley, Carter V. 2005. The Turks in World History. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Fuller, Graham E. 1998. The Impact of Central Asia on the New Middle East in 
 194
Central Asia Meets the Middle East, ed. David Menashri, London: Frank Cass 
Publishing. 
Gelb, Bernard A. and Terry R. Twyman. 2003. The Caspian Sea Region and 
Energy Resources. New York: Novinka Books. 
Goldman, Minton F. 2008. ed. Russia. Iowa: Mc Graw Hill 
 
 Gunn, T. Jeremy. 2003. Shaping an Islamic Identity: Religion, Islamism, and the 
State in Central Asia. Sociology of Religion, 4(3): 389-410. 
 
Hale, William.1998. Turkey and Transcaucasia in Central Asia Meets the Middle 
East, ed. David Menashri. London: Frank Cass Publishing. 
 
Hostler, Charles W.1957.Turkism and the Soviets: The Turks of the World and 
Their Political Objectives. London: Praeger Publications.  
 
Howard, Douglas A. 2001. The History of Turkey. Westport: Greenwood 
Publishing. 
 
Huskey, Eugene. 2003. National Identity from Scratch: Defining Kyrgyzstan’s 
Role in World Affairs. Journal of Communist Studies &Transition Politics. 19(3):111-
138. 
 
 195
Hyman, Mark A.2007.The First Mind-Body Medicine: Bringing Shamanism into 
the 21st Century. Alternative Therapies in Health and Medicine, 13(5):10-11. 
 
Jung, Dietrich and Wolfango Piccoli. 2001. Turkey at the Crossroads. 
London:Zed Books. 
 
Karaman, Erdal. 2007. Bagimsizlik Sonrasinda Turkiye Turkcesi’nden Azeri 
Turkcesi’ne Gecen Kelimeler (Words that have evolved in to the Azeri Turkish following 
the Azeri Independence). Akademik Arastirmalar Dergisi (Journal of Academic 
Research), 33: 178-201 
 
 Kendzior, Sarah. 2006. Redefining Religion: Uzbek Atheist Propaganda in 
Gorbachev-Era Uzbekistan. Nationalities Papers, 34(5):533-548 
 
Khalid, Adeeb. 1998. The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in 
Central Asia. Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
 
Kleveman, Lutz. 2003. The New Great Game. New York: Grove Press. 
 
Kramer, Heinz. 2000. A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the 
United States. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution 
 
Kocaturk, Utkan.1987. Atatürk's Thesis Concerning Central Asia as a Cradle of 
Civilisations. Ataturk Arastirma Merkezi Dergisi (Journal of Ataturk Research Center). 
9(3), available from http://www.atam.gov.tr/index.php?Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=18 
 196
 Larrabee, F. Stephen and Ian O. Lesser. 2003. Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age 
of Uncertainty. Santa Monica: Rand Publication 
 
Lawrence, Krader. 1966. Peoples of Central Asia. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Publication. 
 
Levin, Theodore. 1993. Musical Processes in Asia and Oceania. Yearbook for 
Traditional Music, 25:51-59 
 
London, Kurt.1965. The Making of Foreign Policy. New York: J.B.Lippincott 
Company. 
 
Maurais, Jacques and Michael A. Morris. 2003. Languages in a Globalizing 
World. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Menashri, David. 1998. Central Asia Meets the Middle East. London: Frank Cass 
Publishing. 
  
 Murinson, Alexander. 2006. The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign 
Policy. Middle Eastern Studies, 42(6): 945-64. 
 
Nachmani, Amikam. 2003. Turkey: Facing a New Millenium. New York: 
Manchester University Press. 
 
 197
Olcott, Martha Brill. 2005. Central Asia's Second Chance. Washington DC: 
Carneige Endowment for International Peace. 
 
Oliker, Olga and Thomas S. Szayna. 2003. ed. Faultlines of Conflict in the 
Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Pittsburgh: Rand Cooperation. 
 
Paksoy, Hasan B.1995. The Basmachi Movement from within: An Account of 
Zeki Velidi Togan. Nationalities Papers, 23(2):373-99.   
 
 Rashid, Ahmed.  2003.  Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia. New 
York: Penguin Books. 
 
Robins, Philip. 1998. Turkey’s Ostpolitik. In Central Asia Meets the Middle East, 
ed. David Menashri, London: Frank Cass Publishing. 
 
Rosenau, James N. 1969. Linkage Politics. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Rubin, Barry M. and Kemal Kirisci. 2001. Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging 
Multiregional Power. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 
Rustow, Dankwart A. 1959. The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic. 
World Politics, 11(4):513-52. 
 
 Sahin, Hulya. 2007. Ozbek Turkcesi ve Turkiye Turkcesindeki Atasozleri 
 198
Uzerinde Bir Karsilastirma Denemesi (A Trial of Comparing Turkish and Uzbek 
Proverbs). Akademik Arastirmalar Dergisi ( Journal of Academic Research), 31:189-196 
 
Sclhyter, Birgit N. 2005. Prospect for Democracy in Central Asia. Istanbul: 
Swedish Research Institute. 
 
 Sen, Mustafa. 2005. Turkish Islamist Entrepreneurs in Central Asia in Prospect 
for Democracy in Central Asia, ed. Birgit N. Schylter. Istanbul:Swedish Research 
Institute. 
 
Sezer, Duygu B. 2000. Turkish-Russian relations: The Challenges of Reconciling 
Geopolitical Competition with Economic Partnership. Turkish Studies, 1(1): 59-82. 
 
Soucek, Svatopluk. 2000. History of Inner Asia. New York: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Tachau, Frank. 1964. Language and Politics: Turkish Language Reform. The 
Review of Politics, 26(2): 191-204. 
 
 Tuna, Mustafa O. 2002. Gaspirali v. Il’Minskii: Two Identity Projects for the 
Muslims of the Russian Empire. Nationalities Papers, 30(2): 265-289. 
 
Uzer, Umut. 2002. Racism in Turkey: The Case of Huseyin Nihal Atsiz. Journal 
of Muslim Minority Affairs, 22(1): 119 – 130 
 
Winrow, Gareth. 1995. Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia. London: Royal 
 199
Institute of International Affairs. 
 
_____________. 2004. Turkey and the East-West Gas Transportation Corridor. 
Turkish Studies, 5(2):23-42. 
 
_____________. 2007. Geopolitics and Energy Security in the Wider Black Sea 
Region. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 7(2): 217-235. 
 
Yanik, Lerna. 2004. The Politics of Educational Exchange: Turkish Education in 
Eurasia. Europe-Asia Studies, 56(2): 293-307. 
 
 Yilmaz, Suhnaz. 1999. An Ottoman Warrior Abroad: Enver Paşa as An 
Expatriate. Middle Eastern Studies, 35(4): 40 – 69. 
 
 200
 
                                                 
NOTES  
1 London, Kurt. 1965. The Making of Foreign Policy. New York: J.B.Lippincott 
Company, 54. 
2 Ibid., 56. 
3 Rosenau, James N. 1969. Linkage Politics. New York: The Free Press, 45 
4 Ibid., 47. 
5 Ibid., 293.  
6 Ibid., 47. 
7 Kleveman, Lutz. 2003. The New Great Game. New York: Grove Press, 2. 
8 Findley, Carter V. 2005. The Turks in World History. New York: Oxford 
University Press, ix. 
9 Kandah, Adli. 1996. Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia, available from 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3955/is_n1_v48/ai_18105622, accessed January 
22, 2008. 
10 Djavadov, Maksud. Islamic State in Central Asia, available from 
http://www.islamawareness.net/CentralAsia/state.html#note, accessed January 22, 2008. 
11 Aras, Bulent. 2002. The New Geopolitics of Eurasia and Turkey’s Position. 
London: Frank Cass Publishing, 1. 
12 Akturk, Sener. 2006. Turkish–Russian Relations after the Cold War (1992–
2002). Turkish Studies, 7(3): 337-64, 337. 
13 Aydin, Mehmet. 2004. Foucault's Pendulum: Turkey in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. Turkish Studies, 5(2): 1-22, 1. 
 201
                                                                                                                                                 
14 Akkok, Fusun, Ayse Balci and Cennet E. Demir. 2000. The role of Turkish 
schools in the educational system and social transformation of Central Asian countries: 
the case of Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. Central Asian Survey, 19(1): 141–155, 142. 
 
15 Yanik, Lerna. 2004. The Politics of Educational Exchange: Turkish Education 
in Eurasia. Europe-Asia Studies, 56(2): 293-307.  
 16 Aras, Bulent and George K. Foster. Turkey and the Azerbaijani Oil 
Controversies: Looking for a Light at the End of the Pipeline, available from 
http://meria.idc.ac.il/books/azerbaijan.htm, accessed January 23, 2008. 
17Ibid. 
18 Bacik, Gokhan. 2001. Turkey and Pipeline Politics. Turkish Studies 7(2):293-
306, 293. 
 19 Findley, The Turks, 5. 
20 Orkhon. 2008. Columbia Encyclopedia, available from Columbia Encyclopedia 
Online at 
http://ucfproxy.fcla.edu/login?URL=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&
db=aph&AN=IXBOrkhon&site=ehost-live, accessed February 18, 2008. 
 21 Hostler, Charles W. 1957. Turkism and the Soviets: The Turks of the World and 
Their Political Objectives. London: Praeger Publications, 109. 
22 Tachau, Frank. 1964. Language and Politics: Turkish Language Reform. The 
Review of Politics, 26(2):191-204, 196. 
23 Kocaturk, Utkan. 1987. Atatürk's Thesis Concerning Central Asia as a Cradle 
 202
                                                                                                                                                 
of Civilisations. Ataturk Arastirma Merkezi Dergisi (Journal of Ataturk Research 
Center), 9(3), available from 
.http://www.atam.gov.tr/index.php?Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=18, accessed February 
17, 2008. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Khalid, Turkey in Post-Soviet,198. 
26 Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets, 120. 
27 Tuna, Mustafa. O. 2002. Gaspirali v. Il’Minskii: Two Identity Projects for the 
Muslims of the Russian Empire. Nationalities Papers. 30(2):265-289, 266-268. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Fisher, Alan W. 1998. A Model Leader for Asia, Ismail Gaspirali, available 
from http://www.iccrimea.org/gaspirali/fisher.html, accessed January 25, 2008. 
30 Bowman, Inci. Ismail Gaspirali, available from 
http://www.euronet.nl/users/sota/gaspirali.html, accessed January 25, 2008. 
31 Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets, 130. 
32 Ibid.,129. 
33 Fisher, Alan W. 1998. A Model Leader for Asia, Ismail Gaspirali, available 
from http://www.iccrimea.org/gaspirali/fisher.html, accessed January 25, 2008. 
34 Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets, p.130. 
35 Ibid,143.  
36 Ibid.,145.  
37 Ibid.,137. 
 203
                                                                                                                                                 
38 Yilmaz, Suhnaz. 1999. An Ottoman warrior abroad: Enver Paşa as an 
expatriate. Middle Eastern Studies, 35(4):40 – 69, 41. 
39 Ibid., 43. 
40 Rustow, Dankwart A. 1959. The Army and the Founding of the Turkish 
Republic. World Politics, 11(4):513-52, 517. 
41 Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets, 151. 
42 Yilmaz, An Ottoman warrior, 63. 
43 Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets,152-156. 
44 Ibid, 155.  
45 Ibid, 154.  
46 Ibid, 156.  
47 Yilmaz, An Ottoman warrior, 65. 
48 Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets, 175. 
49 Ibid, 178. 
50 Ibid, 180. 
51 Paksoy, Hasan B. 1995. The Basmachi Movement from within: an account of 
Zeki Velidi Togan. Nationalities Papers, 23(2): 373-99, available from  
http://net.lib.byu.edu/estu/wwi/comment/togan.html, accessed March 26, 2008 
52 Soucek, Svatopluk. 2000. History of Inner Asia. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 219.   
53 Foss, Clive. 2005. When Turks Civilized the World. History Today. 55(8), 
available from 
 204
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst;jsessionid=HYBNFh8h4Z2DdgnL7JJ7M4c1F
pJQ2NL9JXXhyhVyvqp31bwLdMg4!856897951?docId=5010923835, accessed January 
25, 2008. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Uzer, Umut. 2002. Racism in Turkey: The Case of Huseyin Nihal Atsiz. 
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 22(1): 119 – 130, 120. 
56 Ibid.  
57 Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets, 193.  
58 Ibid.  
59 Findley, The Turks,16.  
60 Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets, 6.  
61 Lawrence, Krader. 1966. Peoples of Central Asia. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Publication, 39. 
62 Karaman, Erdal. 2007. Bagimsizlik Sonrasinda Turkiye Turkcesi’nden Azeri 
Turkcesi’ne Gecen Kelimeler (Words that have evolved in to the Azeri Turkish following 
the Azeri Independence). Akademik Arastirmalar Dergisi (Journal of Academic 
Research). 33: 178-201, 181. 
63 Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets, 32. 
64 Karaman, Bagimsizlik Sonrasinda, 180. 
65 Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets, 62. 
66 Ibid, 63. 
67 Dave, Bhavna. 2004. Entitlement through numbers: nationality and language 
 205
                                                                                                                                                 
categories in the first post-Soviet census of Kazakhstan. Nations and Nationalism. 10 (4): 
439–459, 456. 
68 Levin, Theodore. 1993. Musical Processes in Asia and Oceania. Yearbook for 
Traditional Music. 25, 51-59. 
69 Sahin, Hulya. 2007. Ozbek Turkcesi ve Turkiye Turkcesindeki Atasozleri 
Uzerinde Bir Karsilastirma Denemesi (An Essay Of Comparison On Adages In Uzbek 
Turkish With Adages In Turkey Turkish). Akademik Arastirmalar Dergisi. 31. 189-196, 
192. 
70 Maurais, Jacques & Michael A. Morris. 2003. Languages in a Globalizing 
World. Cambridge: New York Cambridge University Press, 268. 
71Hyman, Mark.A. 2007. The First Mind-Body Medicine: Bringing Shamanism 
into the 21st Century. Alternative Therapies in Health and Medicine, 13(5):10-11, 10. 
72 Lawrence, Peoples of Central Asia, 132. 
73 Findley, The Turks, 15. 
74 Ibid., 69. 
75 Cagaptay, Soner. 2006. Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: 
Who Is a Turk? London: New York Taylor & Francis Routledge, 15. 
76 Esposito, John L. 2002. What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 46. 
77 Ibid.,45  
78 Ibid.  
79 Gunn, T. Jeremy. 2003. Shaping an Islamic Identity: Religion, Islamism, and 
 206
                                                                                                                                                 
the State in Central Asia. Sociology of Religion, 64(3):389-410, 390. 
80 Ibid., 406. 
81 Findley, The Turks , 225.  
82 Lawrence, Peoples of Central Asia, 137.  
83 Findley, The Turks, 18. 
84 Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets, 6. 
85 Gelb, Bernard. A. and Terry R. Twyman. 2003. The Caspian Sea Region and 
Energy Resources. New York: Novinka Books, 4. 
86 Winrow, Gareth. 1995. Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia. London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 33. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Aras, Bulent. 2000. Turkey's policy in the former Soviet south: Assets and 
options. Turkish Studies. 1(1):36 – 58, 42. 
90 Hale, William. 1998. Turkey and Transcaucasia in Central Asia Meets the 
Middle East, ed. David Menashri, London: Frank Cass Publishing, 152. 
91 Aras, Bulent. 2002. The New Geopolitics of Eurasia and Turkey’s Position. 
London: Frank Cass Publishing, 7.  
92 Energy Profile, Turkey. The Encyclopedia of Earth, available from The 
Encyclopedia of Earth Online at http://www.eoearth.org/article/Energy_profile_of_Turkey, 
accessed December 22, 2007 
93 Turkish Oil Consumption. The Global Oil and Gas Industry Articles, News and 
 207
                                                                                                                                                 
Blog Directory, available from http://www.oilgasarticles.com/articles/413/1/Turkish-Oil-
Consumption/Page1.html, accessed December 25, 2007 
94 Turkey. Energy Information Administration, available from 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Turkey, accessed February 16, 2008. 
95 Energy Profile. Turkey. The Encyclopedia of Earth, available from The 
Encyclopedia of Earth Online at http://www.eoearth.org/article/Energy_profile_of_Turkey, 
accessed December 22, 2007. 
96 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Project. BP Caspian, available from  
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=9006615&contentId=7014647, 
accessed January 02, 2007. 
97 Environmental and Social. BP Caspian, available from  
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=9006669&contentId=7014360, 
accessed January 02, 2007. 
98 New reports find BTC pipeline unsafe for Azeri citizens. Baku Ceyhan 
Campaign, available from http://www.bakuceyhan.org.uk/news.htm, accessed January 02, 
2007. 
99 Finding a New Route. The Website for the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry, 
available from http://www.offshore-technology.com/features/feature753/, accessed January 
02, 2007 
100 Energy Profile, Turkey. The Encyclopedia of Earth, available from The 
Encyclopedia of Earth Online at http://www.eoearth.org/article/Energy_profile_of_Turkey, 
accessed December 22, 2007. 
 208
                                                                                                                                                 
101 Energy Profile, Turkey. The Encyclopedia of Earth, available from The 
Encyclopedia of Earth Online at http://www.eoearth.org/article/Energy_profile_of_Turkey, 
accessed December 22, 2007. 
102 Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli, Overview. BP Caspian, available from 
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=9006667&contentId=7014330., accessed 
January 2, 2008. 
103 Caspian Business Report, available from 
http://ourworld.compuserve.com/HOMEPAGES/USAZERB/990228c.html, accessed 
January 2, 2008. 
104 Energy Profile, Turkey. The Encyclopedia of Earth, available from The 
Encyclopedia of Earth Online at http://www.eoearth.org/article/Energy_profile_of_Turkey, 
accessed December 22, 2007 
105 Shah Deniz Gas Flows to Turkey. BP Caspian, available from 
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=9006615&contentId=7034735, 
accessed January 6, 2008. 
106  Turkish-Azerbaijani Relations in 2003. Turkish Press, available from 
http://www.turkishpress.com/specials/2003/yir/azerbaijan.asp, accessed February 15, 
2008. 
107 Sayar, Zehra. E-mail communication with the Eximbank official, 10.30.2007 
108 The Republic of Kazakhstan Country Report. Turkish International 
Cooperation and Development Agency (TICA), available from 
http://www.tika.gov.tr/Dosyalar/Kazakistan.doc, accessed January 4,2008.  
 209
                                                                                                                                                 
109 The Major Economic Indicators of the Republic of Kazakhstan and Trade 
Between Turkey and Kazakhstan. Izmir Trade Chamber, available from 
http://www.izto.org.tr/NR/rdonlyres/9131C974-19A0-49C2-B2F1-
C8FBDA90A78C/9059/KAZAKISTAN2007EYLUL.pdf, accessed January 4,2008. 
110 Turkish-Kazakh Business Council. Dis Iliskiler Ekonomik Kurulu/Foreign 
Economic Relations Board (DEIK), available from 
http://www.deik.org.tr/Pages/TR/IK_AnaSayfa.aspx?IKID=30, accessed January 4, 2008. 
111 The Republic Of Kazakhstan, Country Report. Small and Medium Sized 
Industry Development Organization (KOSGEB), available from 
http://abmankara.org.tr/ulkeler/Kazakistan%20Ulke%20Raporu.doc, accessed March 1, 
2008. 
112 Monthly Energy Chronology. Energy Information Administration, available 
from http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/chrn1997.html, accessed January 3, 2008 
113 The Republic of Kyrgyzstan Country Report. KOSGEB, available from 
http://abmankara.org.tr/ulkeler/Kazakistan%20Ulke%20Raporu.doc, accessed February 
29, 2008.  
114 Kosok, Elif. E-mail communication with the Eximbank official, 10.31.2007 
115 Ozdenoglu, Selda. 2005. Kirgiz Cumhuriyeti (Kirghiz Republic), Ankara: 
TIKA, available from www.tika.gov.tr/Dosyalar/Kırgızistan.doc, accessed March 26, 
2008 
116 Dikkaya, Mehmet and Ibrahim Keles. 2006. A case study of foreign direct 
investment in Kyrgyzstan. Central Asian Survey, 25(1-2):149-156, 151. 
 210
                                                                                                                                                 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid., 152. 
119 Ibid., 154. 
120 Ibid. 
121 The Republic of Kyrgyzstan Country Report. KOSGEB, available from 
http://abmankara.org.tr/ulkeler/Kirgizistan%20Ulke%20Raporu.doc, accessed March 1, 
2008. 
122 Dikkaya, A Case Study, 152-155. 
123 Ibid., 154. 
124 Kosok, Elif. E-mail communication with the Eximbank official, 10.31.2007 
125 Energy Profile, Turkey. The Encyclopedia of Earth, available from The 
Encyclopedia of Earth Online at http://www.eoearth.org/article/Energy_profile_of_Turkey, 
December 30, 2007. 
126 Emerging Opportunities and Challenges in the Caspian, available from 
http://www.searchanddiscovery.net/documents/abstracts/2004/istanbul2000/extended/yigi
tguden.pdf, accessed March 1, 2008. 
127 Emerging Opportunities and Challenges in the Caspian, available from, 
http://www.searchanddiscovery.net/documents/abstracts/2004/istanbul2000/extended/yigi
tguden.pdf, accessed March 1, 2008. 
128 For more information see www.botas.gov.tr  
129 Energy Profile, Turkey. The Encyclopedia of Earth, available from The 
Encyclopedia of Earth Online at http://www.eoearth.org/article/Energy_profile_of_Turkey, 
 211
                                                                                                                                                 
accessed December 30, 2007. 
130 Turkish Daily News, February 16, 1996  
131 Aras, The New, 11. 
 132 International Market Research Reports, available from 
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/site/imr-ri.nsf/en/gr117701e.html, accessed December 30, 
2007. 
133 Yildiz, P. (2005). Turkmenistan Country Report. KOSGEB, available from 
abmankara.org.tr/ulkeler/Turkmenistan%20Ulke%20Raporu.doc, accessed December 30, 
2007.  
134 Yildiz, Pembe. (2005). Turkmenistan Country Report. KOSGEB, available 
from abmankara.org.tr/ulkeler/Turkmenistan%20Ulke%20Raporu.doc, accessed 
December 30, 2007. 
135 Kosok, Elif. E-mail communication with the Eximbank official, 10.31.2007 
136 Kosok, Elif. E-mail communication with the Eximbank official, 10.31.2007. 
137 Turkmenistan Country Report. KOSGEB, available from 
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/publications/GCA/GCAPUB-13.pdf, accessed 
March 11, 2007. 
138 Bayar, Funda. E-mail communication with the Eximbank official. 10.30.2007 
139 Chufrin, Gennady. 2001. The Security of the Caspian Region. Stockholm: 
International Peace Research Institute, 41. 
140 Olcott, Martha. B. 2005. Central Asia's Second Chance. Washington DC: 
Carneige Endowment for International Peace, 227. 
 212
                                                                                                                                                 
141 Bilateral Relations with Uzbekistan. DEIK, available from 
http://www.deik.org.tr/Pages/TR/IK_TicariIliskilerDetay.aspx?tiDetId=23&IKID=34, accessed 
January 6, 2008. 
142 Kaya, Kemal. Turkey. Silk Road Studies, available from 
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/publications/GCA/GCAPUB-13.pdf, accessed 
January 6, 2008.  
143 Bilateral Relations with Uzbekistan. DEIK, available from 
http://www.deik.org.tr/Pages/TR/IK_TicariIliskilerDetay.aspx?tiDetId=23&IKID=34, accessed 
January 6, 2008. 
144 Uzbekistan Country Profile. 2006. DEIK, for more information see 
www.dtm.gov.tr  
145 Kosok, Elif. E-mail communication with the Eximbank official. (Accessed  
10.31.2007) 
146 Aydin, Foucault's Pendulum, 2. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Azerbaijan. US Department of State, available from 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2909.html, accessed January 15, 2008. 
149 Bal, Idris. 2000. Turkey’s Relations with the West and Turkic Republics. 
England: Ashgate Publishing, 146. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ebulfez Elchibey, available from 
http://www.ulkuocaklari.org.tr/elcibey/ardyaz5.htm, accessed January 23, 2008. 
152 Bal, Turkey’s Relations, 81. 
 213
                                                                                                                                                 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid., 51.  
155 Ibid., 149. 
156 Fuller, Graham. E. 1993. From Eastern Europe to Western China: The 
Growing Role of Turkey in the World. California: RAND, 83. 
 157 The Coup of June 1993, available from  
http://countrystudies.us/azerbaijan/31.htm, accessed January 19, 2008. 
158 Larrabee, Stephen and Ian O. Lesser. 2003. Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age 
of Uncertainty. Santa Monica, California: RAND, 107.  
159 See Cornell, Svante. E. 1999. The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. Report no. 46. 
Department of East European Studies, Uppsala University for an extensive analysis of the 
conflict  
160 Menashri, David. 1998. Central Asia Meets the Middle East. London Frank 
Cass Publishing, 154. 
161 Ibid, 156 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Cornell, The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, 119. 
165 Menashri, Central Asia, 156. 
166 Rubin, Barry. M and Kemal Kirisci. 2001. Turkey in World Politics: An 
Emerging Multiregional Power. Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 176. 
167 Aras, Turkey's policy, 47. 
 214
                                                                                                                                                 
168 Blank, Stephen J., Stephen. C Pelletiere and William.T. Johnsen Turkey’s 
Strategic Position at the Crossroads of World Affairs, available from 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB178.pdf, accessed January 11, 2008. 
169 Larrabee, Turkish Foreign Policy, 107  
170 Ibid., 108. 
171 Aydin, Foucault's Pendulum, 10. 
172 Aydin, Mehmet. New Geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus Causes of 
Instability and Predicamen, available  from  
http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/sampapers/NewGeopoliticsofCentralAsiaandtheCauca
sus.pdf, accessed January 22, 2008 
173 Aydin, Foucault's Pendulum, 10. 
174 Winrow, Gareth. 2004. Turkey and the East-West Gas Transportation Corridor 
Turkish Studies. 5(2):23-42, 25. 
175 Aras, Bulent and George K. Foster. Turkey and Azerbaijani Oil Controversies: 
Looking for a Light at the End of the Pipeline, available from 
http://meria.idc.ac.il/books/azerbaijan.htm, accessed January 15, 2008 
176 Aras, Turkey's policy, 39. 
177 Ibid., 40. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid., 41. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid. 
 215
                                                                                                                                                 
182 Ibid., 42. 
183 Baku Ceyhan Campaign. New Report Find BTC Pipeline Unsafe for Azeri 
Citizens, available from http://www.bakuceyhan.org.uk/news.html, accessed January 2, 
2008. 
184 The Website for Oil and Gas Industry. Finding a New Route, available from  
http://www.offshore-technology.com/features/feature753/, accessed January 2, 2008 
185 Akkok, Fusun, Ayse Balci and Cennet E. Demir. 2000. The role of Turkish 
schools in the educational system and social transformation of Central Asian countries: 
the case of Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. Central Asian Survey. 19(1): 141-155, 142. 
186 TICA. Projects in Azerbaijan. available from 
http://www.tika.gov.tr/EN/Icerik.ASP?ID=326., accessed January 20, 2008 
187 Sen, Mustafa. 2005. Turkish Islamist Entrepreneurs in Central Asia in 
Prospect for Democracy in Central Asia, ed. Birgit N. Schylter. Istanbul:Swedish 
Research Institute., 253. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid., 257. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Ibid., 253. 
192 Bal, Turkey’s Relations, 91. 
193 Bal, 149. 
194 TICA.  Projects by Country: Azerbaijan. available from 
http://www.tika.gov.tr/TR/Icerik_Detay.ASP?Icerik=539., accessed January 25, 2008 
 216
                                                                                                                                                 
195 Bal, Turkey’s Relations, p.82 
196 Jung, Dietrich and Wolfango Piccoli. 2001. Turkey at the Crossroads. 
London:Zed Books, 185. 
197 The Turkish Republic PoliceAcademy. Relations Between Turkey and Turkic 
Republics, available from http://www.pa.edu.tr/tr/baskanlik/index.php?sayfa=14&id=2, 
accessed January 25, 2008. 
198 Bal, Turkey’s Relations, 91. 
199 TICA. Azerbaijan. available from 
http://www.tika.gov.tr/TR/Icerik_Detay.ASP?Icerik=213, accessed March 1, 2008 
200 Jung, Turkey at, 186. 
201 Bal, Turkey’s Relations, 150-153. 
202 Ibid., 155. 
203 Winrow, Turkey in Post-Soviet, 20. 
204 Bal, Turkey’s Relations, 155. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Ibid., 156. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Winrow, Turkey in Post-Soviet, 17.  
210 Bal, Turkey’s Relations, 159. 
211 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, available from 
www.mfa.kz/eng/index.php?base=3&article_id=31, accessed January 25, 2008. 
 217
                                                                                                                                                 
212 Goldman, Minton F. 2008. ed. Russia 11th ed: Mc Graw Hill, 246. 
213 Bal, Turkey’s Relations, 156. 
214 Ibid., 157. 
215 Larrabee, Turkish Foreign, 109. 
216 Ibid. 
217 TICA. Kazakhstan, available from 
http://www.tika.gov.tr/EN/Icerik.ASP?ID=326, accessed  01.28.2008. 
218 Bal, Turkey’s Relations, 156  
219 Ibid., 159. 
220 TICA. Projects in Kazakhstan. available from 
http://www.tika.gov.tr/EN/Icerik.ASP?ID=330, accessed 04.04.2008 
221 Robins, Philip.1998. Turkey’s Ostpolitik in Central Asia Meets the Middle 
East, ed. David Menashri, London: Frank Cass Publishing, 145. 
222 Jung, Turkey at , 185.   
223 Bal, Turkey’s Relations , 91. 
224 The Turkish Republic Police Academy. Relations Between Turkey and Turkic 
Republics, available from http://www.pa.edu.tr/tr/baskanlik/index.php?sayfa=14&id=2, 
accessed  12.01.2008. 
225 Bal, Turkey’s Relations, 161. 
226 Ibid. 
227 Ibid. 
228 Ibid., 164. 
 218
                                                                                                                                                 
229 Ibid. 
230 Goldman, Russia, 246.  
231 Cornell, Svante E. The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, available from 
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/publications/1999_NK_Book.pdf, accessed  
12.01.2008. 
232 Winrow, Turkey in, 18. 
233 Ibid. 
234 Fawn, Rick. 2003. Ideology and National Identity in Post-Communist Foreign 
Policies. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics. 19(3):1-41  
235 Huskey, Eugene. 2003. National Identity from Scratch: Defining Kyrgyzstan’s 
Role in World Affairs. Journal of Communist Studies & Transition Politics. 19(3):111-
138. 
236 Chufrin, The Security, 30. 
237 Ibid., 103. 
238 Hellenic Resources Network. Turkey and Kyrgyzstan Sign Military 
Cooperation Agreement, available from 
http://www.hri.org/news/turkey/anadolu/2000/00-06-16.anadolu.html, accessed on 
01.15.2008. 
239 Bal, Turkey’s Relations, 91. 
240 Ibid., 88  
241 Akkok, The Role, 142. 
242 Ibid.  
 219
                                                                                                                                                 
243 Ibid., 144. 
244 Ibid., 151 
245 Bal, Turkey’s Relations, 81 
246 Ibid., 91. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Ibid., 163. 
249 TICA. Projects in Kyrgyzstan, available from  
http://www.tika.gov.tr/EN/Icerik.ASP?ID=331, accessed 01.29.2008. 
250 The Turkish Republic Police Academy.  Relations between Turkey and Turkic 
Republics, available from http://www.pa.edu.tr/tr/baskanlik/index.php?sayfa=14&id=2, 
accessed 16.01.2008. 
251 Bal, Turkey’s Relations, 82 
252 Turkish Police Academy. Relations Between Turkey and the Turkic Republics, 
available from http://www.pa.edu.tr/tr/baskanlik/index.php?sayfa=14&id=3, accessed 
01.29.2008. 
253 Bal, Turkey’s Relations , 167. 
254 Ibid.  
255 Ibid., 81 
256 Ibid., 80 
257 London, The Making, 75. 
258 Kramer, Heinz. 2000. A Changing Turkey. Washington DC: The Brookings 
Institution, 109.    
 220
                                                                                                                                                 
259 Erginsoy, Ali. Are Turkey’s Caspian Relations Losing Energy?, available from 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav030801.shtml, accessed 
01.29.2008. 
260 Kramer, A Changing, 109-110. 
261 Botas. Trans-Caspian Turkmenistan-Turkey-Europe Natural Gas Pipeline 
Project, available from  
http://www.botas.gov.tr/eng/projects/allprojects/trans.asp, accessed 01.11.2008. 
262 Akkok, The Role, 142.   
263 Ibid. 144 
264 Bal, Turkey’s Relations, 173. 
265 Turkish Republic Police Academy. Relations Between Turkey and the Turkic 
Republics, available from  http://www.pa.edu.tr/tr/baskanlik/index.php?sayfa=14&id=2, 
accessed 01.01.2008. 
266 Bal, Turkey’s Relations, 176. 
267 Ibid., 177. 
268 Kubicek, Paul. 1997. Regionalism, Nationalism and Realpolitik in Central 
Asia, Europe-Asia Studies. 49(4):637-655, 649. 
269 Bohr, Annette. 1998. Uzbekistan: Politics and Foreign Policy. London : Royal 
Institute of Internal Affairs, 1. 
270 Bal, Turkey’s Relations, 80. 
271 Aras, Turkey's policy, 51. 
272 Menashri, Central Asia, 130.  
 221
                                                                                                                                                 
273 Rashid, Ahmed. 2003. Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia. New 
York: Penguin Books, 84. 
274 Akbarzadeh, Shahram. 2005. Uzbekistan and the United States: 
authoritarianism, Islamism, and Washington’s security agenda. London:Zed Books, 29. 
275 Tashkent Terrorists. available from 
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/apostolou200408020848.asp, accessed 
01.18.2008. 
276 Kleveman, Lutz. 2003. The New Great Game. New York: Grove Press, 172. 
277 Ibid.  
278 BBC News. Turkey and Uzbekistan Agree Military Cooperation. available 
from  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/975530.stm, accessed 10.02.2008.  
279 Larrabee, Turkish Foreign, 103.  
280 Human Rights Overview, Uzbekistan, available from 
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/13/uzbeki9895.htm, accessed 10.02.2008. 
281 Kanpolat, Hasan. Turkish Weekly, Turkish-Uzbek Relations in Their 16th Year, 
available from http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=48371, accessed 02.08.2008. 
282 Turkish Police Academy Administration, Relations Between Turkey and the 
Turkic Republics available from  
http://www.pa.edu.tr/tr/baskanlik/index.php?sayfa=14&id=3, accessed 
10.02.2008. 
283 Yanik, Lerna. 2004. The Politics, 294. 
284 Embassy of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Uzbeks’ Contribution to Islamic 
 222
                                                                                                                                                 
Culture, available from 
http://www.turkey.mfa.uz/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=23
27, accessed 01.19.2008.  
285 Kendzior, Sarah. 2006. Redefining Religion: Uzbek Atheist Propaganda in 
Gorbachev-Era Uzbekistan. Nationalities Papers, 34(5):533 – 548, 533. 
286 Merdanoglu, Suleyman. Dinin Verdigi Gorev ( The Mission that Religion 
Gives). Zaman, available from 
http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2002/09/04/yorumlar/yorum2.htm, accessed 01.18.2008. 
287 Kubicek, Regionalism, Nationalism, 642. 
288 Bal, Turkey’s Relations, 180. 
289 London, The Making,  p.259 
290 Fuller, Graham E. 1998. The Impact of Central Asia on the New Middle East 
in Central Asia Meets the Middle East, ed. David Menashri, London: Frank Cass 
Publishing, 1998, 221.  
291 Akturk, Sener. 2006. Turkish–Russian Relations after the Cold War (1992–
2002) Turkish Studies 7(3): 337-64, 338. 
292 Ajdari, Zohreh, and Farhad Kazemi. 1998. Ethnicity, Identity and Politics in 
Central Asia Meets the Middle East, ed. David Menashri, London: Frank Cass 
Publishing, 53. 
293 Bal, Turkey’s Relations, 161  
294 Aras, The New Geopolitics, 2. 
295 TICA. 1996. Turkmenistan Country Report, Ankara: TICA Publishing.  
 223
                                                                                                                                                 
296 London, The Making, 55.  
297 Ajdari, Ethnicity, Identity, 53. 
298 Oliker, Olga. 2003. Faultlines of Conflict in the Central Asia and the South 
Caucasus. Pittsburgh: Rand Cooperation, xix. 
299 Aras, Turkey's policy, 48. 
300 Yanik, The Politics, 294. 
301 Akkok, The role, 154. 
302 Ibid., 145. 
303 Ibid., 152. 
304 London, The Making, 259. 
305 Eurasia Insight. President Ponders Alphabet Change in Kazakhstan, available 
from http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav111706b.shtml, accessed 
02.03.2008. 
306 Kendzior, Redefining Religion, 533. 
307 Fuller, Graham E. 1998. The Impact of Central Asia on the New Middle East 
in Central Asia Meets the Middle East, ed. David Menashri, London: Frank Cass 
Publishing, 221.  
308 Ibid., 221. 
309 Ibid.  
310 Dikkaya, A Case Study, 153. 
311 Chufrin, The Security, 139.  
312 Akturk, Turkish-Russian Relations, 338. 
 224
                                                                                                                                                 
313 Hunter, Shireen T. 1996. Central Asia since Independence. Westport: Praeger 
Publishers, 157. 
314 Ibid. 
315 Ibid.  
316 Fuller, The Impact, 216.  
317 Winrow, Turkey in Post-Soviet, 32. 
318 Clawson, P. 1998. The Disintegration of the Soviet Union, in Central Asia 
Meets the Middle East, ed. David Menashri, London: Frank Cass Publishing, 209.  
319 Human Rights Overview, Uzbekistan, available from 
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/13/uzbeki9895.htm, accessed 02.08.2008. 
320 Turkish Weekly, Turkish-Uzbek Relations in Their 16th Year, available from 
http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=48371, accessed 02.08.2008.  
321 Ajdari, Ethnicity, Identity, 52. 
 
 
